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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between technological change and 
spatial industrial restructuring through a case study of the 1840-1880 British ocean­
going iron and steam shipbuilding industry. The study tests the hypothesis that a 
shipbuilding center's share of the national British shipbuilding market was associated 
with its ability to generate or rapidly adopt technological change.
The study begins by establishing iron steamship technological changes introduced 
by British shipbuilders and the industry's attendant spatial restructuring. It then develops 
two site-specific variables: industrial viability and innovative ability. Data for both 
variables are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping. The 
industrial viability variable ranks each shipbuilding center's annual share of the total 
national shipbuilding market in terms of its being a high, medium or low market share 
center. Innovative ability establishes each center’s level of technological sophistication, 
in terms of either a technological leader or laggard, based on significant component 
technologies. These technologies are identified through a series of multiple regression 
models which, in addition to identifying significant technologies, allow for the testing of 
key assumptions in the historical literature regarding 1840-1880 British iron steamship 
technological change.
The relationship is assessed by testing for a statistical association between the 
industrial viability and innovative ability rankings using contingency tables in conjunction
x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with the chi-square statistic. Additional analysis includes measurement of the strength 
and direct of the association and identification and assessment of individual table cells 
that make significant contributions to the overall chi-square statistic.
The results demonstrate that industrial viability and innovative ability were 
associated. Further, the association was positive, although weak to moderate, indicating 
that innovative ability, while important, was not a precondition for an 1840-1880 
shipbuilding center’s industrial viability. Also, small shipbuilding centers that produced 
small, technologically lagging ships for the British coastal trade made a significant 
contribution to the association. These findings suggest that other considerations, such as 
access to markets, initial advantages, and factor inputs were as important as innovative 
ability in explaining the industry's spatial restructuring.
xi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The spatial industrial structure of the United States and other industrialized
countries is undergoing significant changes. This restructuring process is characterized
by the shift of manufacturing activity from established industrial core regions to new,
formerly peripheral regions. Regional economists argue that these shifts are caused by
the peripheral regions' greater capacity for generating or adopting new products and
production processes, or technological changes. Following their lead, local economic
development agencies have implemented industrial recruitment policies that attempt to
attract what are perceived to be innovative firms and industries. These firms and
✓
industries, in turn, will serve as growth poles in attracting related support industries and 
other innovative firms.
Such policies implicitly assume that the more innovative an industrial center is, 
then the greater will be its regional and, by extension, local economic viability. While 
economic geographers have examined this restructuring process, they have not directly 
investigated the relationship between innovation and local economic viability. Two 
reasons for this can be identified: first, economic geographers do not examine 
technological change directly; and, second, they conduct their research at regional or 
national scales that obscure the performance of individual places.
1
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This dissertation assesses the impact of technological change on industrial 
locational viability by examining the relationship between innovation and place. This is 
accomplished through a case study of the 1840-1880 British deep-water iron and steam 
shipbuilding industry. During this period, British shipbuilders perfected iron ship 
construction and steam propulsion, developments which, according to British 
shipbuilding historians, also rearranged the industry's spatial structure. Obviously, 
industrial restructuring is a complex process and many different conditions and forces 
interact to result in the emergence of new places. This study recognizes this complexity 
from the outset but, still, will focus on the importance of technological innovation in this 
process.
This study hypothesizes that innovative shipbuilding centers enjoyed a 
competitive advantage over non-innovative shipbuilding centers. The hypothesis is 
tested by: a) assessing each shipbuilding center's annual market share of production to 
establish its industrial viability; b) using the independent variables derived from multiple 
regression analysis to rank the innovative ability of individual shipbuilding centers, in 
terms of technological leaders or laggards, for each year they were in production; and c) 
exploring the association between established levels of industrial viability and innovative 
ability through the generation of contingency tables used in conjunction with the chi- 
square statistic.
This study makes two contributions to the sub-discipline of economic geography. 
First, it presents a dynamic analytical framework that investigates spatial industrial 
restructuring induced by technological change using actual changes in technologies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rather than changes in employment or other intermediate measures. Second, it 
reincorporates the individual industrial center, the level most effected by these changes, 
into studies o f regional and national restructuring.
1. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING
One consequence of the spatial restructuring process over the past thirty years 
has been the decline of manufacturing activity in traditional industrial regions coupled 
with manufacturing growth in formerly peripheral regions (hUallachain, 1990; Wijers,
1985). Using the United States as an example, industrial restructuring has been 
characterized by the migration of manufacturing employment out of the old 
Manufacturing Core and into the southern tier of US states, the Sunbelt, if not out of the 
country altogether (Berry, Conkling, &nd Ray, 1997; Hanink, 1993; Johnson, 1989; 
Rees and Stafford, 1979; Souza and Stutz, 1994; Weinstein, Gross, and Rees, 1985).
Many regional development specialists argue that the spatial restructuring 
process has been caused by the failure of the traditional manufacturing core regions to 
generate, or rapidly adopt, technological change. According to this explanation, the 
traditional manufacturing regions once served as innovation seed-beds, areas from which 
product and process innovations, technological changes, originated and then diffused to 
peripheral regions (Rees, 1979; Norton and Rees, 1979). These regions, simply put, are 
no longer competitive with the periphery because they do not generate or adopt 
technological changes at the same rate as do industries in the emerging growth regions 
(Wijers, 1985; Bailey and Chakrabarti, 1988).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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This interpretation follows from economists who argue that scientific advance 
and technical change are necessary prerequisites for economic growth (Rothwell and 
Zegveld, 1981). Based on the works of Schumpeter (1935) and Kuznets (1930), these 
economists define technological change as the process of invention, innovation, and 
diffusion (or imitation) which brings about productivity growth. Technology is 
considered to incorporate physical tools and social processes, as well as the changes in 
these tools and processes—technological change—which bring about productivity growth. 
Productivity growth improves production efficiencies which, in turn, leads back to 
greater increases in productivity growth (Berry, Conkling and Ray, 1997; Link, 1987).
Based on this interpretation, regional scientists and economic geographers, 
especially the regional development specialists Hamilton and Linge (1983), argue that 
technical innovation is the source of economic growth and regional economic change. 
Following this line of reasoning, regional planners have implemented industrial 
development policies that attract innovative industries. These development strategies, 
which are referred to as innovation-oriented as opposed to growth-oriented (Stohr,
1986), attempt to attract industries with higher than average rates of technological 
change. Once these innovative industries are in place, they foster agglomeration through 
backward and forward linkages, thus promoting industrial competitiveness and 
stabilizing regional employment (Fusi, 1990; Sweeney, 1987; Tsongas, 1981).
The implicit assumption behind these policies is that there is a direct and positive 
relationship between technological change and a production center's continued industrial 
viability. Unfortunately, neither the nature nor extent of the relationship between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
innovation and place has been appropriately tested. This lack is especially glaring in the 
sub-discipline of economic geography, which is 01-equipped to address issues of 
technological change-induced spatial restructuring because of methodological limitations 
and problems associated with specifying models o f technological change. These 
difficulties are further complicated by issues of scale and theoretical constraints.
In the first instance, geographers make no attempt to examine directly 
technological change. By invoking the economist's black box, geographers equate 
innovation with a product's perceived degree of technical sophistication (Delaney, 1993), 
the number of patents granted to individual firms (Ceh, 1997), or an industry’s rate of 
employment growth (Barkley, 1988; Norton and Rees, 1979). Unfortunately, these 
approaches serve as surrogate measures and do not actually measure technological 
change. The second problem with current geographical analyses o f technological change 
concerns issues of scale and theory. Neo-classical industrial location theory, because of 
its concern with locationally-specific factors, would seem to provide a suitable analytical 
framework (Smith, 1980; and Rees and Stafford, 1986). However, its analytical 
techniques hold technology constant, effectively eliminating consideration of 
technological change. Structuralist industrial location theory, despite its concern with 
the dynamics of change within larger economic spatial systems (Massey, 1979a and 
1979b; Massey and Meegan, 1979), precludes consideration of specific industrial 
centers and technological change across actual places and time.
Hie technological change induced spatial restructuring process can not be 
understood until the relationship between technological change and the competitive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ability of particular places is clarified. The question that needs to be examined, then, is
whether or not the individual production center’s ability to generate or rapidly assimilate
new products or production processes enhances that center's ability to compete
successfully with other production centers. Answering this question requires an
analytical framework that, first, develops a method to measure technological change at
individual production centers and, second, relates this measure to the changes in the
market share of these centers within the context of larger spatial industrial systems.
2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
BRITISH IRON AND STEAM SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
This dissertation investigates the relationship between innovation and place
through a case study of the spatial restructuring of the 1840-1880 British iron and steam
shipbuilding industry. This industry and time period have been selected for study for
three reasons. First, shipbuilding analysts consider technological change to be both the
initiator ofi and a key determinant in, this industry’s periodic relocations (Harrison, 1983;
Todd, 1985). Second, between 1840 and 1880, British shipbuilders perfected iron ship
construction and marine steam propulsion and, in so doing, revolutionized ocean
transport (Gilfillan, 1935). Third, and more importantly from a geographical
perspective, the new ship technology relaxed the industry’s traditional locational
constraints and altered the industry’s spatial structure from the national to inter-regional
geographic scales (Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
hi the late 1830s, British shipbuilders introduced iron construction and steam
propulsion into ocean-going ships. The new ship technologies were then perfected
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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during a forty year innovation cycle that lasted until 1880, when steel construction and 
the quadruple expansion steam engine initiated a new cycle (Brock and Greenhill, 1973; 
Rowland, 1971;Waine, 1976; Abell, 1981). As early as 1872. Britain dominated the 
global iron-steamship market and, despite the fact that other national shipbuilding 
industries were clearly capable of building iron steamships, its dominance remained 
unchallenged until 1918 (Jones, 1957; Pollard, 1957; Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
2.1. Iron and Steam Shipbuilding Technological Change
Shipbuilding historians argue that Britain's early lead in the development of the 
iron steamship was a result of the nation's early start in the industrial revolution. The 
superiority of the British iron and mechanical-engineering industries conferred 
comparative advantages in these technologies and, with the growth of the nation's 
merchant marine, created demand and supply feedback loops between the shipbuilding, 
shipping, iron and steel, and mechanical-engineering industries. Innovations in each of 
these industries dramatically raised the technical efficiency and economic productivity of 
the ship and accelerated the innovation process (Gilfillan, 1935; Thornton, 1959; Hughes 
and Reiter, 1958; and Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
Iron was introduced as a shipbuilding material in the late eighteenth century. 
Experiments with iron shipbuilding were stimulated by increasing difficulties in obtaining 
suitable timber for ships combined with declining iron prices created by technological 
changes within the iron industry. As shipbuilders gained experience with the new 
material, iron proved to be both stronger and more weight-efficient than wood. Coupled 
with new hull forms and new ship designs made possible by iron construction techniques,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ships became ever larger and more cargo efficient throughout the study period. By 
1880, when the industry began to replace iron with stronger and lighter steeL, modem 
construction systems, hull forms, and ship designs were in place.
Although experiments with steam propulsion occurred simultaneously in both 
Britain and the United States, British shipbuilders were installing steam engines in iron 
hulls by the early 1820s. and iron steamships successfully crossed the Atlantic Ocean 
under continuous steam power in 1838. These ships demonstrated the practicality of the 
new ship technology as an ocean-going cargo carrier. A series of improved engine 
designs, steam boilers and condensers, and propulsion systems was introduced and 
improved upon over the next forty years. The marine steam propulsion systems in place 
by 1880 remained the industry standard until the introduction of the marine diesel engine 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.
2.1.1. Ship Changes
By 1850, the new ship technologies had been accepted by the shipping industry, 
and by 1872 the British iron steamship was the accepted world standard. Innovations 
between 1840 and 1880 were directed toward increasing ship size and power. By 1880, 
when steel construction and the multiple expansion engine introduced a new innovation 
cycle, modem ship construction techniques, propulsion systems, and ship designs were 
essentially established (Jones, 1957; Musson, 1978; Pollard and Robinson, 1979; 
Whitehurst, 1986).
These changes can be seen in the following illustrations which document the 
evolution of the iron and screw steamship during the study period. Figure I-1 shows the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Great Britain, built in Bristol. England and launched in 1843. This ship, 289 feet long 
and 50 feet wide, was the largest ship built up to that time. It was also one of the first 
iron and screw-propelled liners designed to carry passengers, mail, and high value freight 
between Europe and North America (Rowland, 1970; Gilfillan. 1935; Cunningham, 
1903). As indicated by the lines of the bow and stem, the ship was designed like a 
wooden sailing ship, and its six rigged masts demonstrate its capability to raise sail in 
case of engine break-down or to conserve coal if favorable winds allowed.
By 1879, the packet liner had evolved into the Pacific and Oriental Line's Oriental 
(Figure 1-2), the largest and most powerful ship o f her day. Differences between this 
ship and the Great Britain are striking. Most apparent is the Oriental’s greater size, 
made possibleby advances in both iron construction and marine steam engine 
technology. Also, the fewer number of masts and minimal rigging indicate that sails 
could be raised in an emergency to maintain headway, but the arrangement of the masts 
and rigging reflect their primary use as cargo booms.
Although less romantic than the great packet liners, the contribution of small 
coastal steamers and colliers to the new ship's acceptance by the shipping industry was 
even more significant (Hughes and Reiter, 1958). The ship in Figure 1-3 is a traditional 
wood and sail collier, built on the English North East Coast to haul coal from the 
region’s coal fields to London and northern European ports (Abell, 1981; Waine, 1976). 
These ships had two drawbacks: first, they could not sail against contrary winds and 
tides; and second, they had to make their return voyage in ballast. The first iron and 
steam collier, similar to that in Figure 1-4, was the John Bowes built by Palmers of
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Early Iron and Steam Collier, circa 1852
Source: Walne, 1976.
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Figure 1-4: Early Iron and Steam Collier
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Newcastle in 1852. Use of the steam engine meant that cargo ships were no longer 
forced to stay in port because of contrary winds and tides. Iron construction, in addition 
to permitting larger ships, allowed for the fitting of water ballast tanks for stabilizing the 
ship's trim when sailing without a cargo. Both changes meant that the same ship could 
make many more voyages per year and that those voyages could be scheduled, which 
revolutionized both the collier and coasting trades (Abell, 1981; Dougan, 1968; Waine. 
1976).
By 1880, the coastal steamer had evolved into the tramp steamer, shown in 
Figure 1-5. This particular ship, though built in 1890, is representative of circa-1880 
coaster/colliers and incorporates such modem features as cut down rigging and a raised 
quarterdeck. These features are characteristic o f modem ocean-going cargo ships.
Their appearance by this date illustrates both the greater reliability and power of the 
1880 marine steam engine compared to that of 1840, and the fact that modem ocean­
going cargo carriers evolved during the 1840-1880 period.
2.2. Spatial Change in British Shipbuilding
One practical effect of the adoption of the iron steamship was that it completely 
altered the spatial structure of the British shipbuilding industry. Before 1840, 
shipbuilding was constrained to locations with suitable river-ffontage and proximity to 
raw materials and markets. These constraints favored rivers in the south of England, 
with the largest concentration of shipbuilding firms and shipyards found on the rivers 
Thames and Solent (Figure 1-6). Tools and equipment were negligible, construction 
methods primitive, and little capital was required for entry. As a result, the industry was
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Figure 1-6: British Shipbuilding Regions, 1840-1880
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made up of a large number of highly competitive, small-scale producers characterized by 
relatively easy entry and exit (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
After 1850, when iron replaced wood, the industry’s scale and complexity 
changed. As ships got larger, the construction process became more complicated and 
required more space and capital. Shipbuilding shifted from an industry o f small 
handicraft firms to large, highly capitalized firms with large labor forces o f semi-skilled 
machine workers, laborers, and craftsmen using complex power tools. Not only did the 
scale and complexity change, but shipbuilding activity experienced a profound spatial re­
orientation toward the iron and mechanical-engineering industries located on northern 
rivers: the most famous being the Clyde; and the Tyne, the Wear, and the Dees on the 
English North East Coast.
The growth of Scotland's Clyde-side industry (Figure 1-6) has been attributed to 
the joint ventures of shipowners and boiler makers. On the Clyde, many shipbuilders 
began their careers as boilermakers and continued to rely on spatial proximity and 
industrial linkages with iron manufacturers and mechanical engineers. From the outset, 
the Clyde region's shipbuilders drew upon the external economies associated with the 
region's iron, mechanical-engineering, and shipping industries to develop reputations for 
highly efficient marine steam engines, boilers, and propulsion machinery (Bremner, 1969; 
Robb, 1958; Tumock, 1982; and Walker, 1984).
England's Northeast Coast was already an established wooden shipbuilding 
region, but a new market for colliers and other bulk cargo vessels gave the region's 
industry new life. The new iron and mechanical-engineering industry formed the nucleus
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around which the iron and steam shipbuilding industry developed (Waine, 1976). 
Although the first iron steamship was not built until 1850, the region's shipbuilding 
enterprises established solid reputations for their screw propulsion systems, cargo ship 
designs, and marine engines (Pollard and Robinson, 1979; Dougan. 1968; Smith and 
Holden, 1953).
The standard explanation for the growth of the British shipbuilding industry and 
shipbuilding centers implies a positive relationship between technological change and 
industrial locational viability. This interpretation, while intuitively appealing, is also 
misleading because it is based on interpretations of the post-1880 performance of the 
national shipbuilding industry and dominant post-1880 shipbuilding centers. All British 
shipbuilding centers did not, in fact, benefit from the new technologies. For example, 
London and Liverpool (Figure 1-6) were routinely recognized as the dominant centers in 
the traditional wood and sad-based shipbuilding industry, but these centers did not 
survive the 1840-1880 period. Both cities, however, developed reputations as 
innovative iron and steam shipbuilding centers: London enjoyed a reputation for her 
innovative marine engineers and naval architects and pioneered twin-screw propulsion 
systems and machined boiler and engine parts. Liverpool's reputation was based on fast 
paddle steamers while Birkenhead, across the Mersey from Liverpool, was known for 
innovative warships. But, despite their renown, these cities declined in terms of gross 
production and market share during the 1840-1880 period because o f factors unrelated 
to innovation, such as high labor costs, congestion, and a lack of cheap and readily
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accessible iron supplies (Banbury, 1971; Pollard. 1950; and Pollard and Robinson,
1979).
The fortunes of these British shipbuilding centers and regions reveal two 
contradictions in the assumptions that link technological change and place. First, as the 
London and Liverpool industries demonstrate, innovative ability need not necessarily 
guarantee industrial viability. Second, local industrial changes are caused by the net 
effects of growth and decline within a spatial system's individual production centers.
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
One of the purposes of this study is to introduce an analytical framework that 
reconciles the consideration of structure and place in industrial locational analysis. As 
the above overview indicates, both economic structure and locationally specific attributes 
of particular centers operated to reconfigure the British shipbuilding industrial landscape: 
nineteenth-century technological changes were both introduced by shipbuilders and 
imposed on them by changes in world shipbuilding and related industries. What is 
needed, therefore, is an analytical framework which evaluates the effects of technological 
change on locational viability using both Structuralist and neo-classical techniques. 
Although these two theories are often presented as antithetical, spatial restructuring over 
time and space is the culmination of changes initiated at and imposed upon each and 
every location within an industrial system. Therefore, their apparent conflicts may be 
circumvented if analysis is conducted at multiple scales.
This study treats innovative ability as a locationally specific capacity for 
generating or rapidly assimilating innovations, while industrial viability specifically refers
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to a center's growth or stability, in terms of share of total gross tonnage output vis-a-vis 
the larger industrial system. The large scale-factors of time—the technological cycle—and 
space—the individual components of the industrial system—form the framework within 
which the locationally-specific variables of innovative ability and industrial viability are 
positioned. This framework allows for analysis of the technological performance of any 
center within the industrial system at any time during the technological cycle.
This study is not concerned directly with steamship productivity or efficiency 
gains associated with technological change. Rather h assumes that innovation and 
adoption are a response to efficiency and productivity gains and that their continued use 
in the modem merchant ship sufficiently establishes the case for their superiority. Nor is 
the study concerned with the original rationale for adopting these technological changes: 
it is assumed that each shipbuilder’s decision to adopt a particular technology reflects a 
rational assessment of the prevailing economic situation, both within the shipyard and the 
industry as a whole.
4. METHODOLOGY
The relationship between technological change and locational viability is assessed 
by testing the hypothesis of a positive association between a British shipbuilding center's 
industrial viability and its innovative ability. Functionally, industrial viability is defined as 
a center’s annual market share of total national shipbuilding output, while innovative 
ability is defined as a shipbuilding center's role as a technological leader or laggard.
The test o f this hypothesis requires three steps. First, the industrial viability of 
each individual shipbuilding center for each year it was in production is determined by
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calculating its share of total national output for that year. The data on shipbuilding 
output are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping The 
Register is an annually published listing, beginning in 1834, of all ships inspected and 
certified by its ship surveyors. Once the individual ship data for each firm are aggregated 
by center, each production center's annual output is categorized as either a high, 
medium, or low production center. Based as it is on total annual tonnage output, this 
ranking reflects the center's competitiveness within its industrial system for each year that 
the center contributed a ship to the Register.
The second step establishes the innovative ability of each center through the 
derivation of a synthetic measure o f component technologies which differentiates 
technologically leading and lagging iron steamships. This is accomplished in the 
following manner. First, a series o f multiple regression models, one for each o f four 
shipbuilding cycles, are specified to identify significant component iron steamship 
technologies (independent variables) that contributed to a ship's register tonnage (the 
dependent variable). Next, the significant set of component technologies for each ship 
are ranked and assigned a value ranging from one (lowest) to five (highest), based on the 
range of values for each variable. Each value is then summed to develop a score of each 
ship's level of technological sophistication. Finally, each center's annual status as 
technological leader or laggard is established by summing the score for each ship built at 
the center during a given year and assigning centers with scores above the mean to the 
rank of high (technological leader) and below the mean to the low rank (technological 
laggard). The data are obtained from the Register
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The last step in this analysis connects the industrial viability and innovative ability 
measures to investigate the relationship between innovation and place. The test is 
carried out using contingency tables in conjunction with a chi-square test statistic. Each 
center's industrial viability and innovative ability rankings are combined to produce four 
three-by-two contingency tables, one for each shipbuilding cycle. The chi-square 
statistic is then calculated to test for the presence of an association between innovation 
and place.
5. CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH
Changes in regional US manufacturing employment have raised concerns over an 
apparent lack of innovative ability in the world's industrial countries and the effects of 
this lack on the economic viability of established industrial centers and regions. These 
concerns are based on the implicit assumption that industrial viability is related to 
innovative ability, or the ability to generate or rapidly adopt technological change. At 
the same time, the literature on technological change, capitalist growth, and spatial 
industrial restructuring, all of which attempt to examine technological change, ultimately 
fail to examine this relationship because it does not deal realistically with the spatial 
aspects of the restructuring process. Instead, this literature often obscures our 
understanding of the impact of technological change on the individual production center 
because it obscures the interaction between structure and place. Hopefully, this 
analytical framework will provide us with greater insight into the problems facing 
production centers during periods of technologically-induced spatial industrial
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restructuring and help in the formulation of strategies that anticipate, rather than react, to 
change.
This study of the relationship between innovative ability and locational viability 
operates at two levels. First, it presents an analytical framework which reconciles the 
broad macro-scale concerns o f the new economic development theories with the place- 
specific focus of the more traditional regional scientists. This framework is presented in 
a locational analysis of the technological change-induced spatial industrial restructuring 
that accompanied British development of the iron steamship which tests the assumption 
that locational viability is dependent upon a location's innovative ability. Understanding 
this relationship is fundamental to understanding not only the nineteenth-century 
restructuring of the British ocean-going iron and steam shipbuilding industry, but the 
spatial shifts in industrial activity occurring today.
At a broader level, this study seeks to incorporate place into considerations of 
spatial industrial restructuring. Although the current round of industrial restructuring 
has raised the issue of innovation and industrial viability, concern over theoretical issues 
has obscured the relevance of place in economic geographical analysis. While 
geographers have examined the relationship between technological change and industrial 
regions, few have examined the relationship between innovative ability and the individual 
production center—the place where innovations emerge and where spatial changes are 
most directly felt. In short, this study seeks to understand the interplay of structural and 
locational forces. This "squaring o f the theoretical circle" is needed if more realistic
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models of the spatial restructuring process and more effective locational analytical 
techniques are to be developed.
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CHAPTER n
LITERATURE REVIEW
The previous chapter introduced the argument that current studies of technological 
change-induced spatial industrial restructuring are inadequate because they fail to 
explicitly examine an important underlying assumption. This assumption is that the 
greater an industrial center or region's ability to initiate or rapidly assimilate innovations, 
then the greater its economic viability which translates directly as success in the market. 
Further, two reasons for this shortcoming were provided: First, economic geographers do 
not directly measure technological change; and, Second, they have not related 
technological change to the viability of individual production centers.
This chapter extends this argument through a review of the technological change 
literature which directly informs this research effort. This literature intersects the fields of 
economics, economic history, and economic geography. It begins by defining 
technological change and discusses the ground breaking work of two economists, Simon 
Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter. These scholars have had a profound influence on the 
understanding and analysis of technological change and its relationship to economic 
growth. Indeed, their work has framed scholarly research into technological change and 
economic growth for much o f the past sixty years. Next, the chapter examines the 
historical and historical-economic literatures on technological change in mid- to late- 
nineteenth century British shipbuilding and the industry's spatial restructuring. Finally, it
25
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surveys the literatures of regional science and economic geography that deal with 
theoretical, analytical, and methodological issues associated with technological change and 
the spatial analysis o f the effects of technology on industrial location.
1. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This chapter will first define technological change and examine the contributions of 
the two individuals who have made the greatest contribution to research in technological 
change and economic growth. It begins by precisely establishing what is meant by 
technological change and the related concepts of invention and innovation. It then 
discusses the work o f Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter, the two scholars who have 
provided the greatest insights into the relationship between technological change and 
economic growth. Their contributions are then contrasted in order to demonstrate how 
their views have influenced the analysis of technological and spatial economic change.
1.1. Definitions and Concepts
Technology is written or unwritten human knowledge applied in production 
(Rossegar, 1986) and is the physical representation of that knowledge manifested by either 
physical tools or social processes (Link, 1987). Usher (1954) viewed technology as being 
the result of an innovation, and an innovation as the result of an invention (the emergence 
of "new things" requiring "act of insight” going beyond the exercise o f technical or 
professional skills). Accordingly, Mansfield (1968) regarded technological change as the 
advance of technology, often taking the form of new methods for producing existing 
products; new product designs with important new characteristics; and new techniques of 
organization, marketing and management. These technological advances bring about
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productivity growth, which improves production efficiency, which in turn leads back to 
higher productivity growth (Link, 1987).
1.2. Kuznets and Schumpeter on Technological Change
Although the classical economists, from Smith to Marx, recognized the importance 
of technological change, interest in the subject languished among economists until the 
1930s. During this decade, two economists. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter, 
began work that has profoundly influenced scholars interested in technological change and 
spatial economic growth and change. Both individuals considered technological change to 
be the primary cause of economic growth, and both identified technological change as the 
primary cause o f regular, periodic cycles of economic growth and decline.
1.2.1. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter
Simon Kuznets (1930, 1940, 1962) and Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1950) both 
argued that ceaseless change was the dominant characteristic of the modem economic 
system and that technological change was its primary cause. Both also argued that neo­
classical analytical methods incorporating assumptions o f stable systems, or equilibrium 
conditions, were unsuited to examine this change.
Kuznets believed that regional and national disparities in economic growth rates 
were caused by differential rates of growth among industries. These disparities were due 
to the positive effects of technological changes on a succession o f leading industries 
coupled with the impediments to growth created by older industries for which the greatest 
benefits of technological advance had been realized. Technological change is realized 
within an industry following the introduction of an invention. The invention is
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endogenous to the industry but stimulated by population growth or demand. The industry 
experiences rapid growth as the original invention is perfected through a continuous 
process of innovation. However, vigorous expansion eventually slows because the rate of 
technical progress slackens; slower growing industries retard faster growing, but 
complementary, industries; the relative amount of funds available for expansion decrease 
as the industry expands; or the growth of an industry in one country is retarded by 
competition from the same, but rapidly expanding, industry in another country. This 
results in the decline o f the industry and the regions dependent upon that industry. In this 
sense, Kuznets' work was explicitly spatial.
Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1950) also maintained that technological change was 
the driving force behind capitalist growth because it produces regular and period 
economic revolutions that greatly increase economic growth. These economic revolutions 
are caused by radical technological changes that are exogenous to the industrial system 
and that are introduced by new firms during depressions in an attempt to improve their 
competitive position. For Schumpeter, technological change is a disequilibrating 
mechanism rather than the series of adjustments to the equilibrium production function as 
maintained by Kuznets and especially Salter (1960): the new innovations create entirely 
new production functions as factors of production are shifted out of the old and into the 
new techniques. As an innovation diffuses and techniques are standardized during periods 
of economic prosperity, however, production functions begin to converge on, or 
approach, equilibria. This convergence continues until all the benefits o f the original 
innovation have been exploited and economic depression sets in, at which point a new
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wave of innovations are introduced and the capitalist system is reinvigorated in what 
Schumpeter termed the process of "Creative Destruction" (1950, pg. 83).
1.2.3. Contrasts between Kuznets and Schumpeter
While both Kuznets and Schumpeter identified technological change as the driving 
force behind economic growth and identified a regular temporal pattern in the relationship 
between technological change and economic growth, the similarities end there. First, 
Kuznets considered technological change to be a continuous process endogenous to a 
given industry. Since innovations are introduced continuously, the production function 
continuously adjusts to a series of equilibrium conditions which can then be analyzed using 
neo-classical econometric techniques. For Schumpeter, economic growth is a stochastic, 
disequilibrating mechanism because innovations radically alter the production function. 
Accordingly, the student of technological change is required to the analyze the economic 
and industrial system within which it originates, and neo-classical techniques are 
inappropriate for such analysis.
The second major distinction between the two is their view of the business cycle. 
Kuznet's business cycle focused on major industries or systems of related industries, so 
that their impact on regional or national economies reflects the industry's importance 
within that economy. Schumpeter's business cycles, conversely, were predicated on the 
introduction o f revolutionary products and production processes. The new technologies 
changed all that came before and continued to do so until the introduction o f the next 
round of new technologies that are initiated during the final stage of the cycle.
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2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 1840-1880 BRITISH SHIPBUILDING
This section reviews the literature relating to contemporary and mid- to late- 
nineteenth century shipbuilding technological changes and related spatial industrial 
changes. This industry is especially pertinent to an analysis of the impacts of technology 
on spatial industrial development because shipbuilding analysts consider technological 
change to be the primary cause for the regular, periodic spatial restructuring of 
shipbuilding activity. This section begins with a review of studies that establish the 
importance o f technological change to the economic viability of the industry. It then 
concludes with a survey of historical and historical economic studies o f the 1840-1880 
British industry that deal with iron steamship technological change and the British 
industry’s spatial structure.
2.1. Technological Change and Shipbuilding
The recent and significant declines of shipbuilding employment in North America 
and Western Europe relative to Japan and other Pacific Rim countries have generated a 
sizeable literature on the impacts of technological change on the contemporary industry. 
This literature identifies technological change as one of the primary causes for the 
industry’s "West to East" spatial shift and the resultant loss of shipbuilding employment in 
the West. Harrison (1983) argues that spatial shifts in the shipbuilding industry are the 
consequence of S chump eterian-type technological change cycles which significantly alter 
either ships or ship-construction techniques. He identifies five periods o f spatial 
restructuring, beginning with the dominance of the Dutch industry in the seventeenth 
century and ending with the current dominance of the Pacific Rim countries, and
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speculates that innovation is as important to continued growth as are management, 
industrial relations, and productivity.
The most comprehensive work on the impact of technological change on 
shipbuilding has been conducted by Daniel Todd (1985) in his examination of the British 
shipbuilding industry. Using case studies from the British experience, Todd maintains that 
technological change is one of five factors that determine the location of shipbuilding 
activity. He argues that process and product innovations change the competitive position 
o f individual firms, as well as regional and national industries that are best able to take 
advantage o f those changes. Both Todd and Rother (1985) argue that the industry's shift 
out of Western Europe and into Japan was due to both lower factor input costs and 
product and process innovations introduced by the Japanese industry in the early 1960s.
In addition to lower wage rates and newer shipyard facilities, Frankel (1990) identifies the 
increasing integration of the ship into intermodal transport systems as the most important 
recent ship technological change. Hillings (1989) attributes ship intermodality to the 
restructuring o f the British system of ports as cargo-handling capability shifts out of 
larger ports and into revitalized smaller ports.
2.2. Nineteenth Century British Shipbuilding
Shipbuilding historians attribute the industry's domination o f the world shipbuilding 
industry by 1872 to its pioneering efforts in and perfection of the iron steamship. The shift 
o f world shipbuilding to Britain in the mid- to late nineteenth century is the third of 
Harrison's (1983) five restructuring periods and, according to this author, was due to the 
British industry's innovative leadership in iron steamship construction. Todd (985), in his
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examination of the origins of British dominance, attributes the industry’s growth to the 
shipbuilding industry's ability to introduce and perfect new shipbuilding techniques and 
ship technologies.
Shipbuilding was one of the major industries that contributed to Britain's 
nineteenth and early twentieth century dominance o f the world economy. Despite its 
importance, however, the pre-1872 iron and steam shipbuilding industry and its spatial 
change has not received a great deal of attention. Most of the studies that have been 
produced consist of qualitative introductory analyses or regional shipbuilding histories. 
This section examines these studies, by historians and economic historians, that either 
directly or indirectly relate to technological change or the industry’s spatial restructuring.
2.2.1. Technological Change and Spatial Industrial Change
Since it was one of the few British industrial success stories of the late nineteenth 
century, the shipbuilding industry has generated its own significant body of literature. 
Musson (1978) bases the shipbuilding industry's growth on the iron steamship revolution, 
which resulted in advances in the established iron and steel and engineering industries, and 
the increasing inter-relationship between these industries and shipbuilding. Pollard and 
Robinson (1979) consider the industry to be so important to the national economy that 
cycles in the demand for new ships affected the whole economy. These authors argue that 
because Britain was an island nation with sheltered ports which notably controlled a large 
share o f world trade and also held abundant capital, it was poised to become the leading 
shipbuilding nation once an economical supply of raw materials were made available. 
Finally, Deane and Cole (1962) emphasize the importance of the industry by
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demonstrating that the total value of merchant vessels produced in British shipyards 
during 1914 accounted for approximately 1.25% of British gross domestic product; more 
than 2% of all wages; and 30% of British steel production.
Introductory chapters in several books outline the British development o f iron 
steamship technology and its revolutionary impact on raw materials, construction 
techniques, and propulsion. Whitehurst's (1986) analysis of the decline of the United 
States shipbuilding and repairing industries discusses the competition between American 
and British shipbuilders following the repeal of the British Navigation Acts in 1849. He 
argues that British shipbuilders revolutionized both the world shipbuilding and shipping 
industries by developing the iron steamship while the American industry continued to build 
wooden sailing ships. By the mid-nineteenth century British shipbuilders had significantly 
lowered their production costs relative to the more traditional, and complacent, United 
States industry. Jones (1957) considers Britain's head start in metal shipbuilding; cheap 
materials, especially iron and steel; and abundant skilled labor as British advantages that 
were established during the first half o f the nineteenth-century and fully realized during the 
second half Further, and as a result o f these advantages, Britain was identified with iron 
and steam shipbuilding by the 1870s and had displaced other countries as the world's 
leading shipbuilding nation.
Studies o f the industry's role in keying Britain's impressive late-nineteenth-century 
economic growth emphasize the demand and supply feedback loops between interrelated 
industries and their impacts on the shipping and shipbuilding industries. Several authors 
emphasize the shipping industry's need for fuel efficient and cargo efficient vessels as
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causes o f innovations in construction and propulsion (Cunningham. 1903; Moyse- 
Bartlett, 1968; MacGreggor, 1980 and 1984; and Thornton, 1959). Economic analyses 
have also been conducted (Pollard and Robinson, 1979; Pollard, 1957; and Harley, 1974). 
Other authors (Rowland, 1971;Waine, 1976; Abell, 1981; Jones, 1957; Parkinson, 1960; 
Graham, 1958; and Gilfillan. 1935) emphasize technological changes in the iron-working 
industries that lowered raw material prices, improved strength and malleability, and raised 
the quality of high tolerance machine work.
The spatial impact o f these technological changes have also been studied. Bremner 
examined the role of technological change on the growth of the Clyde shipbuilding region 
in a series of articles originally published in 1868 (1969). More contemporary work on 
the importance technological change on the Clyde's growth includes Robb (1958),
Tumock (1982), and Walker (1984). Relatively little has been written concerning the 
English North East Coast, but Smith and Holden (1953), Dougan (1968), and especially 
Waine (1976) relate the region's growth and mid-nineteenth-century importance to the 
development and implementation of product and process innovations in iron and steam 
shipbuilding.
Other authors have examined the decline of shipbuilding activity in traditional 
shipbuilding regions as well. Banbury (1971) and Pollard (1950) have examined the 
London industry, arguing that shipbuilding declined because its pioneering and highly 
innovative marine engineers and iron shipbuilders could not overcome such disadvantages 
as river congestion, high land and labor costs, and the distance from raw materials. Pollard 
and Robinson (1979) make a similar argument for the decline of the Mersey industry, and
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add that Liverpool's harbor management board, in addition to driving up waterfront land 
prices for shipbuilders, refused to provide them with adequate rail facilities.
2.2.2. The Technology and Productivity Debate
The economic impacts of the mid-nineteenth century British iron screw steamship 
have stoked a lively debate among economic historians that began in 1958. In this year, 
Hughes and Reiter (1958) examined technological changes in the 1860 British iron 
steamship merchant fleet. These researchers argued that iron construction and the marine 
steam engine increased cargo-carrying capacity and ship speed, and that these new ship 
technologies accounted for the dramatic shipping productivity gains o f the British 
merchant fleet between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This argument was challenged by Max Fletcher (1958) and Douglas North (1958, 
1968). Fletcher argued that the opening of the Suez Canal had the greater impact on 
shipping productivity gains because it rendered the sailing ship obsolete and directed ship 
technological changes, for both iron screw steamships and traditional sailing ships, toward 
those that best exploited the "least distance" trade routes afforded by the CanaL North 
explicitly challenged the view that technological change is the most important factor in 
economic growth by contending that shipping productivity gains pre-dated the 
introduction of the iron steamship and that these productivity gains were the result of the 
development of new regions that produced agricultural staples and provided paying cargos 
for both legs of the ship's voyage. Other changes that reduced shipping costs were the 
decline in piracy and improved business organization within the shipping industry. These 
arguments have been examined in more detail by North's students Walton and Shepherd
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(1979). Ville (1986) also argued that British shipping productivity gains, at least in the 
coastwise coal trade, predate the introduction of the iron and screw collier, a bulk cargo- 
carrier used to haul coal from the English North East Coast to London and other coal 
markets. According to Ville, the factors contributing to lowered shipping costs included, 
among others, improved cargo-handling techniques, lower manning requirements, stable 
insurance costs, and quicker turnaround time and. hence, more voyages.
The arguments of North and Ville have been challenged on a number of points, 
however. Harley (1988) noted that North only considered US and Caribbean shipping 
data (and made several computational errors at that). Based on his analysis of a much 
larger dataset incorporating a greater diversity of trade routes, Harley contended that 
worldwide improvements in shipping began with the application of the iron steamship to 
ocean transportation because the new ship saved on factor inputs and increased 
competition in the shipping industry. Hausman (1987), in a discussion of Ville's article, 
maintained that productivity gains in the coal trade had little impact on the British 
economy and were much smaller than for those in other industries. He also observed that 
the single most dramatic change in the technology of the shipping industry was the 
adoption of the iron screw steamer, and thus, the actual question to be answered is why 
shipping costs did not fall even more rapidly.
3. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
The concerns of the shipbuilding-specific literature mirror the essential components 
o f the broader debate regarding the overall importance of technological change and both 
economic and regional economic growth. Due to its interest in the spatial distribution of
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economic activity, the sub-field of economic geography has generated a sizeable literature 
on the impacts o f technological change to the spatial distribution of economic activity in 
general. Since the late 1970s especially, this literature has focused on the role of 
technological change in the industrial location decision and regional economic 
development. This literature is often characterized by what might best be described as an 
at times acrimonious debate among two competing paradigms.
3.1. Industrial Location Theory
This section reviews the two most commonly used industrial location theories, the 
neo-classical and the structuralist. It also notes their analytical shortcomings, namely, 
their inability to realistically explicate the links between technological change and spatial 
industrial restructuring. Further, it argues that elements of both theories in synthesis, 
rather than one or the other, are required to understand this phenomenon.
3.1.1. Neo-classical Industrial Location Theory
The older o f the two theories, the neo-classical economic location tradition, held 
sway until the industrial and employment dislocations within the US and Western 
European economies in the early 1970s. Up until the 1970s, it was generally accepted that 
net investment, rather than technological change, was the primary cause of economic 
growth (Link, 1987). However, these social disruptions raised questions about the utility 
of investments in explaining the spatial restructuring process and attendant job losses. At 
the same time, neo-classical theory, which holds technological change constant, was also 
found wanting.
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Neo-classical industrial location theory regards locationally-specific factor 
endowments or factor costs to be the primary determinants in the industrial location 
decision. The analytical approach was first introduced by Weber (1929). Weber’s 
analytical framework identified the "best" location for a manufacturing establishment using 
neo-classical micro economic theory. He argued that industrial locations are 
fundamentally determined by differences in costs, and that cost differences are due to 
natural conditions, such as climate, transport costs, or the spatial distribution of raw 
materials and labor. Further, cost differentials can only be changed by technical progress 
or by economic or social conditions which alter interest rates, labor skills, and living 
standards. However, only transport and labor costs vary with location, so that the 
identification of the optimal, least-cost location requires the identification of cost 
differentials from one production location to another. The result was a transport and 
labor deterministic modeL
The approach has been broadened, however, by factors other than transport and 
labor costs, and as Smith (1981) argues, neo-classical location theory still provides a valid 
framework for examining the location decision. The framework is still used extensively by 
economic geographers who are concerned with locationally-specific attributes that 
influence the location of industrial activity. Oakey and Cooper's (1989) locational analysis 
of high technology firms, which emphasizes locational considerations such as psychic 
income, least cost location, and agglomeration, explicitly points out the utility of neo­
classical location theory in understanding the locational behavior of these firms. Cornish 
(1997) analyzes the spatial interaction of innovation and new product introduction to
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argue that innovative activity is a function o f the spatial proximity between producers and 
markets and is based on locationally specific attributes. The neo-classical framework is 
also used extensively by economists and regional scientists, with examples being Jin's 
(1991) analysis of technological change and Chinese industrial structure using Cobb- 
Douglas type production functions, and Frenkel and Shefefs (1996) modeling of regional 
innovativeness that employs a LOGIT behavioral model to evaluate the probabilities of a 
firm's adoption of innovations.
Neo-classical industrial location theory provides a framework for identifying the 
considerations involved in the individual firm's location decision. However, it is ill 
equipped to consider technological change for two important, if overlooked, reasons. The 
first is that while its practitioners are aware that technological change alters factor 
availability and price, neo-classical assumptions of economic equilibria assume away 
adjustments to factor inputs that are the result o f the dynamic process of technological 
change. This is a fundamental problem for regional scientists: their methodological 
approaches adequately describe a steady-state system, but such approaches become 
awkward when change over time is introduced to the analysis. The second drawback is 
that traditional locational analysis, because o f its emphasis on the individual firm or 
industry, takes a bottom-up approach that does not consider the economic and 
organizational environment within which the location decision is made.
3.1.2. Structuralist Industrial Location Theory
Currently, the most commonly used theoretical framework for assessing the 
industrial location decision is Structuralism. Structuralist industrial location theory,
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strongly influenced by the Marxist critique of the capitalist system, regards the location 
decision as directly related to the dynamic disequilibria of capitalism which is, in turn, 
caused by technological change. The structuralist critique of neo-classical industrial 
location was introduced by Massey and Megan in 1979 and has its origins in the social 
dislocations associated with the "stagflation" of the 1970s (Freeman, 1982).
Massey ( 1979a) objected to neo-classical marginalist economic theory and its 
idealized, but unrealistic, model of the firm. She argued that neo-classical industrial 
location theory cannot account for spatial behavior because its approach, which begins 
with the firm and then works up to the broader economy, eliminates historical and 
individual variations in behavior. As a result, it ignores the dynamics of the system in 
which the firm exists. Her observations, in many ways, reflect the Marxist view expressed 
by Storper and Walker (1989) and Sayer (1983) who see technological change as a 
negative consequence of the capitalist economic system, Le., as the instrument o f uneven 
spatial economic development. To correct these deficiencies, Massey and Meegan 
(1979b) introduced a structuralist, top-down analytical approach which isolates conditions 
within the larger economic structure and traces their impact down to the individual firm 
and its locational strategy.
Structuralist industrial location theory has been widely adopted by economic 
geographers interested in the relationship between technological change and industrial 
restructuring. Freeman (1982) stressed that accelerated economic growth is associated 
with major innovations but that hierarchical regional industrial structures concentrate 
research and development efforts in a few select locations. This view is echoed by
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Sweeney (1987) who has argued that self-generating economic growth requires high rates 
of innovation and the formation o f new firms, but that regions differ as to their innovative 
and entrepreneurial ability. Markusen (1985), whom we will discuss later in relation to 
her Profit Life Cycle, takes an explicitly structuralist view, while Faberberg et al. (1997) 
explain unequal European regional growth of gross domestic product in terms of the 
unequal distribution of research and development activities. The structuralist approach is 
also used in formulating the "new economic development theory" which promotes the 
endogenous creation of innovative firms based on the existing industrial structure and 
composition of a region or area (Teitz, 1994).
Models based on structuralist industrial location theory, based as they are on 
dynamic disequilibrium, offer a powerful analytical framework for understanding the 
relationship between technological change and spatial industrial change. They are 
predicated on the fret that spatial industrial behavior cannot be understood unless the 
dynamics of change, conditions in the overall economic system, and variations in firm 
behavior are taken into account. At the same time, however, the approach is limited by 
the level of generalization at which it operates. Studies using the structuralist framework 
take a top-down analytical approach, confining themselves to regional level studies rather 
than investigating the impact o f technological change on individual production centers. As 
Smith (1981) observed, focusing exclusively on larger economic systems overlooks the 
site-specific factors upon which industrial viability is contingent. Warren (1991), in his 
industrial location analysis of the Consett Iron Works, concluded that any study which is 
based exclusively on theoretical considerations and disregards the experience of actual
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firms or locations inevitably ignores discrepancies in the performance of individual centers 
and their larger industrial region.
3.2. Life Cycles
Kuznets' and Schumpeter’s concepts o f the business cycle, although differing on 
major points, have had a profound impact on economists and economic geographers 
because they provide a framework for examining technological change through time. 
Schumpeter has had an especially strong influence because the employment dislocations 
over the course of the past twenty-five years have been directly linked to the stagnation 
and depression phases of his business cycle model. Schumpeter is often invoked by 
scholars who consider new industries, especially information technology industries, to be 
the leading sectors of a new industrial era (Berry, 1991, 1997; Mensch, 1978).
The first explicit use of the business cycle as an analytical framework for 
understanding the spatial dynamics o f technological change was Raymond Vernon's 
Product Life Cycle (1966). Vernon's cycle provides Kuznets' model of industrial growth 
with a spatial dynamic and allows for the assessment of location decisions based on the 
industry's trajectory in particular phases of the cycle (Norton and Rees, 1979; Rees, 1979). 
Vemon postulated that an industry goes through three development phases: an innovation 
phase leading to the industry's spatial concentration in areas offering agglomeration 
economies; a growth phase during which production becomes standardized, allowing for 
new firms and production locations to become established, and during which the industry 
is characterized by increasing sales and competition; and a standardization or mature phase 
characterized by declining sales, intense competition, and a production process so
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standardized that the industry becomes "foot loose" and seeks out new low cost 
production locations. The Product Life Cycle has been used by geographers to link 
technological change to the North-South shifts in US manufacturing activity (North and 
Rees 1979; Rees, 1979) as well as to the growth and decline (circa 1979) o f the Petro- 
Crescent along the US Gulf Coast (Weinstein, Gross, and Rees, 1985; Weinstein and 
Gross, 1987).
An important structuralist reformulation of the Product Life Cycle has been 
presented by Markusen (1985, Markusen et aL, 1986). She argues that the changing 
regional distribution of plants and jobs in any industrial sector reflects the priorities of 
corporations at each stage of an evolutionary profit cycle. Locational strategies vary over 
the course o f the five stages that range from an emphasis on innovative activities in early 
stages to the creation of market power and/or rationalization in its final stages. Each 
strategy has unique sets of demands on factor inputs and market access which, in turn, are 
unevenly distributed across regions. The model is therefore market-driven as opposed to 
technology-driven.
Although both the Product Life Cycle and Profit Life Cycle provide valuable 
analytical frameworks for conceptualizing technological change-induced spatial 
restructuring through time, these theories are controversial Examples of the debate over 
the utility of the Product Life Cycle are Sherwood-Coll's (1992) use o f the framework to 
confirm the geographic dispersion o f the electrical components industry, while Johnson 
(1991) contends that a complete explanation ofbranch-plant locations in the non- 
metropolitan US South cannot be obtained within the Product Life Cycle framework.
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Clark (1989) considers the Profit Cycle to be one of the most sophisticated theoretical 
tools for conceptualizing the regional growth process, but he reserves doubt on the impact 
of cyclical or structural patterns. Similarly, Sorenson's (1997) empirical tests of 
Markusen's key hypotheses of regional industrial composition and cycle trajectories 
produce mixed results
3.3. The Measurement of Technological Change
This section concludes with a review o f the techniques used by economic 
geographers and regional scientists in relating technological change and place. As Acs and 
Andretsch (1991) acknowledge, measuring technological change presents researchers with 
serious difficulties. The problem is one of measuring new knowledge and its contribution 
to technological progress. As Kuznets (1962) observed thirty years before, the difficulty 
lies in finding meaningful measures of innovative inputs and outputs. Because of this 
difficulty, investigators have relied on three proxy measurements: input-output analysis; 
the market share of new products relative to old products; and the measurement of 
investment in research and development.
The two most commonly used methods in the regional science and economic 
geography literature for measuring technological change are based on the surrogates of 
research and development expenditures and production functions which measure 
technological change. The first method is based on Gilriches study of the social returns of 
hybrid com, while the second is a variant of the Hicks-neutral technological change 
production function developed by Solow. An example o f the first approach is the general 
equilibrium model of North-South trade developed by Segertrom, et aL (1990) in which
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research and development expenditures are used to determine the rate of new product 
development. An example of the second approach is an estimation of a firm's ability to 
incorporate innovations by Green et al. (1991) in which the error term from the 
production function is split to isolate random variations which are outside of the firm's 
control and those which can be attributed to the firm's technological inefficiency.
The largest component of the economic geographic literature examines the spatial 
behavior o f high technology industries such as electronic components and bio-engineering. 
These studies make no attempt to determine the innovative ability of the industry being 
studied. One example of this approach is Delaney's (1993) study of the urban 
agglomeration of bio-engineering firms in which innovative ability is treated as a given.
More rigorous approaches rely on either proxy measurements such as employment 
change, research and development expenditures, or patent counts to establish spatial 
innovative ability. Examples of these approaches are Sherwood-Coll (1992) and 
Markusen (1985, Markusen et al. 1986). Many of these studies are methodologically 
sound and provide valuable insights into the relationship between technological change 
and place. An example is Feldman and Florida's (1994) study that models the 
geographical distribution o f innovation in the US in 1982 in which the number of 
innovations originating in a state is a function of university research, industrial research 
and development, networks of related firms, and specialized business services.
The approaches discussed above provide methods for measuring the impacts of 
technological change and relating those changes back to the spatial system. However, 
none of these methods actually measure technological change. It is one thing to measure
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costs associated with research and development or the number of patents that originate in 
a particular area (and to disregard the question of whether or not the patents are ever 
brought to the market). It is quite another to use actual data to measure the technical 
changes that actually arise from research, development, and patents.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has reviewed the literature that guides this research effort. It began 
by defining technological change and introducing the work of Simon Kuznets and Joseph 
Schumpeter, the two scholars who have had the greatest impact on contemporary studies 
of technological change and spatial industrial change. It then discussed the historical and 
economic historical literature concerning the 1840-1880 British iron and steam 
shipbuilding industry. This literature has directed the discussion and analysis of the 
assessment of the relationship between industrial viability and innovative ability that 
follows. It concludes with a review o f the theoretical and analytical frameworks used by 
geographers to investigate current issues of technological change-induced spatial 
restructuring. These frameworks are extensively utilized in this study because of the 
insights and analytical frameworks they provide for any study of the relationship between 
innovation and place.
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METHODS
This chapter describes the methods that will be used to investigate the relationship 
between innovative ability and industrial locational viability. As discussed earlier, the 
measurement of technological change and its linkage with the performance of individual 
centers within an industrial system present researchers with serious problems. As a result, 
this study employs a rather complex methodology to establish and locate technological 
changes in iron shipbuilding and to relate those change's to a center's industrial viability.
The data used for the study were obtained from the Lloyd's Register o f British and 
Foreign Shipping. The Register, which began annual publication in 1834 and continues to 
the present, is an efficient source o f information for the British iron and steam shipbuilding 
industry and provides an excellent opportunity to explore the importance of technology to 
the industrial viability of individual production centers. However, the data are not without 
their problems. These problems will be discussed in more detail in later sections of this 
chapter.
The chapter begins by establishing the conceptual model of technological change 
and its impact on individual production centers that guide this research. Next, it provides 
definitions for key terms and concepts. It then presents the methods used to develop 
required variables and specifies the test that will be used to assess the association between 
industrial viability and innovative ability.
47
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter begins by identifying guiding concepts and defining key terms. The 
analytical framework, including key concepts, is introduced first. Next, it provides a 
working definition o f the industrial center and its role and importance within larger 
industrial structures. This is followed by a discussion of the rationale for technological 
change and its implications on innovative ability and locational viability.
1.1. Analytical Framework
This research combines the disequilibria concept of change with the traditional 
neo-classical concern with place. Although these two theories are often presented as 
antithetical, spatial restructuring over time and space is the culmination of changes 
initiated at and imposed upon each and every location within an industrial system. The 
large scale-factors of time—the technological cycle—and space—the individual components 
of the industrial system—form the framework within which the locationally-specific 
variables of industrial viability and innovative ability can be examined. This framework 
allows for analysis of the technological performance of any center within the industrial 
system at any time during the technological cycle.
An industrial center is defined as a single firm or collection of firms producing a 
similar product or related products and operating in the same location. Firms locate at 
specific locations for access to markets, factor inputs, or both, and compete with other 
firms. These centers collectively form progressively larger portions o f the industrial 
system at regional, national, and international scales.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
Innovation is initiated or adopted by individual firms in an attempt to improve 
profitability. Early adopters enjoy excess profits by improving their profitability relative to 
firms using old technology, while late adopters imitate early adopters so as to maintain 
their competitiveness. As the rate of technological change increases, locational instability 
and disruption occur as the new technologies alter the relative importance o f factor inputs. 
Since factor prices vary in space, new firms can locate at new least cost locations which 
can then become viable production centers. Established firms can either move to new 
least cost locations, or maintain their locational viability by generating innovations or 
adopting the most current, but rapidly changing, "best practice" techniques (Salter, 1960).
Innovative shipbuilding centers enjoy locational advantages over less innovative 
centers. This is because dining periods of rapid technological change locational viability 
depends upon the ability to generate, adopt, and incorporate "best practice" techniques. 
Competitive advantages due to innovative ability can then mitigate against locational 
disadvantages in factor inputs.
1.2. Definitions
Innovative ability and locational viability are considered to be locationally specific 
attributes that allow for the assessment o f the relationship between innovative ability and 
industrial locational viability. Innovative ability is a production center's ability to generate 
or to assimilate technological changes. Industrial viability is a center's growth, stability, or 
decline, in terms o f gross output, within the industry's spatial system and is indicated by its 
market share.
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Ships incorporated in this research are limited to ocean-going ships that were made 
of iron, propelled by marine steam engines and screw propulsion systems, and carried 
cargo. These ships were the direct predecessors of the modem trans-oceanic cargo 
carrier. Although the production of fishing vessels, dredgers, tugs, and similar vessels was 
an important component of many production centers' output, these vessels are excluded 
from this study because their functions, and hence their technological requirements, were 
different from cargo carriers. Paddle-steamers are also excluded because, although they 
were highly innovative ships for a time and their production was important at many 
centers, these vessels were obsolete as cargo carriers and for use on ocean-going trade 
routes by 1865.
The analysis of technological change is restricted to the most significant 
component technologies which characterized the iron steamship. The study does not 
establish steamship productivity or efficiency increases to justify technological change. 
Rather, it assumes that these increases were the original reasons for innovation and 
adoption, and their superiority over other techniques is sufficiently established by their 
continued use, after further modification, in the modem merchant ship. Nor does the 
study inquire into why the individual firm adopted iron and steam construction. The 
shipbuilder's decision to adopt these technologies is considered to a be rational and correct 
assessment o f his particular economic situation.
The iron steamship represents the combination of two complex technologies— 
marine steam propulsion and iron construction. A succession o f innovations in propulsion 
and construction technologies were introduced during the study period. It is assumed that
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these innovations were adopted to improve efficiency or productivity, either for 
shipowners or shipbuilders, and that innovative centers enjoyed competitive advantages 
over their rivals.
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents the methods used to develop the variables that measure 
innovative ability and industrial viability. It begins with a discussion of the data source, 
the Lloyd's Register, and its limitations. Next, it introduces the periodization scheme that 
is used to sub-divide the 1840-1880 period. Finally, it presents the methods that will be 
used to develop the required variables and the procedure for testing the relationship 
between industrial viability and innovative ability.
2.1. Data
Data for this study are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign 
Shipping. The Register collected and reported technical descriptors of individual ships. 
This information was then used by marine insurance underwriters to determine a ship's 
insurance risk. Although it was not intended as such, the Register also provides 
information needed to test for the relationship between a British iron and steam 
shipbuilding center's industrial viability and innovative ability.
The Lloyds Register, not to be confused with the insurance market Lloyds of 
London, was the largest and most prestigious o f several ship classification societies.
These societies, under the authority of both the British government and the insurance and 
shipping industries, were responsible for certifying a ship's seaworthiness by inspecting the 
ship during construction and at regular intervals thereafter. All ships surveyed by Lloyds,
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either new ships or older ships whose owners desired a Lloyds classification, were listed in 
the annually published Register. The amount of information increased over the course of 
the 1840-1880 study period. By 1872, information in the listing consisted of the ship's 
name, the name and location of the builder, the year of construction, registered tonnage, 
and various technical measurements including dimensions and engine specifications such 
as engine type, cylinder size, rated boiler pressure, and horsepower. As such, the Register 
offers an efficient source o f locational and technological data.
These data were collected dining the summer o f 1993 from published Registers 
held by the Social Science Department of the Mitchell Library in Glasgow, Scotland.
Using each Register published in 1840, 1845, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1865, 1870, 1875, and 
1880, all iron steamships built between 1840 and 1880 were identified. All new ships and 
ships inspected after launching but not modified in some manner were entered into a 
standard spreadsheet. Data for each ship includes the following information: construction 
material - iron or steel; tonnage - net, gross, and underdeck; dimensions - length, width, 
and depth; number of bulkheads; number o f decks; double bottom or partial double 
bottom ballast tanks; name and location of shipbuilder; type of ship-paddle, screw, or 
twin screw; engine type—lever, diagonal, oscillating, compound, and inverted; engine 
configuration (angle at which cylinders are mounted on a stationary engine bed); engine 
cylinder volume (number o f cylinders x diameter x stroke); boiler pressure; horsepower; 
name and location of engine builder; and the year in which the ship was built. The 
database for this research consists of over 2,200 ships from 100 shipbuilding locations in 
Britain, Europe, Asia, North America, and New Zealand.
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The dataset was later "culled" to remove all vessels that did not carry cargo, such 
as tugs, dredgers, fishing boats, paddle-steamers, and other iron steam vessels, or that 
were obviously too small for ocean-going trade. The final dataset consists of 1544 ships. 
The data for individual ships are not always complete, especially for ships built early in the 
study period and for ships built at remote ports. The first reason for incomplete data is 
that the data quality and quantity improves over time as Lloyds reporting improved, the 
second reason is that Lloyds seems to have neglected small, isolated British outports and 
foreign ports. Neither of these has much effect on the research findings.
Despite the very large number of observations and variables, these data have 
several problems that restrict the methods that can be used for this study. Four problems 
can be identified. The first is that few variables are available for the entire study period; 
more variables were reported in the Register as the study period progressed. Second, 
many variables in the dataset could not be included in this analysis. This is especially true 
for structural features such as decks, bulkheads, and water ballast tanks because it is not 
always clear if the Register's compilers simply failed to record this information or if the 
ship was not equipped with these features. Third, the Register does not include all ships 
produced dining the study period so that a full time series is lacking. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, there is a high degree of multicollinearity between many variables, 
especially for register tonnage, dimensions, and horsepower.
2.2. Innovation Cycles
The final issue which must be discussed before presenting the methodology 
concerns the sub-division of the 1840-1880 period into shorter sub-periods. As the
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extended discussion in Chapter IV will more clearly demonstrate, the study period consists
of four distinct shipbuilding cycles, each characterized by growth and then decline of
British total shipbuilding output. These cycles also correspond to fluctuations in the rate
of technological change.
As a result, the study period is divided into four separate and distinct shipbuilding
cycles and are:
Cycle 1: 1840- 1855 
Cycle 2: 1856- 1865 
Cycle 3: 1866 - 1872 
Cycle 4: 1873- 1880
This periodization scheme is necessary for two reasons. The first reason is that the use of 
these shipbuilding cycles allows for the inclusion of more technical measurements from the 
Register as they become available. The second reason is that both the rate o f technological 
change and the contribution of the component technologies varied from cycle to cycle.
2.3. Methods
This section presents the methods that will be used to calculate the key site- 
specific variables. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the study's spatial and 
temporal considerations as well as the constraints imposed by the data source, require a 
somewhat complex analytical methodology. The section begins by presenting the 
industrial viability variable used to establish the individual shipbuilding center's viability 
within the larger shipbuilding industrial system. This is followed by a discussion of the 
development of the innovative ability variable that will assess the center’s ability to
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introduce or assimilate technical innovations. Finally, the section outlines the test used to 
assess the relationship between these two variables.
2.3.1. Industrial Viability
The index o f industrial viability establishes the individual British shipbuilding 
center’s relative competitiveness within its larger spatial industrial system. The first step in 
the computation o f this variable is to calculate each center’s annual percent share of total 
annual British shipbuilding output recorded in the Register. Since the majority of ships 
were built on consignment, this variable represents the shipbuilding center's market share 
relative to all other centers. Each center's annual percent share is then ranked into one of 
three categories to produce an index of annual market share. This index is then used in 
the final stage of this analysis.
2.3.1.1. Market Share
The index of annual market share is calculated using the gross tonnage 
measurements provided in the Register. Although net tonnage is provided by official 
annual shipbuilding statements, gross tonnage is the measurement of shipbuilding output 
used by shipbuilding analysts and historians because it represents the total volume of the 
ship as opposed to net tonnage which only measures cargo carrying capacity (Todd,
1985). The annual output share variable is calculated in the following manner. First, and 
for any given year during the study period, the gross tonnage o f all British-built ships is 
summed to give total annual national output. Next, the gross tonnage of all ships built at 
each shipbuilding center during a given year is summed to give the center's total annual 
output. Finally, each center's total output is divided by national annual output to provide
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each center’s share of the total national shipbuilding market. The procedure is expressed 
in the following formula:
Output Share = T„ / Tr
Where:
T = total gross tonnage built at shipbuilding center c during yeary  
Tv = total national gross tonnage built during yeary
2.3.2. Market Share Rank
With each center's annual market share calculated, h is necessary to transform this 
variable to make it more amenable to further analysis. Transformation is required because 
a large number of centers produced an extremely small annual output while a small 
number of centers produced an extremely large amount, resulting in a distribution skewed 
to the left. To counter this problem, each center is assigned to one o f three annual output 
categories: high, medium, or low. This ranking system was chosen based on the visual 
inspection of scatter plots of market share and innovative values. This inspection revealed 
that three market share categories, as well as two innovative ability categories, adequately 
capture the joint occurrences of the two variables.
2.4. Innovative Ability
Innovative ability measures a center's capacity for generating or adopting 
technological change. This is the most problematic variable in this analysis because 
measuring technological change, not to mention innovative ability, presents scholars with 
serious methodological problems (Le., how do you measure new knowledge and its 
contribution to technological progress). As a consequence, most studies of technological 
change use one o f three approaches that rely on proxy measurements: input-output
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analysis; the market share of new products relative to old products; and investment in 
research and development (Acs and Andretsch, 1991; Rosegger, 1980).
This study utilizes a more direct measure o f technological change based on Hughes 
and Reiter's (1958) "transport capacity measure." These authors estimated the annual 
amount of cargo-carrying capacity of the British merchant steam fleet to argue that 
technological changes associated with increased ship size and speed directly contributed to 
the British shipping industry's productivity growth before 1860. Their estimates were 
developed from net tonnage and horsepower measurements for individual ships obtained 
from a published list of pre-1860 British steamships as well as estimates o f ship speed.
Hughes and Reiter's approach provides the basic framework for identifying each 
shipbuilding center's annual innovative ability using the technical and locational data 
available in the Register. First, a series of multiple regression models, one for each 
shipbuilding cycle, are specified to identify innovations that made a significant contribution 
to explaining the increasing ship size (economies o f scale)~the most important 
technological change that occurred during the study period. Variables for the models and 
their construction are discussed later in this section. Next, the independent variables are 
used to develop innovative indices that score the level of technological sophistication of 
individual ships. Finally, each center is assigned an annual ranking, in terms of either a 
high or low innovative center, based on the position o f each center relative to the mean 
score o f the calculated innovation index for all ships built at each center during a given 
year relative to the mean score for all ships built during the cycle. The use o f a 
dichotomous ranking scheme allows for the identification of technological leaders and
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laggards which allows for a more straightforward assessment o f the results of the test for 
association. The following sections discuss these three steps in more detail.
2.4.1. Modeling Technological Change
The first task in identifying technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding centers 
is to establish a criteria o f  technological change in iron steamships against which ships 
from individual centers can be compared. This is accomplished by specifying a series of 
OLS multiple regression models, one model for each of the four shipbuilding cycles, that 
incorporate the technical measurements that best characterize steamship technological 
change. These characteristics are based on component ship technologies and their change 
through time. The models serve two purposes: first, they describe the relative 
contribution of key innovations to iron steamship change; second, they identify significant 
innovations used later to rate the technological performance o f individual shipbuilding 
centers.
Multiple regression tests measure a hypothesized relationship between several 
independent variables and a single dependent variable. They are used in this study to 
identify significant innovations which contributed to the world dominance of the British 
shipbuilding industry. This is accomplished by testing the hypothesis that increasing ship 
size, the most important change in iron steamships throughout the study period, was a 
function o f innovations that improved the efficiency o f several key component 
technological systems. The models are specified as:
Ship Size (Registered Tonnage) = technology, + technology 2 + technology „
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Four models are specified using two-stage multiple regression analysis for each 
individual shipbuilding cycle. The reason for developing models for each cycle rather than 
the entire study period is that one model does not provide an adequate explanation of 
overall 1840-1880 iron steamship technological change because of the emergence of new 
technologies (and new variables). The two-stage approach is used because it allows for 
the testing of hypotheses regarding the contribution of important technical changes 
identified in previous research by leading shipbuilding historians.
The two-stage approach begins with a theoretical model for each cycle that 
describes important innovations. The model is assessed based on the explanatory power 
of the model as indicated by the F statistic and its significance; the significance and 
expected sign of the individual regression coefficients; and the sequential contribution of 
individual variables to Adjusted R2. If these conditions are not satisfied, then the model is 
respecified by adjusting the dependent and independent variables as appropriate.
2.4.2. Variables
The data used to specify the technological change models consist of the year in 
which the ship was built, two register tonnage measurements, and five variables that 
represent important technical changes in iron construction and steam propulsion. These 
variables are obtained from the Register and entered, either as raw or derived variables, 
into the model The use of derived variables minimizes collinearity and so maximizes the 
explanatory power of each independent variable. The following section discusses these 
variables, with a summary provided in Table HI-1.
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Register tonnage, both gross and net, measures the enclosed volume o f the ship. 
One ton equals 100 cubic feet. Gross tonnage is the total permanently enclosed volume of 
the ship less deductions for water ballast tanks, wheel house, galley and lavatories. Net 
tonnage is the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, or total earning space. It is legally defined as 
gross tonnage less all non-earning spaces, such as accommodations, and allowance for 
engine, fuel bunker, and machinery space. Gross tonnage is reported for the entire study 
period, while net tonnage was not reported on a consistent basis until 1852. Average 
gross and net tonnage increased throughout the study period.
The NetrGross Ratio is a derived variable that establishes the percent difference 
between a ship's cargo-carrying capacity and its total volume. The ratio is calculated by 
dividing net tonnage by gross tonnage (Riegel, 1921). The variable is used to monitor 
changes in ship design that maximized ship cargo-carrying capacity but which were not 
reflected in net tonnage calculations.
The Length-to-Bearn ratio also monitors changes in ship design. This variable is 
derived by dividing a ship's length by its width. Longer, but not necessarily wider, ships 
reduced water friction against the hull, which increased cargo-carrying capacity (and 
speed) without a corresponding increase in engine power. Pollard and Robertson (1979) 
identify increasing length-to-beam ratios as a key change in ship design.
Two derived variables are used to estimate ship motive power using the two 
register tonnage values and horsepower. These variables unitize horsepower to tonnage 
(Le., one (1) unit o f horsepower equals n tons) to provide a measure of either the number 
of gross or net tons propelled by one unit of horsepower. The variables are constructed
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by dividing the respective tonnage measure by horsepower. Both measures of ship power 
increased throughout the study period. (Two horsepower measurements were commonly 
used during the study period: "nominal horsepower," an arbitrary measure developed by 
Watt; or "indicated horsepower" which is calculated using engine specifications. The 
results of an independent calculation of indicated horsepower using a formula obtained 
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia (1913) suggest that the Register recorded 
indicated horsepower.)
The rated pressure of the ship's boilers is also used. This variable also comes 
directly from the Register and is used to monitor increasing boiler pressure due to 
improved boiler designs.
The final variable is engine cylinder volume (in3) per unit of net or gross tonnage. 
The variable provides a measure of engine size relative to the ship's cargo-carrying 
capacity or its total enclosed volume. Since cylinder volume is unitized to the tonnage 
variable, it allows for the monitoring of engine size efficiencies. The variable is 
constructed using the following formula:
n




V = cylinder volume 
D = cylinder diameter 
H = length of stroke 
n = cylinder 1 through n 
T = net or gross tonnage
All variables used in this calculation are obtained from the Register.
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2.43. Innovative Ability Scale
The innovative ability scale is a synthetic measure of each center's innovative 
ability for each year it was in production. It is developed using the variables identified in 
the regression models. Since the independent variables have minimal multicollinearity, 
each independent variable's contribution is independent of the other variables in the model. 
Innovative ability is expressed as each center's annual rank as either a technologically 
leading or lagging shipbuilding center. A separate ranking is constructed for each of the 
four ship building cycles. The variable is constructed in the following manner.
For any given shipbuilding cycle model, the values for each independent variable 
are sub-divided into quintiles. The lowest score (1) represents the lowest possible level of 
technological sophistication for that variable, while the highest score (5) indicates the 
highest level Every ship is then assigned to a class from one to five that corresponds to 
its position within the total range of the variable. This process is repeated for all variables 
in the model and the scores are summed to create a single value which reflects the 
innovations incorporated in each ship vis-a-vis all other ships for the time period. The 
number of variables used in creating the scale increase from one cycle to the next because 
new technologies were introduced over the course o f the study period and because the 
Register increased the number o f technical measures reported. Each ship's final score, 
therefore, depends on the number of independent variables in the model For example, the 
model for the first shipbuilding cycle has only one independent variable. Therefore, the 
lowest possible ship score is one (1), while the highest possible score is five (5). For the 
last cycle, which uses five independent variables to calculate the innovation index, scores
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may range from five (5) to twenty five (25). Again, the final score indicates the ship's 
level of technological sophistication relative to all other ships built during that particular 
cycle.
After each ship is scored in terms of its technological performance, the 
technological rank for each shipbuilding center for each year can be calculated. Each 
center’s rank is computed as the mean score for all ships built at the center during a given 
year. For example, if Glasgow produced 15 ships in 1876, then the average innovative 
ability index is computed using those 15 ships. Once the mean innovation index is 
calculated by center and year, each center is assigned to one of two classes: if the 
innovative index value is above the mean score for all centers, the center is designated as a 
technological leader; while a center with an index value below the mean is designated as a 
technological laggard. This process aggregates the individual ship innovation scores into 
measures of the innovative ability of individual centers for each year, thus repeating the 
shift in scale which is required for the locational analysis. These data, combined with the 
industrial viability ranking, allow for a final test for the association between a specific 
center's industrial viability and its innovative ability.
2..S. The Relationship Between Innovation and Market Share
The final stage of the statistical analysis tests for association, in a statistical sense, 
between the center's market share (the measure of industrial viability) and its innovative 
ability. The question is whether or not shipbuilding centers were rewarded economically, 
as indicated by their market share, for their innovative ability. The test assumes that a
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shipbuilding center's ability to compete successfully with other centers in its industrial 
system was directly related to its ability to generate or assimilate shipbuilding innovations.
The test is carried out using a chi-square contingency table test. Chi-square, a 
non-parametric statistical procedure, tests for an association between a set of observed 
categorical frequencies and a set of hypothesized frequencies. In order to carry out the 
test, the market share rankings are combined with the innovative ability rankings for each 
center and each year it was in production. As previously mentioned, the index scores for 
each center and for each year are assigned to three classes: high, medium, and low. 
Similarly, the innovative ability variable is divided into two classes: above the mean and 
below the mean for each cycle. The result is a two-by-three contingency table. A chi- 
square test statistic is calculated to test for the association between innovation and place 
for each of the four cycles. Additional analyses measure the strength and direction of the 
association using Kendall's Tau-c statistic, and assess the contribution of individual 
categories (cells) within the two-by-three contingency table to the total chi-square 
statistic. Given the sub-division of the study period into four cycles, there are four 
contingency tables and four sets o f tests for association. The number o f shipbuilding 
center and year observations available for each of the four tests o f association vary 
because different locations enter and leave the Register during each year and each cycle.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the implicit assumption of interdependence between technological change 
and the industrial viability of the individual production center, economic geographers have 
not examined the relationship between innovation and place. This chapter has presented
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an analytical framework for assessing this relationship. However, the complexities of the 
research problem combined with the nature of the data require a somewhat involved 
research design.
This research design provides a methodology for directly examining the 
relationship between industrial viability and innovative ability. It incorporates time—the 
technological change cycle—and space—the individual components of the spatial industrial 
system. This analytical approach allows for the examination technological change at a 
variety o f  spatial scales, from the national to the level of individual production centers, and 
provides economic geography with a methodological framework with which to assess the 
interaction between innovation and place.
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CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE 1840-1880 BRITISH IRON SCREW
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry presents an excellent 
opportunity to examine the relationship between technological change and industrial 
restructuring. Innovations during this period dramatically increased ship size, power, and 
cargo-carrying capacity. The period also witnessed the establishment of modem ship 
construction techniques, propulsion systems, and designs (Abell, 1981; Brock and 
Greenhill, 1973; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Parkinson, 1960; Rowland, 
1971; Waine, 1976). More importantly from a geographic perspective, the new ship 
transformed the scale of the individual shipbuilding firm and reconfigured the industry's 
spatial structure as new centers emerged and older centers declined in importance.
This chapter provides a broad overview of the important changes in the iron 
steamship between 1840 and 1880. It begins with an introduction to, and brief outline of 
British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion before 1840. It then 
discusses key innovations in iron ship construction techniques and marine steam 
propulsion systems. Next, it examines the transition of the British shipbuilding and 
shipping industries from the traditional wooden sailing ship to the iron steamship. Based 
on this analysis, four distinct shipbuilding and innovation cycles within the study period are 
identified. The final section demonstrates that these changes resulted in continuous 
increases in ship size, power, and efficiency.
67
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1. IRON STEAMSHIP TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Although shipbuilding is one of that country's oldest and most important industries, 
Britain's perfection of new ship technologies allowed her to dominate world shipbuilding 
output from 1872 to 1918. The British shipbuilding industry's dominance was due to its 
development o f and specialization in iron and steam shipbuilding. At the beginning o f the 
nineteenth century, when shipbuilding was synonymous with wood and sail, British 
shipbuilders began experiments with iron construction and steam propulsion. By 1840, 
the new ship had established its economic viability for select trade routes, and a second 
innovation cycle began that perfected the new technologies. Changes during this period 
led to dramatic increases in ship size, power, and cargo-carrying efficiency (Musson,
1978; Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and by 1880 modem ship construction techniques, 
propulsion systems, and designs had been established (Abell, 1980; Waine, 1976).
1.1. Introduction of and Early Experiments in Iron and Steam Shipbuilding
Britain was able to experiment with and then perfect the new ship because of its 
head start in the Industrial Revolution. James Watt's improvements to the Newcomen 
engine (1763) provided a relatively efficient engine, while Cort's puddling process (1782) 
provided a cost-effective method for producing malleable iron bar and plate (Walker,
1984; Jones, 1957). Britain's pioneering efforts in the iron-working and engineering 
industries conferred initial and comparative advantages on that country which were most 
instrumental in the development of the new ship. This is evidenced by the fact that 
original experiments and financial support came from the mechanical engineering, civil
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engineering, and iron-working industries rather than shipbuilders and shipowners (Jones, 
1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
The first British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion occurred at 
the end o f the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The first iron vessel 
was the TriaL built by John Wilkerson at Sunderland on the North East Coast. Iron 
shipbuilding was then confined to river and canal boats for the next twenty years 
(Cunningham, 1903; Dougan, 1968; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
Although steamboats were built earlier in the United States, the first practical British 
steamboat was the canal towboat Charlotte Dundas. built by Robert Symmington in 1801 
near Glasgow. Further work on the Clyde culminated in the first commercially successful 
British passenger steamer, Henry Bell's Comet, built in 1812 (Jones, 1957; Rowland,
1970; Walker, 1984).
The first iron hulled steamship was the Aaron Manbv. built in 1821 for the short 
ocean Liverpool to Ireland packet service. The advantages of installing steam engines in 
iron hulls were that iron is fireproof and, since stronger and lighter than wood, iron was 
better able to the support the heavy engine without sacrificing the ship's earning potential. 
Following the success o f the Aaron Manbv, iron steamships were built in increasing 
numbers for service on rivers, protected open water, and the English Channel and Irish 
Sea (Cunningham, 1903; Gilfillan, 1935; Jones, 1957; Rowland, 1970).
The iron steamship still required an efficient propulsion system before h could 
become a suitable ocean-going cargo carrier, however. The original steamers were 
propelled by the paddle-wheel, a propulsion system that made for very fast vessels and
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which was well-suited for the low piston speeds obtained by the early steam engines. 
Unfortunately, the paddle-wheel was very inefficient, since only the immersed paddles do 
useful work. Further, it was unsuitable for ocean-going trade routes because the paddles 
were easily damaged and came out of the water in heavy seas. The preferred system was 
the screw propeller because it eliminated the problems noted above: all blades are 
immersed and perform useful work; is less subject to damage because it is sturdier and 
below the waterline; and remains operable in all sea conditions. The introduction o f an 
efficient screw did not occur until fairly late, however, because of the high costs 
associated with casting alternative screw designs. As a result, the first screw propeller 
was not introduced until 1826 and the first prototype of the modem screw propeller, 
installed on the Archimedes by Francis Smith, did not appear until 1839 (Graham, 1958; 
Gilfillan, 1935; Rowland, 1970; Walker, 1984).
By 1840 improvements in iron construction techniques and steam propulsion 
systems made the iron screw steamship superior to the paddle steamer and competitive 
with the traditional wooden sailer on select ocean-going passenger and cargo routes. The 
ship’s acceptance by the shipping community was signaled by the entry of the Sirius in the 
Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping in 1837. The feasibility of the new ships 
as long distance ocean carriers was demonstrated by the first trans-Atlantic crossing under 
continuous steam power made by this same ship in 1838. These two accomplishments 
signaled the end of the iron steamship's technological gestation period and initiated the 
1840-1880 technological change cycle. By the end of this cycle the iron steamship was 
the dominate ocean-going cargo carrier on all but the longest trade routes.
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1.2. 1840-1880 Iron Steamship Technological Change
Iron ship construction and steam propulsion systems perfected between 1840 and 
1880 revolutionized ocean transport. In 1840 the new ship occupied a small niche within 
a British merchant fleet dominated by the traditional wooden sailing ship. By 1880, afler 
progressive and unprecedented increases in ship size and power, the steamship was the 
dominate ship technology. Sailing ships were relegated to trade routes either too long for 
the steamer's coal requirements or with profit margins too low to justify the iron 
steamship's greater initial and operating costs. In addition, the period saw the 
establishment of shipbuilding techniques, ship designs, and propulsion systems that are the 
basis of the modem shipbuilding industry.
Iron steamship technological change was the response to both supply and demand 
factors. During the pre-1840 period and until the introduction of the John Bowes, which 
established the iron and screw steamship's advantages as a bulk cargo carrier, interest in 
iron ship construction was led by shipbuilders attempting to substitute increasingly scarce, 
and so more expensive, ships timber. In this respect, technological change can be 
considered to have been "supply pushed.” At the same time, however, packet services 
became increasingly interested in the application of the steam engine to navigation, 
originally as towboats for canals and later for packet services on rivers and short ocean 
routes. In this sense, then, technological change can be considered to have been "demand 
pulled.” Afler the acceptance of the iron steamship, however, innovations in iron 
construction and steam propulsion were driven by shipowner demand for more cargo- and 
fuel-efficient ships.
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1.2.1. Iron
The main advantages of iron as a shipbuilding material are its reduced weight 
combined with greater strength. Wooden ship structural components embody a large 
amount of lost and dead weight. Twenty to fifty percent of ffaming-timber weight is lost 
immediately in planing and shaping, while dead weight cargo-carrying capacity is reduced 
because a full half of wooden hull weight is needed to simply hold the ship together. Iron, 
because of its greater weight and strength efficiencies, reduced hull thickness and so 
increased dead weight cargo capacity by 30 percent and hold capacity from 20 to 50 
percent in proportion to exterior dimensions. Iron's greater longitudinal strength also 
allowed it to take greater structural stresses so that the length of iron hulls could exceed 
the 300 feet limit imposed by wood (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker, 
1984).
In addition to its weight and strength efficiencies, iron had several other 
advantages. Iron could take the localized stresses caused by the screw propeller, allowing 
for the full utilization of this propulsion system. The ends of iron plate could be 
overlapped and riveted to make for a stronger, water-tight vessel over its entire length, 
while water-tight bulkheads made for greater transverse strength. Finally, and not least, 
iron construction was much faster than wooden construction (Jones, 1957; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
Despite its advantages, iron also had a number of drawbacks that had to be 
overcome before it could displace wood as the material o f choice for trans-oceanic 
carriers. First, iron required anti-corrosion processes and the development o f compasses
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that were not affected by the hull's magnetic field, both accomplished by 1839 (Gilfillan. 
1935; Walker, 1984). Second, the cost o f iron plates and frames had to be reduced and 
their quality improved. Both problems were addressed by the iron industry between 1840 
and 1850 through technical improvements in iron rolling techniques as demand increased 
from the shipbuilding industry (Jones, 1957; MacGregor, 1980; Pollard and Robertson, 
1979). Third, shipbuilders had to develop new construction techniques, machinery, labor 
practices, and shipyard layouts to fashion, assemble, and fasten individual structural pieces 
and systems (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984). Finally, 
shipbuilders, shipowners, merchants, and ship surveyors had to be convinced that iron 
ships would withstand the stresses associated with trans-oceanic service (Jones, 1957; 
MacGregor, 1984;Waine, 1976).
I.2.I.I. Iron Construction
Basic ship construction techniques were essentially the same as those for wooden 
ships. The difference was that, rather than being a handicraft industry as was the case with 
wooden shipbuilding, iron shipbuilding became an industrial enterprise that altered 1) 
shipyard practices used to fashion, assemble, and fasten individual structural pieces and 
systems; and 2) shipyard layouts that maximized throughput. As such, it adopted many of 
the same techniques, machinery, and labor practices already developed in foundries and 
engine and boiler works. Although they were continually modified throughout the study 
period, the construction techniques and yard layouts were essentially in place by 1834 with 
the establishment of the first exclusively iron shipyard, located on the River Clyde (Abell, 
1981; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker; 1984).
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Except for a few isolated experiments with the longitudinal framing  system, used 
for steel ships after 1880, iron ships were built using the transverse framing  system. This 
was the same system used to build the Vulcan, the first iron steamer built on the Clyde in 
1818, and was a direct adaptation of the framing system used for wooden ships. The 
primary structural components and their order of assembly were as follows. The keel, an 
iron plate miming the length of the ship, was assembled. Floor plates were then attached 
at right angles to the keel to form the bottom of the hull. The ribs, bent to the contour of 
the hull before erection, were attached to the ends of the floor plates. Bars that ran the 
length o f the ship were used to tie in the ribs and floor plates for longitudinal support, 
while iron bulkheads and deck beams running the width of the ship provided transverse 
support. The last step in the assembly process was to attach the metal plates, shaped to 
the form of the outer hull or skin, which were overlapped and riveted to the floor plates 
and ribs and made watertight (Abell, 1981; Bremner, 1868; Walker, 1984).
Changes in ship construction were directed towards maximizing dead weight 
cargo-carrying capacity and increasing ship length without an attendant loss in strength 
(Abell, 1981; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Most of these changes were accomplished 
through leaming-by-doing and leaming-by-using. First, methods emerged for 
strengthening longitudinal framing pieces. Second, fastening systems for joining structural 
pieces were modified to strengthen joints and eliminate redundant framing pieces for 
weight and construction cost savings. Since these changes were embedded in the 
production process and are not discussed by shipbuilding historians, they are difficult, if 
not impossible, to date. Two significant changes which increased longitudinal strength
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(and so ship length) and which can be dated were the introduction of hollow floor framing 
systems for water ballast, introduced in 1842, followed by the double-bottom water ballast 
system introduced in 1860 (Abell, l981;Dougan, l968;Waine, 1976; Walker, 1984).
1.2.1.2. Hull Forms and Ship Design
Modem hull forms and ship design were also introduced during the 1840 to 1880 
period. Based on available information, efficient hull forms were not introduced until the 
1870s while changes in ship design began in the mid- 1840s and culminated in the ship 
superstructures and additional decks and spaces typical of modem ships. The following 
discussion is composed of two parts. The first examines changes in hull form represented 
by changes in the length-to-beam ratio. The second examines changes in ship design that 
increased the ship's cargo-carrying efficiency.
1.2.1.3. Hull Form
The steam engine's greatest handicap, especially before 1852, was the amount of 
potential money earning space occupied by the engine and fuel supply. One of the most 
effective methods for maximizing engine efficiency relative to cargo-carrying capacity 
was to utilize iron's greater longitudinal strength to make the hull longer relative to its 
width. This relationship is referred to as the length-to-beam ratio and is expressed by the 
ratio Length : Width (Muckle and Taylor, 1975). Higher ratios allowed for increases in 
hull volume without a corresponding increase in engine power because the water 
resistance against the ship was not materially increased (Rowland, 1970).
The first significant change to the length-to-beam ratio was introduced by I.K. 
Brunei Brunei built the Great Britain, the most celebrated of the early iron steamships, in
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1843. Brunei utilized a length-to-beam ratio o f  5.8:1 for this ship, radical for the period, 
and justified it by formulating the principle that the carrying capacity of a ship's hull 
increased as a cube of the ship's dimensions, while the power required to overcome water 
resistance increased only as a square (Rowland, 1970). By 1854, length-to-beam ratios 
for ocean steamers were between 5.5:1 and 6 :1, as compared to the 3.5:1 common 
at the end of the eighteenth century. By 1860 the ratio had increased to between 8:1 and 
9:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Rowland, 1970). According to testimony before the 
1873 Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea, by the late 1860s ships already in service 
were being sent back to the yard for lengthening to increase both cargo-carrying capacity 
(allowed for by improved ship framing techniques) and length-to-beam ratios.
Lengthening consisted of separating the ship at its midsection and inserting a new hull 
section. The fact it was a common practice by the early-1870s indicates that the greater 
advantages o f the new construction and propulsion systems were clearly recognized 
within both the shipbuilding and shipping industries. While ships with ratios of 10:1 to 
11:1 were built in the 1870s, such extreme ratios over-extended framing systems and were 
suspected of causing ship failure (Parliamentary Papers. Vol XXV, 1969). By the end of 
the study period the ratio stabilized at around 8:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine, 
1976).
Changes in iron construction and steam propulsion dictated changes to hull forms, 
which were constantly modified throughout the study period. The earliest steamship hull 
forms, copied directly from those used for wooden sailers, were modified as the handling 
qualities of steamships and the capabilities o f iron and steam became better known. These
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changes were based on the preferences of shipbuilders and shipowners as they gained 
more experience with the new ship technologies, but scientific methods for designing hull 
forms were introduced in the 1860s and 1870s.
The earliest hull form modifications extended bull length and made the bows 
finer, or sharper. Hull lengthening came about because iron hulls, due their greater 
longitudinal strength, were less subject to the stresses of hogging and sagging 
(longitudinal bending) caused by being driven through heavy swells (Rowland, 1970). 
Driving also resulted in bows being further sharpened to allow the ship to cut through 
heavy seas rather than sail over them. This was a common feature in iron steamships in 
the 1860s. Bows then became blunter in the 1870s as problems with hogging and sagging 
in the longer ships forced a return to the practice of riding over seas (Waine, 1976). The 
final change to hull forms, based on the experiments of William Froude and other naval 
architects, also came about in the 1870s with the squaring o f hulls at the keel to reduce 
turbulence and resulting drag at the propeller (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine,
1976).
I.2.I.4. Ship Design
Between 1840 and 1880 the iron steamship was transformed from being little more 
than a modified copy o f traditional wooden sailers to prototypes of modem passenger and 
cargo ships with multiple decks, raised decks at the bow and stem, and superstructures. 
Although either neglected or given cursory attention by most shipbuilding historians,
Waine (1976) provides important insights into these changes. The following discussion is 
based on Waine's discussion and ship drawings.
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In 1840, deck layout and rigging systems were copied from wooden ships 
employed on the same trade routes. Changes began sometime around 1848, as indicated 
by plans for a ship built in that year, with the erection of a rudimentary bridge to allow 
for a better view forward. Sometime between 1848 and 1865, the exact date not given, 
the forecastle deck made a tentative appearance (Waine, 1976). The first specialized bulk 
cargo-carrier, the collier John Bowes, was built in 1852. Although it was designed like 
the wooden sailing ships employed in the trade, the ship featured water ballast tanks to 
adjust the depth and angle at which the ship rode in the water. Bulkheads were also added 
to separate hold compartments, which improved ship stability and cargo handling 
capability while reducing the threat of flooding in the event the ship's skin was punctured. 
Water ballast tanks and bulkheads are common to modem cargo ships (Dougan, 1968; 
Waine, 1976).
Although (somewhat surprisingly) no sources corroborate this, the Merchant 
Shipping, or Moorsom, Act o f  1854 would appear to have had a profound impact on the 
development of modem ship designs. This act established new definitions for calculating 
register tonnage (one ton being equal to 100 cubic feet) used to assess harbor duties and 
other charges. The Act defined gross tonnage as the ship's total permanently enclosed 
volume less certain exempted spaces such as water ballast tanks, wheel house, galley, and 
lavatories. Net tonnage was defined as gross tonnage less non-earning spaces such as 
crew accommodations, as well as allowances for engine and machinery space.
Since harbor duties and fees were based on the ship's net tonnage, shipowners 
expected net tonnage to be kept as low as possible without jeopardizing cargo-carrying
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capacity. Shipbuilders responded by adding non-permanently enclosed decks and spaces 
above the tonnage deck (first permanently enclosed deck) that could still be used to carry 
cargo. These decks and spaces were used to calculate gross tonnage but met the 
exemption requirements for calculating net tonnage (Waine, 1976). The practice was 
common by 1872 and was suspected of making ships unstable, leading to the 
implementation of the Plimsoll Line (1894), a legally required mark on the hull used to 
indicate when a ship was overloaded and to set its trim (Parliamentary Papers. 1969).
The profile of the modem ship began to take form in the 1860s with the 
appearance of the hurricane deck, a deck fitted at the bow to keep water from sweeping 
over the decks. Since the space under the deck was not necessarily permanently enclosed, 
it created more gross tonnage but not net tonnage (Waine, 1976). The blunt bow and 
square hull was common by the 1870s, the first so that ships could ride over seas, rather 
than through them, while the second reduced water turbulence and resulting drag at the 
propeller. For smaller vessels, the raised quarterdeck (at the stem) was extended and the 
hatches were placed in the well deck (between quarter and hurricane decks) on small 
ships. For larger vessels, the raised quarterdeck was extended all the way to the bridge 
which was placed approximately in the middle of ship. Finally, the superstructure became 
permanent when the bridge was completely enclosed (Waine, 1976).
1.3. Steam Propulsion
The mam advantages of the early steamships were their greater speed and 
dependability. Unlike sailing ships that are subject to winds and tides, steamers could 
keep pre-arranged schedules and were faster than sailing ships, important qualities for the
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Irish and Continental packet services which depended upon regular service and rapid turn­
around time. These qualities allowed shipowners to charge premium fares for both 
passengers and low bulk, high value express freight, essential if owners were to recapture 
the steamship's higher initial and operating costs (Cunningham, 1903; Rowland, 1970).
Still, the early steamers were not suitable as trans-oceanic cargo-carriers because 
of their gross inefficiency in terms of converting heat into propulsive energy. Early 
engines required one half ton of machinery and 4.7 pounds of coal to generate one unit of 
indicated horsepower. Improvements in the engine plant before 1850 were directed 
toward reducing engine weight and size and improving fuel efficiency. Improvements in 
weight and size were gained through the development of and refinements to a succession 
of engines that attempted to either improve engine power or reduce size and weight, 
while fuel efficiencies were gained through improved boilers and steam condensers. Other 
improvements in engine and boiler performance were gained by improved metal working 
techniques, such as boring and screw making machines and close tolerance metal working 
techniques introduced in the 1840s; the development of petroleum based lubricants 
beginning in the late 1840s and lasting throughout the study period; and the perfection of 
the screw propeller (Elkins, 1884; Gilfillan, 1935; Jones, 1957;RiegeL, 1924; Rowland, 
1970; Walker, 1984).
1.3.1. Engines
The two engines in common use at the beginning o f the study period were the 
side-lever and oscillating engines. These engines were simple to operate and suitable for 
the low boiler pressures used in the early British steamships. However, because of their
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low boiler pressures, they consumed excessive amounts of coal. By the early 1850s screw 
propellers were becoming more common, but the side-Iever and oscillating engines were 
unsatisfactory for the screw because crankshaft revolutions were too low and had to be 
stepped up three to six times. Transmission systems were introduced as early as 1843, but 
they remained unsatisfactory throughout the study period (Elkins, 1884; Riegel, 1924; 
Rowland, 1970; Walker, 1984).
Rather than develop new transmission systems, a new engine was introduced. This 
was the compound engine, originally introduced in 1804 but not patented for marine 
use until 1852. The benefits of this engine were that it took better advantage of steam 
pressure, was coupled directly to the drive shaft, and developed high enough crankshaft 
revolutions to drive the screw propeller.
With the compounding system, steam entered a large diameter (low pressure) 
cylinder where it expanded to drive the large cylinder. The steam was then exhausted into 
a second, small diameter (high pressure) cylinder where it expanded again to drive the 
second cylinder before being condensed and returned to the boiler. Since more work was 
done by the same steam, the compound engine saved thirty to forty percent in fuel costs 
over a single expansion engine of the same horsepower, while increasing the ship's sailing 
radius as fuel stores went farther (Elkins, 1884; Riegel, 1924). The first engine was 
installed on the Brandon in 1853, the same year that the Crimean War started, and the new 
engine was used extensively for the resulting build-up of the merchant fleet (Gilfillan,
1835; Jones, 1957; McNeil, 1990; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968; Rowland, 1970).
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In addition to savings in operating costs, the engine increased the regularity of the 
turning moment, yielding higher propeller efficiency, while also decreasing stresses and 
strains on the ship and engine frames, shaftings, and bearings. The engine was also much 
simpler in construction than previous engines, which reduced materials and further 
reduced costs (Riegel, 1924; Rowland, 1970; Pollard and Robinson, 1979). Toward the 
end of the study period the engine had been enlarged to the triple expansion engine (three 
pairs of cylinders) and then to the quadruple expansion (four pairs of cylinders), the latter 
engine remaining the standard for cargo ships until the introduction of the diesel engine 
(Jones, 1957; Walker, 1984).
1.3.2. Boilers and Condensers
Better engine performance and fuel consumption were also achieved through 
improvements to boilers and steam condensers. The first significant change to the boiler 
occurred in 1844 with the introduction of the marine fire tube boiler. Rather than 
circulating water through tubes placed immediately above the fire, as was done in the early 
steamers, flat horizontal tubes connected the combustion chamber to the funnel uptake.
The tubes were surrounded by water and steam was generated as the hot gasses passed 
through the tubes and on to the funnel (GilfiUan, 1935; Jones, 1957; Reigel; 1924; 
Rowland, 1970). The Scotch boiler, introduced in 1862, operated on the same principle 
as the fire tube but was cylindrical in shape rather than box-like. This boiler became 
popular after 1870 because it was sturdy, reliable, and suitable for pressures up to 600 
pounds per square inch (Ib/in2), and so ideal for long haul cargo ships (Rowland, 1970).
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A year after the Scotch boiler was introduced, the surface condenser made a 
second appearance. The condenser allows the engine cylinder to perform useful work on 
the piston's downstroke by exhausting all unexpanded steam in the cylinder to create a 
vacuum. This is Watt's major improvement to the original Newcomen engine (Usher. 
1954). The most commonly used condenser before the introduction of the surface 
condenser was the jet condenser. This condenser, which sprayed water into the cylinder, 
did not differ greatly from that invented by Watt. It was replaced beginning in 1863 with 
an improved surface condenser, first introduced in 1834 but never gaining wide popularity 
because of its complexity and maintenance requirements. The new surface condenser used 
a pump to draw unexhausted steam out of the cylinder and then pass it through tubes of 
cool, fresh water. Its most important improvements were that it improved the cylinder 
vacuum by using a pump to draw the unexhausted steam out of the cylinder, and reduced 
maintenance by using distilled water and employing filters to draw off lubricant residues 
(Rowland, 1970).
1.4. Screw Propeller
Although screw propellers were in use by 1840, this system required further 
improvements before it became a dependable propulsion system. First, wooden hulls 
could not tolerate the vibrations inherent with screws, so that its full implementation had 
to wait until iron hulls became the industry standard between 1840 and 1850. Second, the 
crankshaft had to be made to turn fast enough to make the screw work efficiently. Several 
transmission systems were patented beginning in 1844, but the problem was not solved 
until the compound engine was introduced. Finally, the rapid wear and tear of the stem
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shaft and propeller bearings had to be overcome and non-leaking, dependable stem 
bearings developed to allow the propeller shaft to pass through the hulL These tasks were 
accomplished between 1839, with the patenting of Babbitmetal, a soft alloy used for 
bearings, bushings, and seals; and lignum vitae stem bearings introduced in 1855 (Graham, 
1958; Rowland, 1970, Taggart, 1969).
2. THE TRANSITION FROM WOOD AND SAIL TO IRON AND STEAM
Previous sections have established the origins of technical changes in 1840-1880 
iron screw steamships. Before proceeding with a examination of the impacts of these 
changes on the iron steamship, the transition o f the British shipbuilding and shipping 
industries over to the new ship will be discussed. In addition, four individual shipbuilding 
cycles are identified. These cycles coincide with the introduction o f important innovations 
which changed the technological composition o f the iron steamship. The following 
discussion is based largely on Figure IV-1, which graphs British sail and steam 
shipbuilding tonnage output for the 1840-1880 period. The graph extends to 1883 in 
order to include the entire fourth shipbuilding cycle. Data are obtained from B. R_ 
Mitchell's British Historical Statistics (1988).
Three observations are in order. The first is that 1840-1880 shipbuilding, like the 
modem industry, was a very volatile industry subject to periods o f boom and bust (Todd, 
1985; Ville, 1990). The cyclical nature of shipbuilding output reflected in the graphs 
correspond to British trade cycles (Saul, 1985; Thomas, 1954) which, like business cycles 
in the United States, are characterized by rising output followed by market saturation and 
glut. These cycles are directly linked to the larger economy as demonstrated by their

















British Shipbuilding Output, 1840-1883









£ 2 0 0
%
100
m r H + W -
1840 1845 1850
|- | I I i I I I I I- I I I I 
1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880
Year
Source: Mitchell, 1868. Steam Sail
Figure IV-1: British Shipbuilding Output: 1840-1883
00
86
correspondence to fluctuations in British interest rates (Mitchell, 1991). The second 
observation is that the prolonged growth of iron steamship output between 1860 and 1866 
clearly demonstrates the new ship's acceptance by the shipowning community, while the 
collapse in sail output coupled with growth in steam output demonstrates the change-over 
o f the merchant fleet to steam Finally, the opposite trend lines for the two ship 
technologies represents the existence of two distinct ship markets by 1869 and possibly as 
early as 1860.
2.1. Output
The traditional sailing ship dominated British shipbuilding output from 1840 to 
approximately 1870. With the exception of the 1840 to 1845 period, when iron steamship 
production remained stable during a decline in sailing ship output, steamship output 
tracked that for the larger industry. This trend continued until approximately 1865 and
1866, when output for the two ship types began to diverge. In 1865, sailing ship output 
began a decline, with a similar decline for the steamship beginning the following year. By
1867, sailing ship output experienced a brief revival until 1869, after which output 
declined to its lowest level for the entire study period. Steamship production, conversely, 
declined until approximately 1869 and then began a revival and growth period lasting until 
1873. This divergence in output for the two ship types, with peaks for one type 
corresponding to troughs for the other, demonstrates that the iron steamship became the 
industry standard either in 1869 (from the graph), or in 1870 (Pollard and Robertson, 
1979).
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The reasons for this divergence are that the steamship became economically viable 
on most routes while the sailing ship remained an attractive alternative for shipowners 
during depressions in overseas trade. Steamships became viable because of the 
introduction of the multiple expansion engine in 1852 and the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1868. The introduction of the multiple expansion engine made the marine steam engine 
an efficient, cost effective propulsion system. The engine was specifically developed for 
screw propulsion and, when combined with the more efficient boilers that were coming 
into general use at this time, allowed for fuel savings o f between 30 to 40 (Rowland,
1970) or 40 to 50 percent (Jones, 1957). The opening of the Suez Canal in 1868 
considerably shortened voyages and reduced the distance between coaling stations, so that 
the steamship was now an economically viable ocean-going cargo carrier on most major 
routes (Fletcher, 1958; MacGregor, 1984; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
Shipowners continued to order sailing ships because they remained viable for the 
wool trade from Australia and the nitrate trade from the South American west coast until 
the opening of the Panama Canal (Cunnison and GilfiHan, 1958; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
In addition, sailing ships remained attractive during depressions because they were cheap 
and therefore price competitive during periods of reduced shipping and trade. When trade 
increased, however, demand for the more expensive, but much more efficient steamships 
also increased, causing depression in the wooden shipbuilding industry (Cunnison and 
(lilfillatij 1958).
2.2. Cycles
Figure IV-1 also shows four distinct iron and steam shipbuilding cycles. Although 
two distinct cycles occurred at the beginning of the period, 1840-1847 and 1848-1855,
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iron and steam shipbuilding output remained fairly stable until the 1850-1855 upswing. As
a result, the two early cycles are combined for this and all subsequent analysis. The four
cycles are dated using Mitchell's tabular shipbuilding output, rather than the moving
averages in Figure IV-1 which have been "smoothed." Each cycle runs from the year with
the highest output and to the year immediately preceding the next peak in output. The
exception are the first cycle, which began before the start of the study period, and the last
cycle which ended in 1883. The cycles are:
Cycle 1: 1840-1855 
Cycle 2: 1856-1865 
Cycle 3: 1866-1872 
Cycle 4: 1873-1880
Cycles for iron and steam shipbuilding correspond to those for the larger industry 
up until 1867. During the first cycle, 1840-1855, shipbuilding output is dominated by sail. 
Steamship output is relatively stable from 1840 to 1843, unlike the larger industry, 
suggesting that the market for steamships was somewhat distinct from that of the overall 
ship market. Steamship output comes into synch with the larger industry in 1842, after 
which its cycles are indistinguishable (except that peaks and troughs for steam occur from 
one to two years before those for sail) for those of the larger industry until 1865. The 
bust cycle ending in 1843 can be associated with the world wide trade depression 
beginning in 1839 (Temin, 1969), while the crashes in 1855 and 1865 are due to the gluts 
o f shipping capacity following the Crimean and American Civil Wars, respectively (Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979; Todd, 1985; Walker, 1984). By the beginning of the third 
shipbuilding cycle, steam and sail output begin to diverge. In 1868 the two cycles take
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opposite tracks, with steam output entering a growth period in 1869 while that for sail is 
delayed until 1873 and never again reaches its 1865 peak. (The crash in 1873 can be 
associated with the world-wide financial crisis that began as early as 1866 (Kendleberger. 
1990; Pollard, 1989; Saul, 1985).) This divergence demonstrates that the iron steamship 
became the dominate shipbuilding technology and that two distinct industries, sail and 
steam, had emerged by 1868.
3. IRON STEAMSHIP CHANGE
The technological changes discussed earlier resulted in increases in average ship 
size, power, and efficiency over the course o f the study period. The following discussion 
is based on Table IV-1, which shows increasing engine plant efficiencies in terms of 
horsepower and coal consumption. These data are collected from various sources.
Figures IV-2 through IV-4 graph annual changes in average ship size (gross tons per 
ship), engine horsepower, and ship power (gross tons divided by horsepower) based on 
technical measurements in the Lloyd's Register available for the entire study. At the same 
time, these changes are placed within the context o f the shipbuilding cycles discussed 
above to show that technological changes introduced either in preceding cycles or 
immediately at the beginning of a cycle resulted in distinct phases in the development of 
the common practice steamship.
3.1. Engine Efficiency Gains
Efficiency gains to the entire propulsion system created by improvements in 
engines, boilers, condensers, and screw propulsion are shown in Table IV-1. The data are 
obtained from discussions of improved steam engine performance located in Elkins (1884)
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and Reigel (1921). Although incomplete, the data indicate steady steam engine efficiency 
gains throughout the study period. Boiler pressure, using the original box-boiler, was only 
5 pounds per square inch (Ib/in2) in 1834. The use of the fire-tube boiler, introduced 
during the first shipbuilding cycle, and following improvements raised boiler pressures to 
between 25 and 40 lb/in2 in 1862. Finally, at the end of the third cycle in 1872 and with 
the common use o f the Scotch boiler, pressures had risen to between 45 and 60 Ib/in2.
TABLE IV-1: 1840-1880 Changes in Boiler Pressure and Coal
Consumption
Boiler Coal
Year Expansion Pressure' Consumption2
1834 single 5 lb/in2 ***
1840 (Cycle I) single *** 4.7 Ibs/hp
1852 (Cycle 1) single *** 3.75 Ibs/hp
1862 (Cycle 2) compound 25-40 lb/in2 ***
1872 (Cycle 3) compound 45-60 lb/in2 ***
1873 (Cycle 4) compound *** 2.5 Ibs/hp
1892 triple *** 1.5 lbs/hp
*** no data
Source:1 Elkins, 1886;2 Riegel, 1921
Reductions in coal consumption were even more dramatic. The amount of coal 
consumed to generate one unit of indicated horsepower (Ib/hp) declined during the first 
cycle, from 4.7 Ib/hp in 1840 to 3.75 Ibs/hp in 1852. By the beginning of the last cycle, in 
1873, and after the full implementation o f  the changes discussed above, coal consumption
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had fallen to 2.5 Ibs/hp Coal consumption continued to fall with the introduction of the 
triple and quadruple expansion engines to a low of 1.5 Ibs/hp in 1892.
3.2. Increases in Ship Size and Power
The following graphs conclusively demonstrate that the technological changes of 
the 1840-1880 period dramatically increased the size and power of the ship. However, 
these increases were not continuous but rather were accomplished through net gains from 
one cycle to the next. Note that dramatic increases in ship size and power occur either 
immediately before, during, or after the transitions between shipbuilding cycles. This 
suggests that the benefits o f technological innovations introduced during one economic 
cycle are not fully realized until following cycles. This finding supports arguments made 
by authors ranging from Kuznets (1930) to Hyde (1977) to Mensch (1978). The declines 
in the later phase of the cycle are most likely due to the retrenchment within the shipping 
industry in response to declining trade.
The first graph in the series (Figure IV-2) reports average annual iron steamship 
size in terms of gross tons, a measure of permanently enclosed ship volume. The years 
1843 and 1844 contain single observations which distort the trend and the following 
graphs at the beginning of the study period. The graph demonstrates that average ship 
size increased for the entire study period. Average gross tonnage rose from approximately 
183 gross tons in 1845 to 1400 tons by 1880. The only exceptions to this record of steady 
growth in average ship size are three periods o f decline: from 1857 to 1860; 1865 to 1868; 
and 1874 to 1877. Despite these periods of decline, however, average size never fell 
below the peak of the previous cycle. The periods of declining ship size correspond to
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periods of declining iron steamship output and most likely reflect demand within the 
shipping industry for smaller ships during periods of economic contraction. This 
observation is suggested by the fact that the first two periods correspond to ship market 
gluts following the Crimean War and American Civil War. respectively (Hughes and 
Reiter, 1958; Lester, 1975; and Spencer, 1983).
The trend for engine horsepower (Figure IV-3) is less clear than that for average 
ship size. The graph shows that, except for brief periods of fluctuation from 1852 to 1854 
and 1856 to 1858, average engine horsepower increased steadily until 1863. This year is 
significant because it coincides with the introduction o f the Scotch boiler (1862) and 
surface condenser (1863). After 1863, the trend for average horsepower is characterized 
by both large fluctuations and overall decline. Interestingly, periods of increasing average 
horsepower, either before or after 1863, correspond to periods of declining average ship 
size. The reason for this correspondence is unclear, but could possibly be due to the need 
for more powerful engines for smaller ships with larger length-to-beam ratios.
The reasons behind the decline in average horsepower clarify when we consider 
annual changes in average ship power (Figure IV-4). This variable is calculated by 
dividing the ship's gross tonnage by engine horsepower to measure the amount of gross 
tonnage propelled by one unit o f engine horsepower. The performance o f ship power is 
unlike that of average horsepower in that the period before 1869 was highly cyclical but 
characterized by a slight overall increase in power. The exception is the period of rapid 
growth beginning in 1861 and then the just as rapid decline until 1869. Periods of 
increasing and declining ship power correspond with those for average ship size and
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Figure IV-4: Average Ship Power Per Iron Steamship
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horsepower, suggesting only modest increases in ship power before 1869. After 1869. 
however, and around the same time the use of the Scotch boiler and surface condenser 
(introduced in 1862 and 1863, respectively) were widespread, ship power rises 
dramatically until 1873. After this year, the cyclical trend characteristic of the pre-1869 
period resumes.
These graphs demonstrate that, despite the high fluctuations in horsepower and 
ship power, the amount of power installed on individual ships rose steadily during the 
period, indicating that shipbuilders were using engines commensurate with the power 
requirements of the individual ship. This observation suggests increasing ship power 
efficiency and, since this is not indicated by average horsepower alone, supports the 
argument made earlier that greater pow er efficiencies were the result o f complex inter­
relationships between the iron steamship's two component technologies, iron construction 
and steam propulsion, and their sub-systems.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion began at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. By the late 1830s, the innovation process had 
advanced to the point that the iron screw steamship was accepted by the shipping industry 
for trans-oceanic trade routes. This acceptance initiated a forty year innovation cycle that 
transformed the iron screw steamship from a ship type suitable for only a few select trade 
routes to the dominate trans-oceanic cargo carrier.
This revolution in ship technology was the result of successive improvements in 
two basic ship technological systems over the course of the 1840-1880 period. Iron
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construction techniques and ship designs led to cargo carriers that were much more 
efficient than traditional wooden ships, while a succession of improvements to the 
propulsion system, including engines, condensing systems, and boilers resulted in dramatic 
efficiency gains. Although the 1840-1880 innovation cycle concluded with the change­
over to steel construction and the multiple expansion engine, modem iron construction 
techniques, ship designs, and propulsion systems were in place.
Significantly, however, the innovation process was not continuous. The 1840- 
1880 period can be broken into four genuinely distinct cycles caused by periods of 
economic expansion and depression within the shipbuilding and shipping industries. These 
cycles are important to any understanding of technological change within the shipbuilding 
industry for two reasons. First, changes in key technological indicators, such as average 
ship length or horsepower, track shipbuilding output fluctuations. Second, these changes 
were not continuous but rather occurred in jumps from one cycle to the next. This 
strongly indicates that innovations introduced in one cycle were not fully exploited in 
commercial terms until the following cycle.
This chapter has established the important changes that occurred in the two iron 
steamship component technological systems: iron construction and steam propulsion.
These findings will be used in Chapter VI to direct the specification o f four multiple 
regression models that identify the most significant technological changes that 
characterized the 1840-1880 iron steamship. These four sets of significant variables are 
then used to construct the innovation index that will be used to test for association 
between innovation and place.
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CHAPTER V
THE 1840-1880 BRITISH IRON AND STEAM SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The adoption of the iron screw steamship had a profound impact on the British 
shipbuilding industry. The new technologies required an expansion in shipyard scale and 
complexity, altered factor inputs, and created new industrial linkages These changes 
relaxed the industry's traditional locational requirements and allowed for its spatial 
reconfiguration at a variety o f scales.
This chapter examines the 1840-1880 British shipbuilding industry. It begins with 
a discussion o f changes in shipyard operations and factor inputs that were brought about 
by the new shipbuilding technologies. It demonstrates that these changes altered the 
industry's locational requirements, primarily reflected in the industry's shift from southern 
centers to formerly peripheral northern centers. The industry's spatial relocation, at both 
the national and intra-regional levels, is then discussed. The chapter concludes with a 
survey of 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding regions, identifying component 
shipbuilding centers, their advantages and disadvantages, and their performance between 
1840 and 1880.
1. INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
This section begins with an examination of changes within the shipbuilding 
industry. It examines changes in shipyard operations that altered the locational 
requirements for any particular shipyard. This is followed by a discussion o f changes in
98
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factor inputs that weakened the position of established shipbuilding centers and allowed 
for the industry's spatial reconfiguration at a variety o f scales.
1.1. Shipyard Operations and Site Requirements
In 1840, the shipbuilding industry was dominated by wooden sailing ships. A 
suitable site for wooden ship construction required frontage on a river channel which was 
wide and deep enough to launch and swing the ship; space to stock timber and erect the 
ship; and proximity to raw materials, skilled labor, and ship markets. Equipment was 
negligible and primitive. Little capital was required, so the industry was made up of a 
large number of highly competitive but generally small scale producers who could enter 
and leave production as economic conditions warranted (Jones, 1957).
Although basic ship construction steps are the same for both types of ship, iron 
and steam shipbuilding required massive increases in the scale and complexity of shipyard 
operations. New construction techniques required new and much more powerful methods 
for manipulating and transporting individual structural pieces, as well as more efficient 
layouts that maximized iron through-put from unloading to final erection. In addition to 
building berths and storage areas, the new shipyard was laid out differently to 
accommodate furnaces for heating the iron; steam-powered machines to cut, roll, and 
punch holes into frames and plate; and workshops for bending structural pieces. If  carried 
out at the same location, workshops for engine- and boilerworks required even more 
space and capital (Abell, 1980; Hume, 1976; Walker, 1984). These changes transformed 
the shipyard from a small, handicraft type shop to a large industrial operation with a highly 
organized labor force using complex power tools (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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As ships became larger, the construction process became more complex. As the 
construction process became more complicated, the shipyard required more area and more 
capital intensive equipment (Jones, 1957). By the late 1860s and early 1870s, when ships 
were becoming much larger and construction processes more complicated, shipyard 
productivity was increased through more efficient yard layouts, including the replacement 
of block and tackle with sheerless booms for lifting frames and plates, and the 
development of more powerful machine power tools (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; 
Walker, 1984).
There were also iron shipyards that operated at a much smaller scale than those 
described above, reflecting a more traditional approach in terms of both ship construction 
techniques and business strategy. Although their operations were similar in regards to 
machinery and yard layout, the smaller scale yards were much less capital intensive and by 
and large still relied on the same locational and business strategies used by the wooden 
shipyards. These yards were located in the smaller ports and were usually operated in 
conjunction with ship repair facilities. The small yards specialized in the production of 
small coastal steamers for the local market and could either close down or concentrate on 
ship repair operations during shipbuilding slumps (Waine, 1976).
1.2. Factor Inputs
Changes in shipyard operations changed the nature and relative importance of raw 
materials, land, labor, and capital. These changes relaxed the shipbuilding industry's 
traditional locational requirements and allowed for its spatial reconfiguration. While not 
deterministic, differences in factor prices favored new and/or formerly peripheral
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shipbuilding regions and disadvantaged traditional shipbuilding regions once the new 
shipbuilding practices became established.
1.2.1. Raw Materials
Iron, both for ship construction and ship machinery, was the industry's single most 
important raw material. As a result, shipbuilding activity was attracted to areas with 
established iron and mechanical engineering industries. The most favored locations were 
those near the innovative iron producing regions in Scotland and the North East Coast 
(Hyde, 1977). These centers were also able to attract large scale mechanical engineering 
industries (Hyde, 1977; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Although regional variations in 
iron prices and transport costs tended to equalize over the course o f the study period, 
northern shipbuilding centers enjoyed initial advantages because they were able to form 
closer business relationships with local iron producers (Jones, 1957; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979; Warren, 1990).
1.2.2. Land
The early iron and steam shipbuilders were located in urban areas because of the 
locational advantages of access to subsidiary industries and ship and capital markets.
Urban advantages eroded as the iron and steam industry became established in that 
congested shipping lanes and high urban land costs soon worked to create localized 
diseconomies o f scale. These disadvantages were avoided in the newer regions by either 
hiving off operations or relocating entirely to low-cost satellite communities further down 
the urban hierarchy. This was made possible by infrastructural improvements, primarily in 
the form o f straightening and deepening river channels and developing new industrial sites
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along their banks (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker; 1984).
Relocation was not an option for the traditional regions, however, either because potential 
river improvements which might permit the development of new sites down the urban 
hierarchy had already been exploited or because of conflicts with the shipping industry. 
Firms located in these traditional regions were clearly at a serious disadvantage relative to 
those in the newer regions. As a result, many traditionally successful firms were forced to 
either relocate out of the region or left the industry altogether (Pollard, 1950; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979).
1.2.3. Labor
Iron and steam transformed shipbuilding into an assembly trade with a more highly 
organized but less skilled labor force. Changes in labor force requirements began almost 
immediately with the introduction of iron and steam as shipbuilders adopted many of the 
labor practices used in engine- and boilerworks. Since most machine operations and new 
ship assembly techniques could be carried out by relatively unskilled workers, immigrants 
were employed in these tasks (shipwrights and apprentices, more highly skilled and higher 
paid, were retained because o f the power of their trade organization). Since immigrants 
were attracted to low skilled jobs in urban areas, urban shipyards enjoyed initial 
advantages in labor recruitment and training. These savings in labor costs did not last, 
however, primarily because o f the early establishment of trade unions and the development 
of inter-regional labor markets in the industry. At this point the advantage often swung in 
favor of those centers located down the urban hierarchy where housing and other 
amenities could be provided (Pollard, 1950; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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1.2.4. Capital
The large fixed plant required for an iron shipyard was much more capital intensive 
than that for a wooden shipyard. Initially, shipbuilders received financial backing from the 
mechanical engineering industry and the owners of steam packet lines. Again, these 
sources were located in large ports. By the 1850s, which saw the expansion of the new 
ship into bulk cargo routes, funds became available from regional mining and iron interests 
that employed specialized iron steamers. Most shipyards were owned by single 
proprietorships or by family groups and, since the vast majority of ships were built on 
order from shipowners, with regular payments made during the course of the ship's 
construction, operating funds and capital for expansion was often raised within the firm. 
Capital markets formalized after the mid-1850s with shipbuilders obtaining funds from 
both local and regional financial institutions. Although several joint stock companies were 
formed between 1856 and 1865 (the second shipbuilding cycle identified in the previous 
chapter), survival rates were not high and this method for capital accumulation was not 
heavily utilized during the study period (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; 
Slaven, 1992; Walker, 1984).
2. SPATIAL CHANGE
Accepting that changes in site location and factor inputs were required as the 
industry responded to new forces of agglomeration and economies of scale, this section 
examines the spatial changes within the 1840-1880 British shipbuilding industry. The 
discussion begins by establishing the spatial industrial system at the beginning of the study
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period, and then documents the changes in the system brought about by changing site 
requirements and factor inputs.
2.1. Circa-1840
The shipbuilding industry in 1840 was widely scattered simply because no single 
region had sufficient river frontage to handle all the yards needed to satisfy the country’s 
annual demand for new shipping. The major centers dominated by wood and sail were 
located on the rivers Thames and Mersey, the ports of Bristol and Dublin, and smaller 
ports in East Anglia and on the North East Coast (Dougan, 1968; Jones, 1957; Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979). Of these centers, London and Liverpool, on the Thames and 
Mersey, respectively, built the highest rated ships and enjoyed the highest product 
identification (Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Although firms with several ports had 
experimented with iron shipbuilding, for example Bristol where the Great Western was 
built, iron and steam shipbuilding was still heavily concentrated in London, Liverpool, 
Birkenhead ( also on the Mersey), and on the River Clyde in Scotland (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
Shipbuilders in large urban ports enjoyed locational advantages over builders in the 
smaller ports. Ships built in these locations were rated higher than those built in smaller 
ports and enjoyed high product recognition. The turban location also gave access to a 
large ship market, and shipbuilding output was directly proportional to the trade of the 
port. Further, pools of skilled workers from the local building trades were readily 
available for both ship construction and finishing work, allowing builders in urban ports to 
better handle rush orders (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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2.2. Post-1840
Iron and steam shipbuilding transformed the industry's locational requirements and 
allowed for the British industry's spatial restructuring at both national and regional scales. 
At the national level, the industry shifted out of the traditional shipbuilding regions and 
centers in the south to formerly peripheral regions and centers in the north. At the 
regional level, the industry expanded out of the original urban centers to satellite 
communities once the shipbuilding process became standardized and the center's 
agglomeration advantages began to erode.
Once iron and steam shipbuilding was established in the 1840s, the industry's 
primary locational concerns included convenient access to iron and mechanical engineering 
industries, cheap labor, ship and capital markets, and repair facilities. These concerns 
favored urban centers located on northern rivers. Firms at these new locations saved on 
raw material transport costs and realized business advantages through backward linkages 
to iron and machinery makers and forward linkages to shipowners. Secondary factors in 
the location decision were the port's volume of trade, capital markets, and engineering 
ability (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
By the early 1850s, iron shipbuilding was increasingly concentrated in centers on 
the Clyde and North East Coast that offered cheap factor inputs; large ship markets; and 
subsidiary industries such as machinery, engine- and boilerworks, and repair services.
Like the established wooden shipbuilding centers, the new iron concentrations enjoyed 
high product recognition and tended to attract shipbuilding migrants. These advantages 
improved the individual firm's costs and profitability, providing competitive advantages
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over the declining older southern regions. Other regions that successfully converted to the 
new ship technology were the Scottish East Coast and the River Humber (Jones, 1957; 
Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
The 1850s and 1860s also saw a high degree of concentration in small towns 
within the regional industrial system. The growth of these centers was due to intra- 
regional shifts as firms migrated out of congested urban shipyards and into small towns 
and new industrial sites. These shifts were made possible by river improvement projects 
that straightened and deepened river channels. The new locations allowed firms to 
maintain business relationships established in the original center while avoiding much 
higher urban land prices and congestion (Dougan, 1968; Walker, 1984). Another 
advantage was the firm's ability to better control workers and dominate the small towns 
socially, politically, and economically (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
Intra-regional shifts occurred for both the Clyde and North East Coast regions. 
Shifts on the Clyde, accomplished before the beginning of the study period, were 
characterized by movement beyond Glasgow's corporate limits to immediately adjacent 
communities or further down the river. Similar shifts on the North East Coast began in 
the 1850s and were confined to the rivers Tyne (Newcastle) and Tees (Stockton)
(Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
3. BRITISH SHIPBUILDING REGIONS
This section presents 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding regions and 
their component centers (figures V-1 through V-6). Each center is assigned to one of ten 
shipbuilding regions. These regions, following standard regionalization schemes used by
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Pollard and Robertson (1979), Todd (1985) and others, are named for either the river or 
sea coast on which they are located. Six of the regions are complete functional systems. 
Three regions include isolated ports that were not functionally a part of the region to 
which they are assigned (Mersey) or by combining several individual regions into one 
greater region (Ireland and Severn). The final region (Irish Sea) consists of isolated ports 
between the Mersey and Clyde regions. These centers were not functionally linked but 
each depended local iron supplies and industrial relationships with the Clyde.
3.1. Clyde
The Clyde was the largest and most famous shipbuilding region in the world. It 
was not one of Britain's traditional shipbuilding regions, however, and its success was due 
to its early specialization in iron and steam. The Clyde was considered to be Britain's 
most innovative shipbuilding region, and its list of innovative firsts include: technically and 
commercially successful steamboats; an exclusively iron and steam shipyard; specialized 
machinery, and the compound expansion engine (Hume, 1976; Jones, 1957; Walker,
1984).
Factors influencing the region's growth included the local availability of iron and 
coal, large pools o f both skilled and unskilled labor, an established mechanical engineering 
industry, and local capital and ship markets. Iron for structural pieces and machinery 
came from the large local iron and mechanical engineering industries. Skilled labor was 
obtained from local mechanical engineering establishments and foundries, while unskilled 
labor was imported from Ireland. The river’s large merchant fleet provided a ready ship
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market, while capital was obtained from shipowners, formal financial institutions, and 
shipbuilders (Hyde, 1977; Robb, 1958;Slaven, 1992;Tumock, 1982).
The distribution of Clyde shipbuilding centers is presented in Figure V -1. The 
region's most important center, Glasgow, was located at the Clyde's head of navigation. 
Next in importance were Greenock, Port Glasgow, and Dumbarton, located at the mouth 
of the river, and Paisley and Renfrew nearer Glasgow. Average ship size data from the 
Register suggests that only Greenock and Paisley specialized in particular types of ships, 
with the former producing large ships and the latter small coastal traders. The location of 
the minor centers of Bowling, Maryhill, and Whiteinch suggest relocation out o f the 
larger, nearby centers. Campbelhown, located on the Kintyre peninsula in the Forth of 
Clyde, did not begin production until the very end of the study period.
3.2. Scottish East Coast
The Scottish East Coast (Figure V-1) was the Register's fourth largest producing 
region. Shipbuilding was a prominent industry during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. The region made an early entrance into iron and steam shipbuilding, with its 
first wood and iron steamships being built in 1823 and 1838, respectively. However, the 
region is considered to have been in decline during the 1840-1880 period because of the 
relocation of many Aberdeen shipbuilders to both the Clyde and North East Coast and the 
decline o f trade at the region's principal port, Leith (Bremner, 1869; Lenman, 1981; 
Tumock, 1982). The region's success came from its specialization in specialty ships such 
as coastal steamers and fishing vessels (a strategy still followed today) (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979; Todd, 1985; Waine, 1976).
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Six centers were in production at one time or another during the study period.
The two most important centers were Dundee and Aberdeen. Kinghom and 
Inverkeithing, located on the Forth of Firth, were in production for a limited amount of 
time, Kinghom appearing to specialize in large ships while Inverkeithing produced coastal 
steamers or smaller specialty craft. Leith, located at Edinburgh, and Montrose were very 
small centers (Tumock, 1982).
3.3. North East Coast
Three sub-regions, the Wear, Tyne, and Tees (Figure V-2), are combined to form 
a single North East Coast shipbuilding region. This regionalization scheme follows that of 
most shipbuilding historians, examples being Dougan (1968), Pollard and Robertson 
(1979), and Todd (1985). The classification is based on their dependence on the North 
East Coast iron and steel and coal mining industrial system (Hyde, 1977; Warren, 1990). 
While output for each individual region was less than fifty percent of the Clyde's, the 
combined output of all North East Coast centers was 31.5 percent greater than that for the 
Clyde.
Although the region built Britain's first iron vessels, in actuality the North East 
Coast did not vigorously enter into iron and steam shipbuilding until relatively late. 
Although authors disagree on the exact location and year, the region's first iron steamer 
was built on the Tyne in approximately 1840, while the first ship on the Tees was built in 
1854 on and the Wear in 1858 (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Smith and 
Holden, 1953). Despite the region's late start and the small scale o f its shipyards even as 
late as 1850, it was the first region to switch exclusively to iron and steam shipbuilding,
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accomplished in 1863 (Dougan, 1968). Somewhat surprisingly, the North East Coast did 
not enjoy a reputation for its innovative ability at the time, though major innovations 
originating in the region included water ballast tanks (1840), the first bulk cargo-carrier 
(1852), and the double bottom water ballast tank (1860) (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979).
The region's primary locational advantages lay in access to cheap iron and 
machinery as well as close proximity to ship and capital markets. The region's iron 
industry was established soon after the introduction of Cort's puddling process (Jones, 
1957), while engine works were established at Newcastle as early as 1820 (Dougan,
1968). The locational advantages in raw materials and components attracted shipbuilders 
from the Scottish East Coast, especially from Aberdeen, who established the region's first 
iron and steam shipbuilding yards on the Tyne. Demand for shipping and capital for 
investment in the new shipbuilding industry was provided by local iron and mining 
interests, who required efficient bulk cargo carriers. These ships transported coal to 
English (primarily London) and Continental coal markets, while iron ore was carried to the 
region's iron furnaces from local iron ore mines and later from mines located in Spain.
The John Bowes, built in 1852, was the first iron and steam collier and revolutionized the 
bulk transport of both o f these commodities. The region did not have an advantage in 
labor costs, with wages generally higher than those on the Clyde, but this disadvantage 
was overcome by longer working hours and the institution of piece work and sub­
contracting (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine, 1976).
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The Tees was the largest producer of the three sub-regions. The sub-region was 
centered on Stockton, which built the first iron steamer and also built the largest amount 
of tonnage on the North East Coast. New sites closer to the coast were developed 
following river improvements begun in 1852. New centers were the Hartlepools and 
Middlesborough, the latter the second largest center on the river (Dougan, 1968; Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979). Sunderland was the only center in the second largest producing 
sub-region, the Wear. This center was a veiy old shipbuilding port, specializing in 
wooden colliers, but it had the poorest reputation, in terms o f ship quality and ship 
innovations, of any shipbuilding region in the study (Smith and Holden, 1953; Ville.
1990).
The final region was centered on the Tyne, specifically Newcastle and its suburbs 
Walker and Jarrow. Newcastle was the home of the Hawthorne Engine Works, which 
specialized in marine steam engines, and the Palmer Shipbuilding Company, builder of the 
John Bowes, (the Palmers Shipbuilding Company also operated a yard in Jarrow). River 
improvements begun in 1850 led to the development of the Shields; South Shields, the 
region's second largest producer; and, after a significant drop-off in output, North Shields.
3.4. Humber
The Humber was one of the few traditional wooden shipbuilding regions that 
successfully made the transition to iron and steam. Hull (Figure V-2), the region's 
principal center, was Britain's third largest port, trading mainly with the Baltic ports 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1882). The center specialized in coastal steamers and bulk
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cargo carriers for local shipowners (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine, 1976). No 
information is available for the minor centers of Grimsby and Gainesborough.
3.5. Thames
The Thames, centered on London, was Britain's oldest and most famous 
shipbuilding region (Figure V-3). Although best known for its wooden sailing ships, the 
Thames was one o f the three pioneering iron and steam shipbuilding regions, with engine 
works established as early as 1810 and iron shipbuilding by 1825 (Rowland, 1970). 
Considered by many authors to be Britain's most innovative iron and steam shipbuilding 
region, the Thames claimed the country's most scientific shipbuilders and naval architects 
and was a leading center in the development of close tolerance metal working techniques 
(Banbury, 1971; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Parkinson, 1960; Rowland, 1970).
Although London's advantages lay in its large ship and capital markets, as the 
industry matured it was fatally disadvantaged by high costs for raw materials, land, and 
labor. Transport costs kept material costs much higher than those on the Clyde and North 
East Coast. Congestion along the city's river front drove up land prices and major river 
improvement and she development schemes had all been completed before 1840. The 
region's greatest drawback, according to Pollard (1950), was the ability of the strong local 
trade unions to enforce high wage rates.
Despite its reputation for innovative ability, the Thames region declined with the 
increased adoption o f the new ship. In 1863 the river produced 117 thousand register 
tons of shipping, or one quarter of all British shipbuilding output, but the industry 
collapsed after 1865 in the face of rapidly increasing costs (Banbury, 1971; Pollard, 1950;
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Pollard and Robertson, 1979). The few shipyards that remained in the region after this 
time specialized in ships that were relatively insensitive to high production costs, such as 
high cost warships and passenger liners.
3.6. Solent
The Solent shipbuilding region consisted of Southampton, Southwick, and 
Portsmouth (Figure V-3). The Solent was an important wood and sail shipbuilding region 
but did not produce iron and steam ships until fairly late. This lag continued despite the 
fact that the Admiralty's principle dockyard was located at Portsmouth and that 
Southampton was one of the major ports, especially for Atlantic packet liners, on the 
southern coast (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1888). Little information from the literature is 
available for the region's iron and steam shipbuilding industry, although Waine (1976) 
identifies three builders of coastal steamers. Since the Register does not include any ships 
until late in the study period, it would appear that the industry did not become established 
until after shipbuilding techniques became standardized in other regions.
3.7. Severn
The Severn shipbuilding region consists o f the English port o f Bristol and the 
Welsh ports o f Llanelly, Neath, and Swansea (Figure V-4). The port of Northam, at the 
entrance to the Mouth of Severn, is also included in this region. The region's most 
significant port was Bristol, an established wooden shipbuilding center and an early iron 
and steam center (the Great Britain was built here in 1843). Bristol was Britain's fourth 
largest port (circa 1882), while the Welsh centers were important local ports and market 
towns (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1882). No information is available for Northam.
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The region's locational advantages were based on local supplies of iron and 
machinery and demand from local shipowners operating out of the region's many ports. 
The Welsh ports were manufacturing centers based on coal mining, raw material 
processing, and iron and steeL Swansea and Neath produced iron and steel, with the latter 
also producing engines and machinery. Based on average ship size, these centers probably 
specialized in small coastal steamers and other specialty craft. This assumption is 
corroborated by Waine (1976), who identifies Bristol and Barnstable (Northam) as coastal 
steamer production centers.
3.8. Mersey
The Mersey was Britain's second largest wooden shipbuilding region after the 
Thames. It was one of the pioneering iron and steam shipbuilding regions, along with the 
Clyde and Thames. The Mersey region proper (Figure V-5) includes the centers of 
Liverpool, Birkenhead, Chester, and Winsford. Aberdovey, a minor Welsh port at the 
mouth of the River Dovey, is included although it was not related to the concentration to 
the north and east.
Liverpool and Birkenhead had strong reputations for innovative steamships. 
Liverpool dominated the region's output, with Birkenhead the second largest center. 
Birkenhead's one shipyard specialized in warships, explaining the sharp drop-ofif in output 
between this center and Liverpool Chester, a minor port whose harbor was silting in 
(Encyclopaedia Rrrtannica 1875), is identified as specializing in coastal traders (Waine, 
1976). Little information is available for the final two centers, Winsford and Aberdovey.
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Liverpool and Birkenhead enjoyed many of the locational advantages of the Clyde 
and North East Coast. Both centers had access to cheap raw materials, but labor costs 
were higher than the Clyde and North East Coast (but still less than the Thames). These 
centers, like London on the Thames, also were in proximity to large ship and capital 
markets (Liverpool was Britain's second largest port, serving as the Manchester's 
entrepot). Despite these advantages, these centers were already in decline by the 
beginning o f the study period. According to Pollard and Robertson (1979) and 
corroborated by the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1875), the decline was caused by the 
Liverpool Corporation's refusal to provide additional river frontage for the shipbuilding 
industry.
3.9. Irish Sea
The four shipbuilding centers o f Barrow, Preston, Whitehaven, and Isle of Man are 
combined to form a single Irish Sea shipbuilding region (Figure V-5). These ports do not 
appear to have been functionally related, other than the fact that they probably obtained 
raw materials from the region's revived iron and steel industry. These port's locational 
advantages were their access to locally produced raw materials and the proximity to the 
Clyde, which provided a ship market and business linkages with established yards. Labor 
was cheap and obtained from the Clyde and Ireland.
Barrow was the most important center in terms of subsequent growth. Developed 
in the early 1870s by local iron interests, it did not become a major shipbuilding center 
until the yard's acquisition by the Vickers armaments company in the 1890s 
{Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1875 and 1882; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Preston was a
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trading port and mechanical engineering center (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1882). O f the 
other two centers, Whitehaven was a traditional wooden shipbuilding center with linkages 
to Clyde shipowners (Turaock, 1982) and its fairly late development, combined with its 
production o f large ships, suggest a functional relationship with the Clyde industry. No 
information is available for the Isle o f Man.
3.10. Ireland
The Register's four Irish centers have been combined into one large Ireland region 
(Figure V-6). Each of the four was a prominent wooden shipbuilding region, but only 
Belfast made the successful transition to iron and steam. The Belfast industry was 
dominated by the Harland and Woolf company, which began, operations in 1857 following 
the construction o f a ship channel and building site. The company specialized in large 
ships, especially packet liners (its most famous ship was the Titanic! Belfast was 
disadvantaged by high raw material costs, as iron and coal had to be imported. Still, the 
city remained competitive because of strong national demand for its ships, an abundant 
supply of cheap unskilled labor, and site and harbor improvements subsidized by the city 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Both Cork and Waterford were wooden shipbuilding 
centers (Todd, 1985) and were active iron and steam centers until the 1865 depression 
which ended the second shipbuilding cycle. (The Encyclopaedia Britannica o f 1875 
reports that Waterford had one operating shipyard.) Although Dublin contributed only 
two ships to the Register. Todd (1985) states that the harbor board subsidized a ship 
repair facility and Waine ( 1976) notes that this yard produced coastal steamers for local 
shipowners.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of iron and steam shipbuilding had a profound impact on the 
British shipbuilding industry and its spatial structure. The new construction techniques 
radically increased the scale and complexity of the individual shipyard and transformed it 
into a large industrial operation. The new technologies also changed the relative 
importance and prices of factor inputs so that, in addition to iron and machinery, the new 
industry required more land to accommodate increased shipyard scale; cheap, unskilled 
labor; and access to ship and capital markets. These locational considerations favored iron 
and machinery producing regions on northern rivers and, at the beginning of the study 
period, urban areas that offered agglomeration advantages. These advantages tended to 
erode as the study period progressed, as witnessed by the movement out o f urban 
concentrations and down the urban hierarchy as rivers were dredged and straightened and 
new industrial sites developed. The growth, expansion, and concentration of shipbuilding 
activity on the Clyde and North East Coast created massive industrial complexes in these 
two regions.
At the same time, formerly important shipbuilding centers, notably London on the 
Thames and Liverpool on the Mersey, declined during the study period. Despite the fact 
that these centers enjoyed reputations as innovative iron and steam shipbuilding centers, 
their disadvantages in terms of access to factor inputs was too great to overcome. Over 
the course of the study period, their competitive positions declined relative to the northern 
regions, and they were relegated to insignificance by the end of the study period.
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However, shipbuilding activity continued and even expanded at minor centers in 
the smaller traditional shipbuilding regions. Although centers such as Belfast in Ireland 
and Barrow on the Irish Sea were the exception, these small scale shipyards represented a 
continuity with the traditional industry. These centers, operating at a disadvantage in 
terms o f access to raw materials and urban concentrations, maintained many of the 
organizational and business strategies of the wooden shipyard and remained viable due to 
their access to local ship markets.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI
SPATIAL INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
The previous chapter examined industrial and spatial changes in the British 
shipbuilding industry over the course of the 1840 to 1880 study period. In particular, it 
examined increases in the scale and complexity of shipyard operations, changes in the 
industry’s locational requirements, and the industry's south-to-north reorientation. It also 
established the country’s ten shipbuilding regions and their component centers.
This chapter investigates changes in the industry's spatial structure in greater detail. 
The first section examines the relative importance of all shipbuilding centers that produced 
at least one ship during the study period which was listed in the Lloyds Register. The 
discussion is based on a series of tables that rank each center in terms of output for each 
of the four shipbuilding cycles identified in Chapter IV. Each center's relative importance 
during each cycle is established, as well as changes in its position from one cycle to the 
next.
The chapter's second section presents the annual market share rankings which, 
when combined with the industrial viability rank to be established in the next chapter, will 
be used to test for the association between industrial viability and innovative ability. The 
market share rankings are presented in a series of tables and maps, one for each 
shipbuilding cycle. The tables present the annual rankings on a regional basis, while the
125
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aps locate and present the ranking of individual centers in production during each cycle's 
last year.
1. SPATIAL INDUSTRIAL FLUX
This section establishes the changing spatial structure of the 1840-1880 British 
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. The discussion is based on four tables, one for each 
shipbuilding cycle. Each center is ranked by its total output (in terms o f gross tonnage) 
during a given cycle. Information provided for each center includes: the number of ships 
built; total tonnage; average ship size; percent change in output from the previous cycle; 
rank; the absolute amount and the direction of change in rank from the previous cycle; and 
the number of shipbuilding firms in operation. Data for the tables was synthesized from 
the Lloyd's Register and as such does not represent total national output.
Please note that there is a great deal of variability in average ship size.
There are several reasons for this variability. First, shipbuilding centers, and regions, 
specialized in the type of ships they produced. Examples of specialized shipbuilding 
centers are Paisley and Renfrew on the Clyde which were recognized for their small 
coastal steamers and harbor craft. Examples of specialized regions are Hull and the 
Scottish East Coast, the former producing small to medium-sized cargo carriers for 
continental trade routes, while the latter was recognized for its coastal steamers and 
fishing and other specialized vessels. The second reason for the variability in average ship 
size deals with the fact that many shipbuilding centers produced few ships that were 
inspected by the Register. The reasons for this are probably due to the Lloyds neglect of
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remote shipbuilding locations and the fact that some shipowners and shipbuilders did not 
choose to have their ships inspected by Lloyds.
The discussion uses Vernon's Product Life Cycle (1966) as a conceptual 
framework. The model provides a spatial expression of Kuznet's (1930) argument that 
industries pass through a regular and predictable development cycle consisting o f three 
periods: innovation; growth; and standardization. Each period of the Life Cycle has 
strong implications for the individual firm's location decision: the innovation period 
requiring close proximity to markets, linked industries, and capital markets; the growth 
stage allowing firms to expand out of their original locations to those closer to markets, 
and the standardization stage requiring firms to seek out the least cost location as profits 
diminish- As such, the Product Life Cycle provides a framework for examining the 
diffusion o f shipbuilding activity.
1.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first cycle can be considered to be the innovation phase for the British iron and 
steam shipbuilding industry. The largest producing centers (Table VI-1) are located on 
the Clyde, Thames, and North East Coast. These regions enjoyed access to large ship and 
mechanical engineering industrial concentrations. These linkages are important during the 
Product Life Cycle's innovation period.
Glasgow and the other centers on the Clyde clearly dominated output during this 
cycle, followed by the Thames. North East centers appear to have occupied a second tier, 
with a drop-off in output occurring between South Shields (North East Coast), and 
Waterford (Ireland) (Aberdeen's relatively high rank is due to its production o f a single
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Table VI-1 : Spatial Industrial Change
Output, Rank, and Firms for Individual Centers, 1840-1855
Number Total Average Ship Percent Number
Port Region Built Output Size Share Rank Firms
(gross tons) (gross tons)
Glasgow Clyde 43 30345 706 35.21 1 4
Dumbarton Clyde 23 8979 390 10.42 2 nd
Greenock Clyde 15 8586 572 9.96 3 1
London Thames 15 6669 445 7.74 4 nd
Port Glasgow Clyde 9 4247 472 4.93 5 nd
Newcastle N.E. Coast 8 3813 477 4.42 6 nd
Shields N.E. Coast 8 3282 410 3.81 7 1
Hull Humber 8 2696 337 3.13 8 nd
Cork Ireland 5 2662 532 3.09 9 nd
Stockton N.E. Coast 5 2272 454 2.64 10 nd
Birkenhead Mersey 2 2258 1129 2.62 11 1
Liverpool Mersey 4 1821 455 2.11 12 1
Aberdeen S.E. Coast 1 1754 1754 2.04 13 nd
Chester Mersey 1488 496 1.73 14 1
Paisley Clyde 5 1335 267 1.55 15 1
South Shields N.E. Coast 5 1193 239 1.38 16 nd
Waterford Ireland 2 699 350 0.81 17 nd
Bristol Severn 3 609 203 0.71 18 1
Jarrow N.E. Coast 1 332 332 0.39 19 1
Walker N.E. Coast 2 315 158 0.37 20 I
Neath Severn 2 240 120 0.28 21 nd
Preston Irish Sea 1 180 180 0.21 22 nd
Swansea Severn 2 124 62 0.14 23 1
Inverkeithing S.E. Coast 1 109 109 0.13 24 nd
Renfrew Clyde 1 95 95 0.11 25 nd
Dundee S.E. Coast 1 84 84 0.10 26 nd
Total 175 86187 492 14
nd  - n o
Source: Lloyd's R oaster. 1 8 4 0 .1 8 4 5 .1 8 5 0 .1 8 5 5 . I860 . 1865. 1870 .1875 . 1880.
large ship). With the exception of Jarrow, Walker, and Renfrew, the small were located 
well away from major markets and industrial centers.
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A review of Table VI-1 indicates the small number of firms. This is probably due 
to the fact that, first, Lloyd's did not make an effort to record builder’s names and, second, 
there were few builders in the period that had established strong reputations. The few 
centers that did record builders names are concentrated in the large centers on the Clyde 
and North East Coast, as well as the Mersey, leaving the impression that these centers and 
their builders enjoyed more established reputations in iron and steam shipbuilding which 
undoubtedly resulted in greater sales opportunities.
1.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
Output more than doubled between the first (1840-1855) and second cycles (1856- 
1865) (Table VI-2). This growth is also reflected in the increase in the number of 
shipbuilding centers and firms within centers. Among all regions, the Clyde still 
dominated national shipbuilding output, recording four centers among the seven largest. 
Despite a 15 percent decline, Glasgow was still the leading center, while Greenock 
remained the third largest after increasing output by over one hundred percent. Newcastle 
was the second largest producer, increasing its output by over four hundred percent and 
rising from its rank of sixth in the previous cycle. Belfast, the fourth largest producer, did 
not even appear in the previous cycle as the Harland and Woolf Company did not begin 
operations until the mid 1850s. Despite experiencing absolute output gains, both 
Dumbarton and London experienced relative declines (dropping 4 and 3 places, 
respectively). Dundee and Renfrew made dramatic gains to lead the second tier of centers 
(output from 1890 to 7654 tons).
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Table VI-2: Spatial Industrial Change 
Output, Rank, and Firms for Individual Centers, 1856-1865
Total Average 
Number Output Ship Size Percent Percent Rank Number
Port___________ Region_____Built (gross tons) (gross tons) Share Change Rank Change Firms
Glasgow Clyde 57 25702 451 14.08 -15 1 nc 5
Newcastle N.E. Coast 37 20074 543 11.00 427 2 +4 6
Greenock Clyde 26 20056 771 10.99 134 nc 4
Belfast Ireland 13 19727 1517 10.81 nd 4 nd 1
Port Glasgow Clyde 35 13619 389 7.46 221 5 nc 5
Dumbarton Clyde 14 11191 799 6.13 25 6 -4 1
London Thames 22 11143 507 6.10 67 7 -3 9
Dundee S.E. Coast 14 7654 547 4.19 9012 8 + 18 1
Renfrew Clyde 16 6794 425 3.72 7052 9 + 16 2
West Hartlepool N.E. Coast 8 6755 844 3.70 nd 10 nd 1
Hull Humber 11 5225 475 Z86 94 11 -3 3
Sunderland N.E. Coast 5 4479 896 2.45 nd 12 nd 2
Waterford Ireland 2 3887 1944 2.13 171 13 +4 1
Liverpool Mersey 4 3700 925 2.03 103 14 -2 3
Cork Ireland 3 3294 1098 1.80 24 15 -6 1
Stockton N.E. Coast 8 3121 390 1.71 37 16 -6 1
Paisley Clyde 11 2427 221 1.33 82 17 -2 1
Bristol Severn 4 2391 598 1.31 293 18 nc 1
Shields N.E. Coast 4 2041 510 1.12 -61 19 -12 3
Hartlepool N.E. Coast 4 2039 510 1.12 nd 20 nd 1
Kinghom S.E. Coast 3 1890 630 1.04 nd 21 nd 1
Middlesborough N.E. Coast 2 930 465 0.51 nd 22 nd 2
Jarrow N.E. Coast 1 899 899 0.49 171 23 -4 1
Inverkeithing S.E. Coast 4 781 195 0.43 617 24 nc 1
Dublin Ireland 1 736 736 0.40 nd 25 nd 1
North Shields N.E. Coast 1 561 561 0.31 nd 26 nd 1
Isle of Man Irish Sea 492 246 0.27 nd 27 nd 1
Whiteinch Clyde 1 324 324 0.18 nd 28 nd 1
Llanelly Severn 1 220 220 0.12 nd 29 nd 1
Grimsby Humber 1 125 125 0.07 nd 30 nd 1
Winsford Mersey I 103 103 0.06 nd 31 nd nd
Aberdovey Mersey 1 101 101 0.06 nd 32 nd 1
Gainesborough Humber 1 85 85 0.05 nd 33 nd 1
Total 318 182566 574 75
n d - n o  data 
n c -n o d ia n g e
Source: L loyd 'sR egiaer 1855. I860. 1865. 1870. 1875.1880
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The table indicates that the shipbuilding industry’s national spatial system was in a 
state of flux with some centers dropping from the list, other centers experiencing relative 
declines, and still others entering for the very first time. Eight centers from the previous 
cycle do not even appear in the next cycle. While this does not necessarily mean these 
centers did not build any ships (ships could have been listed with other registers), still, it 
does suggest a significant drop-off in output. The most significant o f the centers not 
appearing in the second cycle are Birkenhead, probably due to the Laird's shipyard 
concentrating on warships, and Aberdeen which was (and still is) an important 
shipbuilding center. Despite absolute increases in output (only Shields experienced an 
absolute decline) only three firms increased their position within the industrial system. At 
the same time, fifteen centers make their first appearance. Prominent among these are the 
second tier centers of West Hartlepool, Sunderland, Hartlepool, Middlesborough, and 
North Shields, all located on the North East Coast. The last 9 centers, beginning with 
Dublin, were small scale producers and may represent repair yards building a limited 
number of coastal traders for the local market
The increase in the number of shipbuilding centers and the instability in their rank 
order within the system relative to positions in the previous cycle indicates that the 
industry was in the Product Life Cycle's growth phase. Of the new centers on the North 
East Coast, only Sunderland was an established shipbuilding center, indicating movement 
out of the urban centers o f Newcastle and Stockton facilitated both by river improvements 
and the weakening of the close ties to urban markets and support industries characteristic 
o f the innovation phase. Although the record is incomplete, the fact that 75 firms were in
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operation, with multiple firms operating in the larger centers, suggests rapid expansion, 
another indication that the industry had entered the Product Life Cycle's growth phase.
1.3. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Production continued to be concentrated in the north during the third cycle (Table 
VI-3). The centers can be sub-divided into four groups based on output: four centers 
producing over 26 thousand tons; four centers producing between eighteen and fourteen 
thousand tons; twelve centers producing between nine and one thousand tons; and twelve 
centers (not counting the generic "Clyde") producing less than one thousand tons. In the 
last group, only Belfast, Llanelly, and South Shields produced more than one ship.
Of the eight centers in the first two groups, only London was not located on either 
the Clyde, still the leading region, or North East Coast. The increase in total output was 
largely accounted for by increased output in these two regions. Greenock and Newcastle 
dominated national output (with more than four thousand tons apiece). Glasgow, the 
third largest producer, made only a marginal increase in absolute terms and still, perhaps 
more surprisingly, did not equal its output during the first cycle.
Of the thirteen largest centers, only Glasgow did not experience growth or at least 
no change in output. London was among the centers experiencing no growth. Centers 
experiencing the greatest gams were on the North East Coast, especially Middlesborough 
and HartlepooL From Dumbarton (the fourteenth ranked center) down, however, 
declining centers outnumbered growth centers by 7 to 4. Eight centers from the previous 
cycle are no longer present, while nine new centers appear, the most prominent being
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Percent Percent Rank Number
Share Change Rank Change Firms
Greenock Clyde 21 46495 2214 17.71 131.8 1 +2 4
Newcastle N.E. Coast 51 42981 843 16.37 114.2 2 nc 7
Glasgow Clyde 30 27083 903 10.32 5.4 3 -2 12
Renfrew Clyde 28 25951 927 9.88 282 4 +f 2
Port Glasgow Clyde 35 18001 514 6.86 32.2 5 nc 7
Sunderland N.E. Coast 13 17250 1327 6.57 285.1 6 +6 7
London Thames 14 15297 1093 5.38 37.3 7 nc 5
West Hartlepool N.E. Coast 14 14263 1019 5.43 111.1 8 +2 2
Middlesborough N.E. Coast 15 9021 601 3.44 870 9 + i: 1
Liverpool Mersey 8 5641 705 2.15 52.5 10 +4 6
Stockton N.E. Coast 8 5511 689 2.10 76.6 11 +f 2
Kinghom S.E. Coast 4 5378 1345 2.05 184.6 12 +9 1
Hartlepool N.E. Coast 6 5008 835 1.91 145.6 13 +7 2
Dumbarton Clyde 5 4845 969 1.85 -56.7 14 -8 1
Dundee S.E. Coast 7 4593 656 1.75 -40 15 -1 1
Hull Humber 5 4528 906 1.72 -13.3 16 -5 I
Aberdeen S.E. Coast 5 3576 715 1.36 nd 17 nd 3
Paisley Clyde 8 1445 181 0.55 -40.5 18 -1 1
Inverkeithing S.E. Coast 2 1191 596 0.45 52.5 19 +5 1
Southwick Solent 1 1055 1055 0.40 nd 20 nd 1
Belfast Ireland 2 793 397 0.30 -76.7 21 -17 1
South Shields N.E. Coast 4 595 149 0.23 nd 22 nd 2
Llanelly Severn 2 438 219 0.17 99.1 23 +6 1
North Fleet Thames 1 345 345 0.13 nd 24 nd 1
Dublin Ireland 1 234 234 0.09 -68.2 25 nc 1
Northam Severn 1 193 193 0.07 nd 26 nd 1
Grimsby Humber 1 190 190 0.07 52 27 +3 1
North Shields N.E. Coast 1 129 129 0.05 -77 28 _2 1
Preston Irish Sea 1 118 118 0.04 nd 29 nd 1
Southampton Solent 1 108 108 0.04 nd 30 nd 1
Mary hill Clyde 1 101 101 0.04 nd 31 nd 1
Winsford Mersey 1 100 100 0.04 -2.9 32 -1 nd
Clvde Clvde 1 76 76 0.03 nd 33 nd 1
Total 298 262533 881 80
n c - n o  change 
n d - n o  data
Source: Llovds Register. 18 6 5 .1 8 7 0 .1 8 7 5 .1 8 8 0 .
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Aberdeen. Other new centers included Southwick and Southampton in the Solent, North 
Fleet on the Thames, and Maryhill adjacent to Glasgow on the Clyde.
Although there were only five more firms operating than in the previous cycle, 
there was a higher number o f firms per center, especially for those producing over 
fourteen thousand tons. Since these centers, with the exception o f London, were located 
on the Clyde and North East Coast, this finding indicates that these massive shipbuilding 
concentrations formed during the 1865-1872 cycle. The decline in the number of firms 
operating in Glasgow combined with an increase in the number of firms operating in other 
Clyde centers could indicate movement out of the city to centers down the urban 
hierarchy. This is also suggested by the number of firm names that are common to more 
than one center.
The industry was clearly in the Product Life Cycle's growth phase throughout this 
period. This observation is based on the combination of large absolute growth rates and 
system instability as indicated by the dramatic rank order changes within the spatial 
industrial system. At the same time, the relatively small increases in the pioneering centers 
of Glasgow and London suggest that these centers had reached a mature stage in their 
development. That the industry was becoming increasingly standardized is suggested by 
the continued expansion down the urban hierarchy. This is further supported by an 
increase in the number o f branch plants as indicated by the number of firms in the Register 
operating in more than center, as well as the industry's expansion into entirely new 
regions, notably Southampton on the Solent.
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1.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
The fourth cycle was a period of phenomenal growth in the shipbuilding industry 
with continued concentration in the North. The phenomenal growth of the North East 
Coast is most likely due to the growth the region's massive iron and steel industry. Six 
centers experienced absolute growth of over a staggering one thousand percent, the most 
notable being Sunderland and Stockton (Table VT-4). Five groups of centers, based on 
output, can be identified. The first group is composed of Sunderland and Newcastle, the 
first producing 205 thousand and the second 119 thousand tons. The second group, 
producing from 81 to 39 thousand tons consists of two North East Coast centers and five 
from the Clyde, while the third group (20 to 11 thousand tons) includes North East Coast 
centers as well as Barrow (Irish Sea), Belfast (Ireland), and Hull (Humber), indicating 
rapid gains in centers not located within the shipbuilding core regions. Also note the 
increase in average ship size allowed for by technological changes in construction 
techniques and steam propulsion systems.
Industrial growth is also demonstrated by increases in the number of centers that 
experienced absolute production increases, the number of ships produced per center, 
and the number o f firms per center. Although changes in rank importance suggest system 
instability, only five centers experienced absolute declines in output, the most important 
being Renfrew (-89 percent) and London (-62 percent). In addition, both the total number 
of firms and number of firms per center again increased from the previous cycle, although 
the largest gains are in the large, established centers on the North East Coast and Clyde.
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Table VI-4: Spatial Industrial Change 


















Sunderland N.E. Coast 138 204563 1482 24.21 1086 I +5 19
Newcastle N.E. Coast 86 118657 1380 14.04 176 2 nc 13
Stockton N.E. Coast 54 81835 1515 9.68 1385 J +8 2
Middlesborough N.E. Coast 63 76500 1214 9.05 748 4 +5 4
Glasgow Clyde 43 72376 1683 8.57 167 5 -2 11
Port Glasgow Clyde 63 50076 795 5.93 178 6 -1 10
Greenock Clyde 23 44968 1955 5.32 -3 7 -6 5
Dumbarton Clyde 25 38585 1543 4.57 696 8 +6 7
Belfast Ireland 12 20071 1673 2.38 2431 9 + 12 J
South Shields N.E. Coast 22 20070 912 138 3273 10 + 12 3
Hull Humber 7 15966 2281 1.89 253 11 +5 2
Barrow Irish Sea 8 15593 1949 1.85 nd 12 nd i
West Hartlepool N.E. Coast 11 13845 1259 1.64 -j 13 -5 3
Hartlepool N.E. Coast 8 10787 1348 1.28 115 14 -1 1
Aberdeen S.E. Coast 13 9844 757 1.16 175 15 +2 3
Liverpool Mersey 7 8858 12265 1.05 57 16 -6 5
Dundee S.E. Coast 12 7897 658 0.93 72 17 -2 3
London Thames 9 5869 652 0.69 -62 18 -11 6
Whitby N.E. Coast 5 5723 1145 0.68 nd 19 nd 1
Southampton Solent 4 5457 1364 0.65 4953 20 + 10 1
Whitehaven Irish Sea 3 3601 1200 0.43 nd 21 nd 1
Renfrew Clyde 3 2894 965 0.34 -89 22 -18 2
North Shields N.E. Coast 3 2553 851 0.30 1879 23 +5 2
Paisley Clyde 5 1839 368 0.22 27 24 -6 2
Birkenhead Mersey 2 1795 898 0.21 nd 25 nd 2
Blyth N.E. Coast 1 1017 1017 0.12 nd 26 nd 1
Leith S.E. Coast 1 897 897 0.11 nd 27 nd 1
Campbelltown Clyde 2 784 392 0.09 nd 28 nd 1
Montrose S.E. Coast 3 678 226 0.08 nd 29 nd 1
Preston Irish Sea 2 561 281 0.07 375 30 -1 1
Bristol Severn 2 489 245 0.06 nd 31 nd
Bowling Clyde 1 143 143 0.02 nd 32 nd 1
Northam Severn 1 121 121 0.01 -37 33 -7 1
Portsmouth Solent 1 71 71 0.01 nd 34 nd 1
Total 643 844983 1314 122
nc-aocfaaage  
n d -n o  data
Source: Llovds Renister. 187 5 .1 8 8 0 .
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The industry appears to have entered the standardization phase of the Product Life 
Cycle by the fourth innovation cycle. During this phase, competition among firms is 
intense as profit margins decline, while production process are so established that multiple 
production units can be operated to take advantage of least cost production locations or 
access to markets. That this was occurring is evidenced by the industry's rapid growth at 
Barrow and Whitehaven near the revitalized iron producing regions on the Irish Sea, and 
at the major shipping port of Southampton on the Solent. Further, the continued spatial 
expansion of the North East Coast into Biyth and Whitby reflects this trend. The Irish Sea 
is an example of expansion into new least cost areas, expansion on the North East Coast 
probably represents further attempts to escape congestion and high land costs as the 
spatial system in fills, while growth on the Solent was an attempt to exploit larger markets. 
No matter what the reason, these expansions were all made possible by the standardization 
of the production process and subsequent relocation efforts aimed at the reduction of 
costs in the face of rising competition.
2. INDUSTRIAL VIABILITY
The last portion of this chapter presents the measure of industrial viability that will 
be used to assess the association between innovation and place. The innovative ability 
measure ranks each shipbuilding center's share of all ships buflt and registered with Lloyds 
during a given year. Ranking is necessary because a large number o f centers accounted 
for only a small amount of output during any given year. To avoid this problem, each 
year's range o f market share values is sub-divided into three equal parts, high, medium,
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and low, and each center is assigned to one of the three categories that corresponds to its 
annual market share for each cycle.
The following section presents the market share ranks for each shipbuilding center 
and the year in which it produced at least one ship for each of the four shipbuilding cycles. 
Despite it awkwardness, the term center / year combination will be used in this and 
subsequent discussions because it best expresses the fact that each single observation 
consists of both the individual center and the year it was in production. The discussion is 
based on a series of tables and maps. The tables present the total frequencies by region for 
each of the four shipbuilding cycles. For example, there were a total of 82 center / year 
combinations during the first shipbuilding cycle (Table VI-5), and two of the Clyde's 
center / year combinations were in the low market share category. The maps, conversely, 
identify the market share ranking for all centers in production during the last year of each 
cycle. The last year in the cycle was selected for these and following maps because it 
maintains analytical consistency from one series of maps to the next and because, since the 
last year in the cycle was a peak production year, it use assures that a large number of 
centers are available for the maps.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
Nine shipbuilding regions were in production during the first cycle, the Solent 
being the only British shipbuilding region not represented (Table VI- 5). The Clyde and 
North East Coast shipbuilding regions had the largest number of combinations with the 
Clyde having almost twice as many as the later region. These findings should come as no
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surprise given the discussion in the previous section. Following these regions were the 
Thames, Mersey, and Ireland, with seven center / year combinations each.




Clyde 2 11 17 30
North East Coast 8 5 4 17
Thames 1 3 3 7
Mersey 3 4 0 7
Ireland 2 4 1 7
Humber 2 2 1 5
Severn 4 1 0 5
Scottish East Coast I 1 1 3
Irish Sea I 0 0 1
Total 24 31 27 82
The table also demonstrates the considerable degree to which the Clyde dominated 
the iron and steam shipbuilding market during this cycle. Its thirty center / year 
combinations dominated both the high and medium market share categories, accounting 
for almost three quarters of the high and one third of the medium share combinations. The 
seventeen center / year combinations on the North East Coast, conversely, consisted of 
low to medium share centers, with eight low and only four high share centers. The 
Thames was a medium to high share region, while the Mersey and Ireland were made up 
o f low to medium share combinations. Of the remaining regions, there was no difference
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in ranking among the Scottish East Coast's three centers, while the Humber. Severn, and 
Irish Sea regions were low to medium share combinations.
Figure VI-1 reflects a fairly even spatial distribution of shipbuilding centers and 
clearly illustrates the concentration of high market share centers on the Clyde. Each one 
of this region's four centers that were in production during the year 1855 were in the 
highest market share category. Two of the North East Coast's four centers were medium 
share centers, while Shields and South Shields were high and low share centers, 
respectively. London, on the Thames, and Cork in Ireland were low and medium share 
centers, respectively, while two of the Mersey's three centers were medium share and 
Chester was a low share center.
2.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
The only regions not represented during the second cycle was again the Solent 
(Table VI-6). The nine regions that were in production fall into four groups based on the 
number of center / year combinations. The first group is again made up o f the Clyde (45 
center / year combinations) and the North East Coast (27). The Scottish East Coast (13) 
and Ireland (12) constitute the second group. Next are the Thames and Humber, with 
eight and seven center / year combinations, respectively. The smallest group is made up of 
the Mersey, Severn, and Irish Sea regions.
The spatial shifts which characterized this cycle are quickly apparent. Unlike the 
previous cycle, no single region dominated the high market share category. Share 
rankings were evenly distributed on the Clyde, with the largest number o f high (19) and 
low (14) share combinations, and both categories were larger than the medium share
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Market Share Rankings for 
1855 British Shipbuilding Centers
Ltgtnd:
Market share c la sse s  based on parcantaga share of output 

















Source: Uoyds Register. 1855.1860.1865,1870.1875.1880.
Figure VI-1: Market Share Rankings: 1855
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Clyde 14 12 19 45
North East Coast 5 13 9 27
Scottish East Coast 5 8 0 13
Ireland 2 3 7 12
Thames 2 4 2 8
Humber 3 0 1 7
Mersey 3 0 1 4
Severn 1 0 2 3
Irish Sea 2 0 0 2
Total 37 43 41 121
combinations. The North East Coast was characterized by the relatively large number of 
medium share combinations relative to the other two categories. In the second group, the 
Scottish East Coast can be characterized as a medium to low share region while Ireland 
was a high share region. The Thames and Humber, in the third group, were medium and 
low share regions, respectively, and the last group consisted of low share centers with the 
exception of the Severn, which was a high market share region.
Figure VI-2 corroborates the market characterizations identified from the tables. 
The Clyde's four centers were dominated by high share production centers, with only one 
center, Port Glasgow, in the medium share category. On the North East Coast, Newcastle 
was a high share center, Middlesborough a low share center, and the remaining two
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Market Share Rankings for 
1865 British Shipbuilding Centers
Legend:
Market share c la sses  based on percentage share of output 
H = High 
M — Medium 
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Figure VI-2: Market Share Rankings: 1865
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centers were in the medium share rank. Three centers on Scottish East Coast and Ireland 
were in production in 1865, and all of these centers were ranked in the low share category, 
while London on the Thames and Hull on the Humber were medium share centers. The 
Mersey was the only one o f  the remaining regions represented, with Liverpool and 
Winsford high and low market share centers, respectively.
2.3. Cycle 3: 1865-1872
The Irish Sea was the only region not represented during the 1866-1872 
shipbuilding cycle. Although the Clyde was still the largest shipbuilding region, the North 
East Coast began to challenge the former region during this cycle, as demonstrated by the 
number of center / year combinations shown in Table VI-7. The North East Coast 
accounted for thirty-four o f the cycle's center / year combinations compared to the Clyde's 
thirty-six Repeating the pattern established in the previous cycles, the Scottish East 
Coast alone occupied a second tier, being represented by fourteen center / year 
combinations. There was a significant drop-off from the latter region to the remaining 
regions, with the number o f combinations in these regions ranging from the Thames' six to 
the Solent's two.
Continuing the trend established in the previous cycles, the Clyde continued to 
dominate the high market share category. However, it is important to note that the 
categories were not evenly distributed in the region, with twenty center / year 
combinations in the highest rank, eleven in the lowest, but only five in the medium share 
category. The North East Coast was still characterized by fairly equal distribution of 
medium and high market share combinations, and the distribution of combinations among
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Clyde 11 5 20 36
North East Coast 7 15 12 34
Scottish East Coast 4 9 1 14
Thames 2 3 1 6
Mersey 2 3 0 5
Severn 3 1 0 4
Humber 1 1 1 3
Ireland 2 1 0 J
Solent 2 0 0 2
Total 34 38 35 107
the three categories was little changed from the previous cycle. The Scottish East Coast 
was a medium share region, as were the Thames and Mersey. Of the remaining regions, 
however, all were characterized by their low market share rankings.
The northern shipbuilding regions dominated the British shipbuilding industrial 
system by the end o f the third cycle. The concentration of activity in these two regions 
can be clearly seen in Figure VI-3: aside from these two shipbuilding concentrations, only 
four centers were in production south of the North East Coast. While the two Scottish 
East Coast centers fell into the low share category, the Clyde's five centers all placed in 
either the high (3) or medium (2) categories. Eight centers were concentrated in the 
North East Coast, which was dominated by four high share centers. Of the centers south
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Market Share Rankings for 
1872 British Shipbuilding Centers
U g tfid
Market share d a  
H = High 
M s  Medium 
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based on percentage share of output
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Figure VI-3 : Market Share Rankings: 1872
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of the North East Coast, London and Liverpool were medium share centers, while 
North am and Southwick were low share centers.
2.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
By the fourth cycle the North East Coast surpassed the Clyde as Britain's dominant 
shipbuilding region, accounting for fifty-one o f the cycle's center / year combinations 
(Table VI-8). The Clyde accounted for thirty-four of these combinations, down from 
thirty-six in the previous cycle. The Scottish East Coast was again the third largest region 
and was followed by the remaining seven regions that were clustered in a range of 
combinations from a high o f eight (Irish Sea) to a low of two (Humber and Severn 
regions).




North East Coast 6 18 27 51
Clyde 7 13 14 34
Scottish East Coast 10 4 0 14
Irish Sea 4 3 1 8
Mersey 2 4 0 6
Thames 3 1 0 4
Ireland 0 2 1 3
Solent 2 1 0 3
Humber 2 0 0 2
Severn 2 0 0 2
Total 38 46 43 127
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Not only was the North East Coast the dominant region, but it also had the largest 
number o f centers, twenty-seven, in the high market share category. Of the region's other 
center / year combinations, eighteen were ranked in the medium category and only six in 
the low category. In addition to its decline in center / year combinations, the Clyde also 
experienced a shift out o f the high and into the medium share categories. The Scottish 
East Coast was dominated by low share centers. Ireland was characterized by its medium 
to high share centers, the Irish Sea by medium centers, and the Mersey by medium to low 
share centers. All other regions were characterized by their rankings in the low market 
share category.
The south to north spatial shift in shipbuilding output, as well as the industry's 
increasing concentration ou the North East Coast and Clyde can be seen in Figure VI-4. 
Liverpool is the only center south of the North East Coast that contributed a ship to the 
Lloyds Register in 1880. Six centers were in production on both the North East Coast 
and Clyde in 1880 and the three market share categories are fairly evenly distributed. The 
only difference between the regions is that the North East Coast has one more and one 
less center in the high and low share categories, respectively, than does the Clyde. The 
two centers on the Scottish East Coast were again ranked in the low share category, while 
the two remaining centers, Liverpool and Belfast, were both ranked in the medium market 
share category.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the changing spatial structure of the 1840-1880 British 
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. It has documented the industry's spatial relocation,
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Market Share Rankings for 
1880 British Shipbuilding Centers
Ltgtnd:
Market share c la sse s  based on percentage share o f output 
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Figure VI-4: Market Share Rankings: 1880
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ranging from the national to intra-regional levels. Using a conceptual framework provided 
by the Product Life Cycle, this chapter has examined the spatial restructuring process for 
each o f the four shipbuilding cycles. During the first cycle, the Product Life Cycle's 
innovation phase, iron and steam shipbuilding was already concentrated in the northern 
iron and machinery producing regions of the Clyde and North East Coast. In addition, 
favored locations tended to be urban centers that offered access to labor, capital, and ship 
markets. The industry’s continued concentration in the north, as well as its expansion out 
o f the urban centers favored in the first cycle, was apparent during the Product Life 
Cycle's growth phase that corresponded to the second and third shipbuilding cycles (1856- 
1872). By the fourth shipbuilding cycle, 1873-1880, the industry had entered the final 
standardization phase of the Product Life Cycle. This period was characterized by the 
massive shipbuilding concentrations in the north and the development of medium to large 
scale shipbuilding enterprises in formerly peripheral regions on the Irish Sea (Barrow) and 
in Ireland (Belfast).
The concentration of market share in northern shipbuilding regions, first on the 
Clyde and later on the North East Coast, was phenomenal The Clyde dominated both the 
absolute number of shipbuilding center / year combinations developed for the industrial 
viability variable, as well as the number of these combinations in the high and medium 
market share categories. The Clyde's dominance extended into the second cycle, but 
declined and then stabilized for the rest of the study period.
Although the North East Coast was the second largest region in terms of the 
absolute number of combinations, it can not be characterized as a high share region until
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the third and fourth cycles. During the last two cycles, this region overtook the Clyde to 
become Britain's largest shipbuilding region in both the absolute number of combinations 
and in its dominance o f the high market share category.
Still, despite this dominance, it is important to note that smaller regions and 
centers remained competitive and experienced growth. By the end of the period. large 
scale production centers were established in formerly minor regions. However, traditional 
shipbuilding regions, especially the Thames and Mersey, experienced relative declines 
throughout the study period. The performance of all the small regions in the market share 
categories was characterized by the small absolute number of combinations and their 
concentration in the low and medium share categories.
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CHAPTER VH
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND BRITISH SHIPBUILDING CENTERS
The last measure required to assess the relationship between innovation and place 
is a measure of the innovative ability of individual shipbuilding centers. This index is 
developed in two stages. The first stage specifies a series of multiple regression models to 
identify technological innovations that made a significant contribution to increasing ship 
size, the single most important change in iron steamships that occurred throughout the 
study period. The first section of this chapter introduces these models and identifies 
significant variables which can be used to construct the index.
The second stage in developing the innovative ability index uses these significant 
variables to rank each shipbuilding center for every year in which it produced at least one 
ship registered with Lloyds. Since the regression models' independent variables have 
minimal multicollinearity (based on correlation coefficients), each variable included in the 
index represents a unique technological component of the iron steamship. As a result, 
each ship's scores on these variables can be summed to develop a measure of that ship's 
level of technological sophistication vis-a-vis all other centers in each sub-period. A mean 
score for all ships built at a center during a given year, therefore, provides a measure of 
that center's level of technological sophistication. This mean score can then be used to 
develop a ranking system that identifies technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding 
centers and which, when combined with the industrial viability measure presented in the
152
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previous chapter, allows for the statistical testing of the association between innovation 
and place. These rankings are presented and discussed in this chapter's second section.
1. MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This section specifies technological change models for each shipbuilding cycle. It 
begins with a model for the entire study period using available data to demonstrate that, 
though such a model provides a good description o f 1840-1880 technological change, this 
single model is really not appropriate for the entire study period. A series of models are 
then specified that better capture the changes that occurred during the individual cycles by 
incorporating more variables as the Lloyds Register's record keeping improves and more 
data become available.
1.1. The 1840-1880 Model
The nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented changes to the ship. Experiments 
during the century's first four decades established the iron steamship as a viable alternative 
to the traditional wooden sailing ship. Changes introduced between 1840 and 1880 
resulted in continuous increases in ship size and power. By 1880, these changes had laid 
the foundation for the modem ship and rendered the traditional wooden sailing ship 
virtually obsolete.
This success was the result o f  improvements in the two component technological 
systems, iron construction and steam propulsion, as well as interrelationships between the 
two technologies whereby a change in one led to improved performance and innovation in 
the other. Improvements in iron construction techniques resulted in increased ship size 
and cargo-carrying capacity and allowed for modem ship designs. Improvements in
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marine steam engine plants, including boilers and condensers, created ever more powerful 
and more efficient engines which remained the industry standard until the diesel engine's 
introduction.
1.1.1. Model
With these changes in mind, the analysis begins by specifying a model for the 
1840-1880 period. Since shipbuilding historians agree that the greatest changes to ships 
during the study period were increased ship size and power, a model is specified to test the 
hypothesis that ship size, measured by gross tonnage, is a function of the year the ship was 
built and its motive power. As such, the model describes the technological innovations 
that made a significant contribution to increasing ship size. This hypothesis is articulated 
in the following regression model:
Gross Tons = a + bl*Year + b2 * Ship Power
Again, and as discussed earlier, the dependent variable is gross tonnage, a measure 
of the ship's total permanently enclosed volume or absolute size. This is the only tonnage 
measurement available for the entire period. Since both net and gross tonnage are 
common measurements used to describe merchant ships, these variables are key 
descriptors of the ship and both are appropriate measures for the dependent variable. A 
more complete discussion of all variables used this and subsequent models was introduced 
earlier in Chapter HI.
The independent variables are the year in which the ship was built and gross 
tonnage per unit o f horsepower. The variable Year incorporates change over time so the 
variable is expected to have a positive coefficient which reflects the increasing demand for
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larger ships over time. The second independent variable is gross tonnage per unit of 
horsepower, or ship power. This variable is derived by dividing gross tonnage by the 
engine's indicated horsepower. This derived variable is a measure of the number o f tons 
propelled by one unit of horsepower or, simply put, the ship's motive power. Although 
gross tonnage is used to derive the dependent variable ship power, the two variables are 
only moderately correlated (r = .528 at p = .0001), reflecting significant differences in 
power generation technology among ships and, hence, this variable's suitability for 
inclusion in the model. Since ship power increased throughout the study period, its 
coefficient is expected to be also positive.
The final specifications of the model and their associated test statistics are given in 
Table VII-1. The overall fit o f the model is adequate given the complexities of this 
problem, with an adjusted R2 of .29 and a highly significant F-statistic (306.17 at p =
.00001). While the adjusted R2 explains less than one third of the total variance, the 
model is theoretically sound and highly significant, as indicated by the fact that the signs of 
the coefficients are as predicted and the associated high level of significance for each 
independent variable.
While the model provides a good fit to the data, it has two serious drawbacks.
First, it is very simplistic in that it contains only two independent variables. While these 
are the most important variables identified in the literature, a more complete description of 
iron steamship change can be specified as more technical descriptors become available 
over the course of the study period. The second drawback is that the model does not 
describe changes for the entire study period well, as indicated by the distribution o f the
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Table VII-1: 1840-1880 Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -696.71 0.00001 0.00001
Year 12.73 0.1498 0.00001
Ship Power (Gross Tons) 118.67 0.4314 0.00001
n = 1487
Adjusted R Square 0.291
F- Ratio 306.17 0.00001
residuals within the individual shipbuilding cycles. If the model represents the entire 
study period, then the mean residual for each sub-period should sum to zero indicating no 
difference in the explanatory power of the independent variables across the cycles. When 
the mean residuals for each cycle are summed and averaged, however (Table VII-2), it is 
clear that this is not the case: the model underpredicted ship size for the first and fourth 
cycles while it overpredicted ship size for cycles 2 and 3.
Table VII-2: Mean and Summed Residuals by Shipbuilding Cycle








Mean 58.05 -5.11 -44.84 8.53
Sum 9694 -1630.58 13946 5882.59
n 167 319 311 690
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Based on the temporal pattern found dining the residual analysis, it is clear that 
iron steamship change differed from cycle to cycle. This is not surprising when we 
consider the cyclical nature of changes in ship size, engine horsepower, and ship power 
established in Chapter IV. Therefore, to adequately understand the technical components 
of the steamship and their change through time requires the specification o f a model for 
each individual shipbuilding cycle to improve our understanding of how these variables 
interact.
1.2. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first shipbuilding cycle, from 1840 to 1855, was a period o f growth and 
experimentation within the shipbuilding industry. Output increased, especially after 1850 
when the iron steamship made significant inroads in the European cargo routes (Hughes 
and Reiter, 1958). New keel framing systems associated with double bottom water 
ballasting increased longitudinal strength and allowed for greater ship length and tonnage 
(Dougan, 1968; Waine, 1976). Specialized bulk cargo-carriers were also introduced 
during the cycle (Dougan, 1868; Waine, 1976), along with the addition o f deck structures 
(the bridge) and additional decks and partial decks (Waine, 1976). Experimentation also 
continued to make existing engines more suitable for the screw propeller, finally 
culminating in the introduction of the double expansion engine near the end of the cycle 
(Jones, 1958).
1.2.1. Model
A model predicting iron steamship technological change for the first cycle, 1840- 
1855, is now specified. Since the data are limited to the same variables as those available
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for use during the entire 1840-1880 period, the model remains unchanged:
Gross Tonnage = a + b 1 *Year + b2 * Ship Power 
Again, ship size, in terms of gross tonnage, depends on the year the ship was built and its 
motive power. Likewise, both independent variables are again expected to have positive 
coefficients. Regression statistics are reported in Table VII-3.
Once again, the model provides a reasonably good fit to the data. The regression 
coefficients are o f the expected signs and are significant, while the significance level 
associated with the F-statistic is quite good. Although the model explains only. 13 
percent of the total variance, down from an R2 o f .29 for the entire period, this is not 
surprising given the fact that only one technological measurement, ship power, is used to 
describe what is still, in practical terms, a highly experimental ship.
Table VII-3: 1840-1855 Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -1815.78 0.0016
Year 39.99 0.275 0.0008
Ship Power (Gross Tons) 59.65 0.168 0.0381
n =  167
Adjusted R Square 0.134
F-Ratio 13.86 0.00001
The 1840-1855 steamship described by the model had a registered gross tonnage 
o f494 tons and its engine plant propelled 3.99 gross tons for each unit o f engine
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horsepower. Gross tonnage increased rapidly during this cycle, at an average of 40 tons 
per year. Every unit increase in ship power resulted in an average increase o f  60 gross 
tons.
13. Cycle 2: 1856 - 1865
The second shipbuilding cycle was an important period in the development o f the 
iron steamship. The year 1855 witnessed three critical developments that directly impacted 
iron ship construction. First, the shipping community accepted iron as a shipbuilding 
material because of its technical and economic advantages over wood. Second, the 
Register established its first iron ship construction guidelines for ships classified with the 
society. Finally, Parliament passed the Moorsom Act which redefined the methods for 
calculating gross and net tonnage.
Perhaps the most important event o f the entire study period occurred immediately 
before the start of this cycle with the re-introduction of the compound engine. This 
engine, designed to power the screw propeller, was followed three years later by an 
improved stem bearing that eliminated leakage where the propeller shaft exited the hull. 
These changes, introduced during the first cycle, coincided with the outbreak of the 
Crimean War, and the resulting shipbuilding boom accelerated their adoption during the 
second cycle.
The improved engine plant, when combined with the benefits of higher length-to- 
beam ratios, allowed for larger ships without corresponding increases in engine power. 
Changes in ship design included greater use of multiple decks, partial decks, and 
superstructures as shipbuilders sought to minimize net tonnage but not carrying capacity.
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These changes took advantage o f net and gross tonnage exemptions allowed by the 
Moorsom Act and later amendments.
1.3.1. Variables
In addition to the variables that were available for the first cycle's model, the 
Register began to consistently record net tonnage in 1853. Net tonnage is the ship's gross 
tonnage less the amount of ship volume used to cany cargo, and is a measure of the ship's 
cargo-carrying capacity. This improvement in record keeping makes possible a more 
detailed model Using net and gross tonnage, an additional variable is constructed that 
measures cargo-carrying efficiency, expressed a percent of the ship's total permanently 
enclosed volume. This variable, the Net: Gross Ratio, is constructed by dividing net tons 
by gross tons.
A theoretical model is specified that states that a ship's gross tonnage depended on 
the year it was built, the ship's power, and the new variable: the Net:Gross Ratio. As in the 
previous model, the regression coefficients for these variables are expected to be positive 
to reflect increased average ship size and engine power. It is also expected that a negative 
coefficient will result for the Net:Gross Ratio under the assumption that experimental ship 
designs resulted in gross tonnage increasing at a faster rate than net tonnage. This 
assumption is based on Waine's (1976) argument that 1) shipowners demanded ships with 
minimal net tonnage relative to gross tonnage to minimize tax and cargo-handling costs, 
and that 2) this demand was satisfied by incorporating spaces that could hold cargo but 
were not permanently enclosed and so could be excluded from net tonnage calculations. 
This model is specified as:
Gross Tons = Year + Ship Power + Net:Gross Ratio
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As can be seen in Table VII-4, the model does not provide a good fit to the data 
but, still, it is significant. R: is only. 16, but the F-statistic is significant. The regression 
coefficients for Year and Ship Power are both significant and of the expected sign, but the 
Net:Gross Ratio is neither significant nor of the expected sign. The model suggests that 
ship design changes did not contribute to changes in ship tonnage.
Table VH-4: 1856-1865 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -1456.94 0.137 0.0114
Year 23.68 0.137 0.0106
Net Gross 93.29 0.011 0.8343
Ship Power (Gross Tons) 123.60 0.371 0.00001
n = 315
Adjusted R Square 0.158
F- Ratio 20.32 0.00001
Since this result is contrary to Waine's argument, the model is respecified by 
substituting net tonnage for gross tonnage for both the dependent and ship power 
variables under the assumption that shipowners were more concerned with a ship's cargo- 
carrying capacity than they possibly were with its absolute volume. Qualitatively, this 
argument seems sound and precedent for this specification is found in the literature. Net 
tonnage is used to calculate the ship power variable in order to keep it consistent with the
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dependent variable. Therefore, net tonnage is a more appropriate descriptor of the ship. 
The new model then becomes:
Net Tons = Year + Ship Power + Net: Gross Ratio 
The new model reflects an improvement over the first (Table VTI-5). Both R2 and 
the F-statistic improve slightly (to . 18 and 23.7, respectively). All regression coefficients, 
including that for the Net:Gross Ratio, are now significant, although the Net:Gross Ratio 
is still not of the expected sign. The improved performance of the model indicates that 
cargo-carrying capacity is a more precise, and so more appropriate, descriptor of 1856- 
1865 iron -steamship technological change.
Table VII-5: 1856-1865 Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: New Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -1416.324 0.0007
Year 15.31 0.122 0.0212
Net Gross 755.2 0.127 0.0189
Ship Power (Gross Tons) 85.18 0.350 0.0001
n = 315
Adjusted R Square 0.183
F- Ratio 23.74 0.0001
The mean 1856-1865 steamship was registered at 434.14 net tons. Net tonnage 
increased by 7.55 tons with every .01 unit increase in the Net:Gross Ratio. This is 
contrary to expectations that ship size would decline as the ratio increased. The
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NetrGross Ratio makes an important contribution to the steamship, but not through the 
addition of more exempted spaces. Had additional exempted spaces suitable for carrying 
cargo been added, then the ratio's value would have declined reflecting the fact that net 
tonnage declined or stayed the same relative to gross tonnage and, hence, the negative 
coefficient. The increase in gross tonnage relative to net tonnage indicates an increase in 
register cargo space, suggesting that the compound engine's fuel consumption and engine 
size efficiencies were reducing the amount of space being exempted for coal bunkers and 
machinery and so providing more ship volume for cargo.
1.4. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
The 1866-1872 cycle can be considered to have been a consolidation period in ship 
construction. Although shipbuilders continued to build larger ships, no significant changes 
in construction techniques are recorded for this period. Instead, shipbuilders began to 
experiment with new ship designs and adjusted length-to-beam ratios, with the latter 
reaching highs of between 10:1 and 11:1 during the cycle. That shipbuilding techniques 
had become standardized is suggested by the fact that shipbuilders were sending their 
ships back to the shipyard for lengthening (Parliamentary Papers. 1961) rather than selling 
them off to foreign buyers and purchasing newer and improved ships (Jones, 1938; Pollard 
and Robertson, 1979). Lengthening was accomplished by disassembling the ship at its 
midsection and inserting new hull sections.
The most important innovations in the marine steam engine plant during the 1866- 
1872 cycle were the adoption of the Scotch boiler and surface condenser. Following the 
pattern set by the compound engine, these innovations were introduced at the end o f the
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previous cycle (1862 for the Scotch boiler and 1863 for the surface condenser) but not 
fully adopted until the 1866-1872 cycle. Unlike the compound engine, whose introduction 
coincided with a war-dme merchant fleet build-up, the adoption of these innovations was 
much slower and they did not come into common use until after 1870.
1.4.1. Variables
The Register consistently recorded ship dimensions beginning in 1861. As a result, 
an additional aggregate variable, the Length-to-Beam ratio, can now be included in the 
analysis. This ratio, computed by dividing ship length by width, measures changes in hull 
form resulting from the application o f the principle that increasing ship length relative to 
its width reduces water friction against the hull This allows for larger ships but not a 
corresponding increase in engine power. According to Pollard and Robertson (1979), 
increasing the length-to-beam ratio was heavily utilized to improve engine and cargo- 
carrying efficiency.
1.4.2. Model
The theoretical model differs from the previous model only in that it includes the 
Length-to-Bearn ratio. All other variables remain the same. The model is specified as: 
New Tons = Year + Ship Power + NetrGross + Length-to-Beam 
Again, the coefficient for the variable Year is expected to be positive because ship size 
continued to increase. The Length-to-B earn coefficient is also hypothesized to be positive 
as shipbuilders sought to maximize ship power efficiencies by increasing the ratio, 
especially for larger ships. Conversely, the coefficients for ship power and the Net:Gross 
ratio is expected to have either very small positive or negative values, indicating that
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engine plants and ship designs were becoming so efficient that increases in ship size did 
not require corresponding increases in ship power or engine size. Finally, the NetrGross 
coefficient is hypothesized to be negative because of an increasing divergence between net 
and gross tons as shipbuilders included more decks, partial decks, and other unenclosed 
spaces not included in net tonnage calculations.
The resulting model is the best so far. It explains over 50 percent of the variance 
among the variables (adjusted R2 = .52) with a highly significant F-statistic o f 85.6 (Table 
VH-6). However, and somewhat surprisingly, the regression coefficients for Year and 
NetrGross are not significant, indicating that these variables were not significant for 
predicting ship tonnage.
Table VII-6: 1866-1872 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: New Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -4301.17 0.0005
Year 30.41 0.080 0.0727
NetrGross -551.26 -0.057 0.2084
Ship Power (Gross) 48.88 0.155 0.002
Length-to-B earn 435.24 0.653 0.00001
n = 310
Adjusted R Square 0.523
F- Ratio 85.61 0.00001
The model is now respecified to achieve the best fit while retaining as many 
explanatory variables as possible. After running all possible combinations of variables, the
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model that best fit the two conditions is:
Gross Tons = NetrGross + Length-to-Beam + Ship Power (Net Tons) 
Regression statistics are reported in Table VII-7.
Table VII-7: 1866-1872 Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -1876.33 0.00001
Ship Power (Net) 92.56 0.225 0.00001
Net Gross -1220.11 -0.125 0.009
Length-to-Beam 441.41 0.663 0.00001
n = 3I0
Adjusted R Square 0.522
F-Ratio 113.58 0.00001
After the respecification, the results remain consistent. The R2 is unchanged and 
the F-statistic remains highly significant. The differences between the two models are that, 
first, Gross Tons replaces Net Tons as the dependent variable; second, the variable Ship 
Power is computed using net rather than gross tons; and third, the variable Year has been 
dropped from the model altogether. The fact that the variable Year was not significant is 
surprising. That the year in which the ship was buih is not important strongly suggests 
that the pace of technological change slackened during this period and underscores the 
fact that iron and steam shipbuilding techniques had become standardized at this time.
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The three variables that explain ship size, in terms of gross tons, are Ship Power, 
the NetrGross ratio, and the Length-to-B earn ratio. Per unit increases in both Ship Power 
and the Length-to-Beam Ratio resulted in increases of 92.56 and 441.41 gross tons, 
respectively. As expected, but unlike its performance in the previous cycle, a negative 
relationship existed between the NetrGross ratio and ship size: an increase of .01 units in 
this ratio resulted in a decrease in ship size of 12.2 tons.
The performance of the Length-to-Beam and NetrGross ratio variables substantiate 
the arguments made by Pollard and Robertson and Waine concerning changes in hull form 
and ship designs. The Length-to-B earn ratio made the largest contribution of the three 
variables in explaining ship size. The negative relationship between the NetrGross ratio 
and ship size demonstrates that the percent o f net tonnage as a percent of gross tonnage 
declined, demonstrating that shipbuilders were increasing absolute ship size but not 
registered cargo-carrying capacity. Although the divergence between net and gross 
tonnage could be due to increases in machinery and engine plant size that were exempt 
from net tonnage calculations, this is highly unlikely given the emphasis placed on making 
the engine plant more space efficient. A more likely explanation is that shipbuilders were 
making use of deductions that allowed for non-permanently enclosed spaces through the 
addition of decks and partial decks as provided for in the Moorsom Act o f 1854. Non- 
permanently enclosed spaces could be used to carry cargo but were not included in the 
calculation of taxes, cargo-handling fees, and other expenses.
1.5. Cycle 4:1873-1880
A review of the historical literature identifies few changes in either ship 
construction or engine plants during the final cycle incorporating the years from 1873 to
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1880. This suggests that the period was one of stabilization and standardization and that 
further improvements came through the fine-tuning of existing techniques. Changes in 
ship construction centered around a trend toward the stabilization of the Length-to-Beam 
ratio at around 8:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and the increasing use of additional and 
partial decks (Waine, 1976). Improvements in the engine centered around raising boiler 
pressures, made possible by improvements to the Scotch boiler adopted during the 
preceding cycle (Rowland, 1970).
1.5.1. Variables
The Register began recording engine specifications by 1870, allowing for the 
addition of two new variables to the analysis. These variables are boiler pressure and 
engine size. The estimate of boiler pressure reported in the Register is the boiler's rated 
operating pressure rather than the amount of pressure operating on the cylinder head 
(based on experiments attempting to calculate horsepower using the Register's engine 
specifications). The engine size variable is a ratio that unitizes register tonnage, either 
gross or net, to engine cylinder volume (in3) computed from the Register's cylinder 
diameter and piston stroke length specifications.
1.5.2. Model
The theoretical model includes the variables used in the final model for the 1866- 
1872 cycle but also incorporates these two new variables, Boiler Pressure and Cylinder 
Volume: Gross Tons. Gross tons is used as the unitizing value for the cylinder volume 
ratio because this is also the dependent variable. The model is specified as:
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Gross Tons = Ship Power (Net) + NetrGross + Length-to-Beam +
Boiler Pressure + Cylinder VolumerGross Tons 
Positive coefficients are expected for the variables Ship Power and Boiler Pressure 
reflecting continued improvements in engine plant efficiencies. A positive coefficient is 
also expected for the Length-to-Beam ratio. Conversely, the coefficients for both 
NetrGross and Cylinder VolumerGross Tons should be negativer the first because of 
additional exempted spaces within the ship; the second because of scale efficiencies in the 
engine plant, coupled with the effects of the Length-to-Beam ratio, allowed for more 
cargo to be carried without a corresponding increase in engine plant size.
Model statistics, reported in Table VII-8, show that the model provides a very 
good fit to the data. Adjusted R2 is .63 and the F-statistic is highly significant. However, 
the regression coefficient for the NetrGross ratio is not significant, while that for the 
Cylinder VolumerGross Tons ratio, while significant, surprisingly is not of the expected 
sign.
The model is respecified in order to include the NetrGross ratio and see if this 
would change the sign for the Cylinder VolumerGross Tons ratio. As in the previous 
model, the condition for selecting the best model is to retain as many explanatory variables 
as possible without jeopardizing explanatory power. After running all possible 
combinations of variables, the best model in respect to explanatory power is as followsr 
Net Tons = Year + NetrGross + Ship Power (Net) + Length-to-Beam +
Cylinder VolumerGross Tons + Boiler Pressure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
Table VH-8: 1873-1880 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient Beta Significance
Intercept -4512.39 0.00001
Ship Power (Net) 125.23 0.284 0.00001
Net Gross 110.20 0.008 0.7593
Length-to-Beam 540.07 0.638 0.00001
Boiler Pressure 10.97 0.152688 0.00001
Cylinder VolumerGross 0.16 0.111 0.0001
n = 608
Adjusted R Square 0.631
F- Ratio 249.02 0.00001
These changes slightly improve Adjusted R2 from the .63 of the theoretical model 
to .66 due to the additional variables (Table VII-9). The F-statistic remains highly 
significant. The new model also results in two important changes. The first change is the 
renewed emphasis on cargo-carrying capacity in explaining the steamship, as demonstrated 
by the substitution of Gross Tons (absolute ship size) for Net Tons as the dependent 
variable. This change suggests that shipbuilders were more concerned with m aximizing 
the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, and so its earning potential, rather than absolute size. 
The second change is the re-emergence of the variable Year which demonstrates that, 
unlike the 1866-1872 cycle, technological change over time was an important component 
o f the 1873-1880 iron steamship.
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Year 12.96 0.058 0.0442
Net Gross 2151.5 0.225 0.00001
Ship Power (Net) 72.98 0.225 0.00001
Length-to-Beam 358.89 0.627 0.00001
Cylinder Volume: Net 0.08 0.195 0.00001
Boiler Pressure 8.55 0.133 0.00001
n = 608
Adjusted R Square 0.663
F- Ratio 199.64 0.00001
Both average ship size and power increased between the third and fourth cycles. 
The average ship was registered at 1285.63 gross tons and 839.61 net tons, while ship 
volume propelled by one unit o f horsepower increased by 8.41 (gross) and 5.46 (net). 
These changes represent rates o f increase of approximately 27.7 and 20.75 percent, 
respectively, with the slower rate of increase for ship power indicating that engines were 
becoming more efficient in terms o f power. This is because increases in ship size did not 
require corresponding increases in ship power. In addition, the average values for the 
NetrGross and Length-to-B earn ratios did not change from the third to fourth cycle.
The average 1873-1880 steamship was registered at 840 net tons. Net tonnage 
increased 12 tons each year. Every unit increase in ship power, in terms of volume of 
cargo propelled by engine plant, resulted in 73 additional net tons. While the average
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NetrGross ratio remained stable between the third and fourth cycles, net tonnage increased 
21.51 tons for every .01 unit change in the ratio. This is counter to expectations of a 
negative relationship between the variables, and suggests that a limit had been reached to 
the amount of additional space that could be exempted from the net tonnage calculations. 
Based on the size of its beta coefficient, the Length-to-B earn ratio was again the single 
largest contributor with respect to explaining ship cargo-carrying capacity, with a unit 
increase in the ratio resulting in a corresponding increase in cargo-carrying capacity of 359 
tons. Contrary to expectations of a negative relationship between the Cylinder 
Vohime:Net Tons ratio and cargo-carrying capacity (expected if engine size efficiencies 
were being realized), a one unit increase in the ratio resulted in an increase o f  only .08 net 
tons. This a very small value since the average ratio was 1984.4:1, but the coefficient is 
highly significant. The final variable, Boiler Pressure, did perform as expected, with one 
unit change leading to an additional 8.55 tons o f cargo-carrying capacity.
This discussion of the final model for the fourth shipbuilding cycle concludes the 
technological change modeling process. Using data available from the Register, these 
models have identified those innovations that made a significant contribution, in a 
statistical sense, to increasing ship size. With the significance of their importance proven, 
the variables from these models can now be used to construct the innovative ability 
variable that identifies technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding centers.
2. INNOVATIVE ABILITY INDEX
The independent variables for each o f the four models are now used to develop a 
synthetic measure of each shipbuilding center's innovative ability during each year it was in
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production. This variable is developed by scoring each ship built during a given cycle by 
its level of technological sophistication relative to all other ships. This is accomplished by 
assigning each independent variable, which measures an important technological 
innovation, from each cycle a score ranging from one (1) to five (5) based on quintiles 
which reflect the position of each ship on that variable's range of values for all ships. A 
score of 1 indicates that the ship incorporated the lowest possible level of technological 
sophistication for that particular innovation (the lowest quintile), while a score of 5 
indicates that it incorporated the highest level (the highest quintile). The variable scores 
are then summed to produce an "innovative index" for each ship. Since the majority of 
ships were built on order from the shipowner, it should be recognized that the index score 
can be influenced by design considerations such as trade route and owner preferences.
The mean innovative index score for all ships built at any center during any given 
year is then calculated to serve as a benchmark for all ships. The final step is to rank each 
center and year into one o f two categories based on whether or not the center and year 
combination's mean innovative index score was above or below the mean score for all 
ships built during the cycle. A high rank indicates that the center was, in practical terms, 
a technological leader relative to the cycle's mean ship, while a low rank indicates that it 
was a technological laggard.
The use of such composite indices in studies of technological innovation with 
multiple forms has precedent in economics research. An example is the study by Akridge 
(1989) that assesses the effectiveness of a sample o f multiproduct agribusiness firms in 
minimizing costs. The study estimates the frontier multiproduct cost function and then
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develops an index to use as a benchmark against which the performance o f individual firm*; 
is compared. A second example is the study by Baltagi, et aL (1995) who estimate a 
general index of technical change within the US airline industry to identify cost changes 
due to technological change and cost changes due to deregulation.
The following section presents these innovative rankings for each of the four 
cycles. Again, each observation is a combination of an individual center and the year in 
which h produced at least one ship listed in the Register. The discussion is based on a 
series of tables and maps. The tables present the total number of center / year 
combinations by region for each cycle, while the maps provide the rank for each center 
producing a ship during the last year of each cycle.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
Technologically leading shipbuilding center / year combinations outnumbered 
lagging combinations during the first cycle (Table VII-10). Leaders accounted for 57 
percent of the eighty-two total frequencies. The Humber was the most innovative region 
with all its centers being technological leaders. Contrary to the assessment of nineteenth 
century observers and shipbuilding historians (Parliamentary Papers. 1969; Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979), the North East Coast was a technologically leading region while the 
Clyde was evenly divided among technologically leading and lagging center / year 
combinations. The Mersey and Thames, both considered innovative centers (Banbury, 
1971; Pollard and Robertson, 1979), can be so characterized: both having five of their 
seven total combinations ranked as technological leaders. This confirms the assessment of 
previous research discussed in Chapter V. While the innovative performance of the
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Severn and Scottish East Coast was mixed, the remaining regions, especially Ireland, can 
not be considered to have been innovative.




Clyde 15 15 30
North East Coast 5 12 17
Thames 2 5 7
Mersey 2 5 7
Ireland 6 I 7
Humber 0 5 5
Severn 3 2 5
Scottish East Coast 1 2 3
Irish Sea 1 0 1
Total 35 47 82
The map of 1855 centers, Figure VII-1, is dominated by technological leaders. Of 
the eighteen centers, only one center (Preston, the single observation on the Irish Sea) was 
not a technologically leading center. The map, when compared to the regional 
performances in Table VII-10, suggests that innovations associated with the single 
independent variable ship power had been assimilated by the industry.
2.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
Technologically lagging center / year combinations outnumbered leaders during the 
second cycle, with seventy-one o f the total combinations being non-innovative (Table
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Source: Calculated by author.
Figure W - l : Innovative Ability Rankings: 1855
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VII-11). The North East Coast was again the most innovative region. The only other 
region that can be characterized as being innovative was Ireland, where five of its seven 
combinations were in the high innovative ability category. This region's performance is 
due to Belfast's Harland and Woolf Company, a firm which enjoyed a strong reputation as 
an innovative shipbuilding firm. The Clyde, Thames, and Mersey regions can all be 
considered non-innovative, although the Clyde to a lesser extent that the other two.




Clyde 29 16 45
North East Coast 10 17 27
Scottish East Coast 8 5 13
Ireland 5 7 12
Thames 6 2 8
Humber 6 I 7
Mersey 3 1 4
Severn 2 1 3
Irish Sea 2 0 2
Total 71 50 121
O f the fifteen centers in production during 1865 (Figure VTI-2), ten were 
technological leaders. AH four of the centers on the North East Coast were innovative. 
The only innovative center on the Clyde was Dumbarton, where the multiple expansion 
engine was introduced. Unexpectedly, Glasgow is included among this region's non-
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Figure VII-2: Innovative Ability Rankings: 1865
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innovative centers. The only other non-innovative centers were Liverpool on the 
Merseyand Dundee on the Scottish East Coast. London is included among the innovative 
centers.
2.3. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Repeating the pattern in the previous cycle, technologically lagging center / year 
combinations were in the majority (Table VII-12). The best performing region during this 
cycle was the Scottish East Coast were there were as many leaders as laggards (although 
the same can be said for the Solent, this region had only two combinations). In all the 
other regions, including the North East Coast and Clyde, technological laggards 
outnumbered leaders. The Severn was the worst performing region with no technological 
leaders among its four center / year combinations.




Clyde 21 15 36
North East Coast 20 14 34
Scottish East Coast 7 7 14
Thames 4 2 6
Mersey 3 2 5
Severn 4 0 4
Humber 2 1 3
Ireland 2 1 3
Solent 1 1 2
Total 64 43 107
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The nineteen shipbuilding centers shown in Figure VII-3 suggest that the 
technologies represented by the independent variables in the third cycle's model had been 
widely assimilated by the British shipbuilding industry. Only five centers were non- 
innovative centers. The Clyde and North East Coast each accounted for two of these 
centers (Renfrew and Port Glasgow on the Clyde, the two Shields on the North Each 
Coast), while the final non-innovative center was the isolated Northam. Both Liverpool, 
on the Mersey, and London on the Thames were innovative centers.
2.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
Unlike the previous two cycle, the fourth cycle had more innovative center / year 
combinations than non-innovative combinations. Both the North East Coast and the 
Clyde can be characterized as technological leading regions with 66 and 56 percent of 
their shipbuilding combinations being in the technologically leading category. All 
combinations in the Ireland and Humber regions were innovative, and 63 percent (5 of 8) 
of the combinations on the Irish Sea were innovative. The regions that performed poorly 
were the Scottish East Coast, Severn, and Thames, while the Mersey had as many leading 
as lagging combinations.
Of the fifteen centers shown in Figure VTI-4, only two were non-innovative.
These centers were Greenock and Paisley on the Clyde. Again, the high proportion of 
innovative to non-innovative centers suggests that the significant technological changes 
identified by the cycle's model had been widely diffused within the industry by end of the 
fourth, and last, shipbuilding cycle.
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North East Coast 17 34 51
Clyde 15 19 34
Scottish East Coast 11 3 14
Irish Sea 3 5 S
Mersey 3 3 6
Thames 3 I 4
Ireland 0 3 3
Solent 2 I 3
Humber 0 2 2
Severn 2 0 2
Total 56 71 127
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has developed a measure of the innovative ability of each individual 
shipbuilding center and year in which that center produced at least one ship certified and 
registered with Lloyds. This has been accomplished by estimating a series o f regression 
models that describe iron steamships and their technological change over time for each of 
four shipbuilding cycles. It then uses the independent variables from these models to 
construct an innovation index that aggregates all ships built at an individual center during 
each year it was in production and assigning the center / year combination a ranking of 
high, indicating a technologically leading center, or low to indicate a technologically 
lagging center.
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Four regression models, one for each of the four shipbuilding cycles identified in 
Chapter IV, were estimated using variables as they became available over the course of the 
study period. Although initial R2s were low, this is understandable given the lack of data 
available for the early part of the study period and the complexity of these technologies. 
Still, test statistics for the models for the first two cycles were significant and theoretically 
correct. The last two models incorporated more variables and provided much higher 
levels o f explanatory power while maintaining their significance and theoretical 
correctness.
These models reveal a great deal of information about iron steamship technological 
change. Generally, the behavior of the models and the variables incorporated in them 
confirm historical interpretations of steamship technological change while quantifying its 
rate and direction. In addition, the behavior of the variables from one cycle to the next 
provides insights into shipbuilders' technological concerns when designing ships and the 
economic considerations of shipowners.
Several insights are gained when we consider the type of register tonnage 
measurement used for the dependent variables and ship power variables. The highest 
amount of explanatory power for the second cycle model was obtained using net tonnage 
as the dependent variable and net tonnage per unit o f  horsepower for the Ship Power 
variable. Since net tonnage measures the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, its use suggests 
that ships were being built to maximize earning potential in response to the primary 
concern of the shipping industry.
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However, the dependent variables were reversed for the 1866-1872 cycle. While 
this could be a data artifact, it could also indicate that technological change was directed 
toward m aximizing  ship size while maintaining the concern for cargo-carrying potential (as 
indicated by the continued use of net tonnage to derive the ship power variable). It is 
especially interesting that the variable Year did not significantly load in this model. By the 
fourth cycle, however, and when the variable Year again becomes significant the "best fit" 
dependent variable returned to net tonnage, or cargo-carrying capacity rather than 
absolute ship size. Again, this change was in response to the shipping industry’s concern 
for ships that m axim ized  earning potential
The last section in the chapter presented the innovative ability r ankings constructed 
using the statistically significant independent variables from the four regression models for 
each shipbuilding center / year combination. These data were presented through a series 
of tables showing the innovative performance at the regional level and a series of maps 
that identified the performance of all centers that were in production during the last year 
o f each shipbuilding cycle. The rankings for each center / year combination are now 
carried into the final stage of this analysis that, in conjunction with the market share 
rankings developed in the previous chapter, assesses the association between industrial 
viability and innovative ability.
hi m any respects, the results reflected by these regional innovative ability rankings 
do not substantiate the opinions of shipbuilding historians as to which regions were and 
were not innovative. Based on the calculated innovative index put forward in this 
research, the North East Coast can be characterized as Britain's most innovative
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shipbuilding region. This finding is contrary to the consensus historical interpretation 
(with the notable exceptions of those volumes that deal exclusively with the North East 
Coast industry) which considers the Clyde, Thames, and Mersey regions to have been the 
most innovative. However, the assessment based on the innovative index reveals that the 
performance of the Clyde and Mersey was mixed while the Thames innovative ability 
declined after the first cycle.
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CHAPTER V m
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL VIABILITY 
AND INNOVATIVE ABILITY
The final portion o f this study will exam ine  the relationship between every 1840- 
1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding center's industrial viability and its innovative 
ability. The analysis uses a chi-square contingency table testing procedure to determ ine 
whether or not a statistical association exists between a shipbuilding center's annual 
market share rank and its position as either a technologically leading or lagging 
shipbuilding center. In practical terms, the question to be answered is whether or not 
individual shipbuilding centers reaped an economic reward for building innovative iron 
steamships. Following the logic of the implicit relationship between innovation and place, 
this analysis assumes that a center's ability to compete successfully in the market place was 
related to the production o f  innovative ships.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section presents the 
analytical framework that will be used to carry out the test. It briefly outlines the chi- 
square contingency table test, the variables used for this test, and the methods that will be 
used to test for, and then assess, the association. The second section conducts a separate 
test for each of the four shipbuilding cycles and assesses the relationship between 
innovative ability and industrial viability.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The test for the association between a shipbuilding center's innovative ability and 
its ability to compete within the national shipbuilding industrial system is conducted using
187
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a chi-square contingency table test. To carry out the test, the market share rank variable 
developed and introduced in Chapter V is combined with the innovative ability rank 
variable developed in the previous chapter. This section presents the framework that will 
be used to assess this relationship.
1.1. Chi-square Contingency Table Test
The chi-square contingency table test is a non-parametric statistical procedure that 
tests for an association between two sets of categorical variables. The variable categories 
are used to construct a contingency table in which the categories for one variable 
represent rows in the table and the categories for the second variable form the columns. 
Each joint occurrence, or frequency, of the two variables is then entered into one of the 
cells formed by the intersection of the rows and columns The test compares the cells’ 
observed joint frequencies to their expected joint frequencies, with the expected 
frequencies calculated based on the proportions between the total row and column 
frequencies (Conover, 1980). Nonparametric statistical techniques have been used to 
investigate technological change, as in Chavas and Cox’s "A Nonparametric Analysis of 
Agricultural Technology" (1988).
The test's null hypothesis is that the two variables are independent or, more 
specifically, that they are not associated. In this case, there will be little or no statistically 
significant differences between the observed and expected frequencies in each cell o f the 
contingency table. The alternative hypothesis is that the variables are not independent or, 
alternatively, that an association does in fret exist. The test is carried out by calculating a 
chi-square statistic. If the chi-square statistic is insignificant then any differences between
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the observed and expected frequencies is due entirely to chance and the null hypothesis of 
no association must be accepted. If the statistic is significant, then the differences are real 
and the alternative hypothesis of an association is accepted.
1.2. Variables and Categories
For the test between industrial viability and innovative ability, each shipbuilding 
center for each year it produced at least one ship listed in the Register has been ranked in 
terms of its market share and innovative ability. There are three ranks for the market 
share variable based on the amount of annual output the shipbuilding center produced 
relative to all other centers. A center is given a high score if it was in the top 33 percent 
o f all centers in production for that year, a medium score if it was in the middle 33 
percent, and a low score if it was in the bottom 33 percent.
The innovative ability variable ranks centers as to whether the combination of 
technological innovations incorporated in the ship or ships built at that center for that year 
were above the mean value of the index for all ships built during a given shipbuilding 
cycle. A high rank indicates that the technological innovations for the ship or ships built at 
a given center during a given year exceeded the mean level of technological innovations in 
all ships, indicating that h was a "technological leader," while a low rank indicates that 
technological innovations were below the mean and that the center was a "technological 
laggard."
Again, it should be remembered that ships were built on order for shipowners, so 
that the innovative ability index value also clearly reflects shipowner preferences and, as 
such, can be influenced by a shipowner's technical specifications. If  the shipowners’
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specifications included non-innovative technical components, then they are reflected in the 
final ranking- This influence is especially strong for centers that produced only one ship 
during a given year.
This method of analysis results in a three-by-two contingency table with the market
share categories forming the rows and the innovative ability rankings the columns- The six
possible joint occurrences of the two variables are:
Low/Low - Low market share and low innovative ability
Low/High - Low market share and high innovative ability
Medium/Low - Medium market share and low innovative ability
Medium/High - Medium market share and low innovative ability
High/Low - High market share and low innovative ability
High/High - High market share and high innovative ability
There are four contingency tables and four sets of association which reflect the sub­
division o f the study period into four separate shipbuilding cycles.
1.3. Analytical Procedure
The analysis of the tables is conducted in the following manner. First, the test for 
association is carried out. The null hypothesis for each test is that no relationship exists 
between the two variables and that market share and innovative ability are not associated, 
hi the event of an in significant chi-square statistic, the null hypothesis is accepted. In the 
event of a significant chi-square, the alternative hypothesis of an association between 
market share and innovative ability is accepted.
If the chi-square statistic is significant, the strength and direction of the association 
is measured. Since the contingency table is rectangular, rather than square, this is 
accomplished using Kendall's Tau-c measure of association. Tau-c, and other measures of
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association between two ordinal-level variables makes possible a check of every possible 
pair o f cases in the table to determine if their relative ordering on the first variable is the 
same (concordant) or if the ordering is reversed (discordant). If a preponderance o f the 
cases are ordered in the same direction on both variables, then the final statistic will be 
positive and the association is positive. If not, then the final value of the test statistic is 
negative and the association is negative. The Tau-c statistic is interpreted in a manner 
similar to a correlation coefficient, with values ranging from a negative one (-1). indicating 
a perfect negative association, to a positive one (+1) indicating perfect positive correlation 
(Hettmansperger, 1984).
The final step, employed only if the chi-square statistic is significant, is to identify 
which of the six possible categories in the contingency table were the most influential to 
the association and why. This is accomplished by assessing the relative contribution o f the 
individual table cells to the absolute value of the chi-square statistic. If  one or more table 
categories made a higher relative contribution than the other table categories, then those 
categories are examined in more detail to identify the characteristic or characteristics of 
those shipbuilding center / year combinations which might make them more influential 
than the other possible combinations.
2. THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INNOVATION AND PLACE
With the analytical framework established, a report on the actual association 
between innovation and place can precede. The test is conducted for each shipbuilding 
cycle in succession. The discussion for each cycle is organized in the following manner. 
First, the variables'joint occurrence is presented and discussed through a table that
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provides regional breakdowns for the six categories and supported by a map that identifies 
individual shipbuilding centers and their performance during the last year in the cycle.
Next, the results o f  the contingency table test are presented. If no association exists, the 
discussion must end at that point. If there is an association, its strength and direction are 
assessed and the influential categories across rows and columns are identified and 
discussed.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first cycle represents the innovation phase of Vernon's Product Life Cycle. 
During this phase, production tends to be concentrated in a relatively few locations. That 
this concentration occurred in the shipbuilding industry is demonstrated by the number of 
shipbuilding center / year frequencies in the medium and high market share categories on 
the Clyde (Table VUI-1). However, this concentration was not necessarily due to the 
region's greater innovative ability. Granted that the innovative ability measure consists of 
only one variable (ship power), there were just as many center / year frequencies 
appearing in the two low innovation categories as were found in the high innovation 
categories. There does appear to be a positive relationship between innovative ability and 
market share for the North East Coast, Thames, and Mersey shipbuilding regions, 
however, where more frequencies occur in the high and medium share categories. A 
similar pattern does not exist for the other regions.
For the purposes o f illustration, Figure VH3-1 locates the shipbuilding centers and 
their performance in the six categories during the year 1855, the last year in the cycle.
Only four categories are represented. The highest category, high market share and high
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innovative ability, is dominated by the Clyde, with all four of its centers in this category, as 
well as the two Shields on the North East Coast and Aberdeen on the Scottish East Coast. 
The medium share/high innovative ability category is made up o f Newcastle and Stockton 
on the North East Coast, Liverpool and Chester on the Mersey, and Hull (Humber) and 
Cork (Ireland). Four centers, including London, are in the low share/high innovative 
ability category, while Preston on the Irish Sea is the only center in the low share/low 
innovative ability category. Based on the map, and recognizing the exception of London, 
there does appear to have been a relationship between market share and innovative ability 
in 1855.
Table Vm-1: Regional Contingency Table Categories 















Clyde I 1 5 6 9 8 30
N. E. Coast 3 5 1 4 1 3 17
Thames 0 1 I 2 1 2 7
Mersey I 2 I 3 0 0 7
Ireland 2 0 3 1 I 0 7
Humber 0 0 0 2 2 1 5
Severn 3 1 0 1 0 0 5
S. E. Coast 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
Irish Sea 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 11 11 12 19 14 15 82
Percent Total 13.4 15.9 14.6 23.2 14.6 18.3 100
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Figure VIII-1: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1855
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Despite the apparent positive association between market share and innovative 
ability, the chi-square contingency table test resulted in a non-significant chi-square 
statistic. The table and test statistics are presented in Table VDI-2. Based on the results 
of this test (x2 -  .33, df = 2, p = .847), the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between market share and innovative ability is accepted.
Table VDI-2: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results 
Cycle 1: 1843 - 1855
Market Share
Innovative Ability Low Medium High Total
Low Observed 11 12 12 35
Expected 10.2 13.2 11.5
High Observed 13 19 15 47
Expected 13.8 17.8 15.5
Total 24 31 27 82
X2 = .33 df== 2 p = .847
Obviously, the first cycle was a period of high innovation: after all, the first trans­
oceanic iron steamship had been introduced only three years before. Three possible 
reasons for this lack of association can be identified. The first, o f course, is that a model 
based on only two available variables from the Register is not powerful enough to capture 
technological change. There were only two independent variables used to specify the 
regression model and, as discussed earlier, its explanatory power is low. Second, but 
related to the first reason, innovation was going on at such a high rate that the single
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variable used to construct the innovation index, ship power, does not capture the full 
range of innovations that were actually of significance during the period. Finally, the 
reason could lie in the fact that there simply was not that strong an association between 
market share and innovative ability, so that the Clyde's dominance of market share can be 
explained in terms of its initial and locational advantages: its pioneering role in iron and 
steam shipbuilding and its established linkages to the iron and machinery industries and 
ship markets.
2.2. Cycle 2
The industry had clearly entered the growth phase o f the Product Life Cycle during 
the second cycle (1856-1865). As established earlier, the Clyde was again the dominant 
region, but the North East Coast experienced significant growth as did, but to a lesser 
extent, the Scottish East Coast, Ireland, Thames, and Humber regions. From an 
examination of Table VIII-3, it does not appear that the market share of any of the regions 
is associated with innovative ability. On the Clyde, the majority of frequencies occur in 
the low innovative ability categories. With the exception of the North East Coast, all the 
other regions are characterized by the joint occurrence of low to medium market share and 
low innovative ability. Although twice as many of the North East Coast's high share 
center / year combinations were in the high innovative category, the highest proportion of 
its frequencies was in the medium market share / high innovation category.
Figure VHI-2 maps the variables'joint occurrence for all centers that were in 
production in 1865; it shows that the majority of these centers fell into the medium market 
share / high innovative ability and low market share / high innovative ability categories.
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Clyde 10 4 8 4 11 8 45
N. E. Coast I 4 3 10 6 3 27
S. E. Coast 3 2 5 j 0 0 13
Ireland 0 2 1 2 4 3 12
Thames 2 0 3 1 1 1 8
Humber 3 0 2 1 1 0 7
Mersey 2 1 0 0 1 0 4
Severn 0 1 2 0 0 0 3
Irish Sea 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total 23 14 24 21 24 15 121
Percent Total 19.0 18.2 21.5 11.6 17.4 12.4 100
Although all six categories are represented by the fifteen centers, only Newcastle on the 
North East Coast and Dumbarton on the Clyde placed in the high share / high innovative 
ability category, while four centers (two on the North East Coast, and two on the Humber 
and Thames) were in the medium share / high innovative ability category. Four centers 
were in the low share / high innovative ability category. The remaining five centers fell 
into either one of the three market share / low innovative ability categories. The majority 
o f the centers on the Clyde were in the low innovation category, with Glasgow and 
Greenock in the high share / low innovation category and Port Glasgow in the medium 
share / low innovation category.
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Figure VIII-2: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1865
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Once again, and despite an apparent negative association between market share 
and innovative ability, the chi-square contingency table test resulted in a non-significant 
chi-square statistic (Table VIII-4). The test resulted in a x  statistic of .33 (df = 2, p = 
.847), so that the null hypothesis of no association between the two variables is accepted. 
The possible explanations for the lack o f association are the same as those given for the 
first cycle.
Table VDI-4: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results: 
Cycle 2: 1856 - 1865
Market Share
Innovative Ability Low Medium High Total
Low Observed 23 22 26 71
Expected 21.7 25.2 24.1
High Observed 14 21 15 50
Expected 15.3 17.8 16.9
Total 37 43 41 121
X2= 1-57 df =  2 p =.457
2.3. Cycle 3
The Clyde was again Britain's dominant shipbuilding region during the 1866-1872 
period as the industry remained in the Product Life Cycle's growth stage. The second and 
third largest regions were the North East Coast and, after a significant drop-off the 
Scottish East Coast (Table VDI-5). The distribution of categories on the Clyde is 
characterized by the number o f shipbuilding center / year combinations at the two 
extremes: twelve frequencies in the high share / high innovative ability category; nine in
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the low share /' low innovation category; and the remaining frequencies distributed among 
the other four categories. The North East Coast shows a better distribution among all 
categories, but the six frequencies in the low share / low innovative ability category stand 
out. Of the remaining regions, the Scottish East Coast, Thames, and Humber are the only 
other regions represented in the high share / high innovative ability category.
Nevertheless, these regions are all characterized by the absolute number of frequencies in 
the low share / low innovative ability category. These results suggest a negative 
association between market share and innovative ability.














Clyde 9 2 4 1 8 12 36
N. E. Coast 6 1 7 8 7 5 34
S. E. Coast 2 2 5 4 0 I 14
Thames 2 0 2 1 0 1 6
Mersey 2 0 I 2 0 0 5
Severn 3 0 1 0 0 0 4
Humber 1 0 I 0 0 1 3
Ireland 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
Solent 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Total 28 6 21 17 15 20 107
Percent Total 26.2 5.6 19.6 15.9 14.0 18.7 100
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The map of 1872 shipbuilding centers (Figure VTH-3) shows that, for this year at 
least, high and medium share centers were the most innovative. Eleven of the nineteen 
total centers were in these two categories. Five centers were in the highest category (two 
from the Clyde and three from the North East Coast), while six centers were in the 
medium share / high innovative ability categories (one Clyde, three North East Coast, and 
one each from the Mersey and Thames). The two remaining Clyde centers were in the 
high and medium share / low innovative ability categories, while the two remaining North 
East Coast centers were in the lowest category. Both centers on the Scottish East Coast 
and Southwick, on the Solent, were in the low share / high innovative ability category, 
while the final low share / low innovative ability center is at Northam on the Severn.
Unlike the previous two cycles, a significant association between market share and 
innovative ability was identified. The existence o f this association is indicated by the 
significant chi-square statistic (x2 = 1169, df = 2, p = .003). The contingency table and 
test results are given in Table VTH-6.
In addition to the information presented in the previous contingency tables, two 
further pieces of information are included in this and the following table. The first is 
Kendall's Tau-c statistic, a measure o f the strength of the association and its direction.
The second addition is the reporting of the relative contribution of each individual cell to 
the overall chi-square statistic to identify the most important categories in explaining the 
association.
Based on the Tau-c statistic, a positive association was identified, albeit moderate 
to weak, across categories (zc = .344; p = .0003). This indicates that there was a positive
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Figure VEI-3: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1872
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relationship between a center's market share and its innovative ability. Bearing in mind its 
low value, the statistic indicates that centers that ranked high on the innovative index were 
also ranked highly on market share, while centers that were low on the innovative index 
were also low in terms of market share. Therefore, the Tau-c statistic confirms the 
implicit assumption that innovative shipbuilding centers enjoyed a competitive advantage 
over non-innovative shipbuilding centers.
Table Vm-6: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results:
Cycle 3: 1866 - 1872
Market Share
Innovative Ability Low Medium High Total
Low Observed 28 21 15 64
Expected 20.3 22.7 20.9
Contribution to
Total x2 25 1 14
High Observed 6 17 20 43
Expected 13.7 15.3 14.1
Contribution to
Total x2 37 2 21
Total 34 38 35 107
X2 = 11.69; df = 2; p = .003 Kendall's Tau c = .344; p =.0003
The reasons that the association first appears in the third shipbuilding cycle are 
probably twofold. The first is statistical: the independent variables in the multiple 
regression model, which were used to develop the innovation index, were much more 
powerful in explaining increasing ship size than those in the previous model This results 
in a much better representation of the changes in the individual technological components
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incorporated in these ships. The second probable reason is that the shipbuilding industry 
had become more competitive: initial advantages, especially for the Clyde, were eroding 
and shipbuilders were building more efficient, and so more innovative, ships to attract 
ship owning customers.
An examination of the differences between the observed and expected frequencies 
for the individual categories reveals important information about the relationship between 
market share and innovative ability. The table shows that there was no difference between 
observed and expected frequencies in either the two medium share categories, indicating 
that there was no association between market share and innovative ability for these 
combinations. Conversely, the high share / high innovation categories performed better 
than would be expected, while the low share high innovation categories did not perform as 
well. This demonstrates that, for the high share centers, innovative centers received more 
orders for ships than could be expected were there no relationship between innovation and 
place.
However, the performance of the two low share frequencies are the most 
interesting in that they contribute the largest amount to the absolute value o f the chi- 
square statistic: 39 percent for the low market share / low innovative ability category and 
25 percent for the high market share / high innovative ability category. This is larger than 
that for the high share / high innovative ability category's 21 percent. This is because these 
two categories had the highest and lowest number of frequencies, respectively, of the six 
classes. In addition, these categories combined contribution to total chi-square was 
enough to produce a significant statistic.
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2.4. Cycle 4
The North East Coast surpassed the Clyde as Britain's largest shipbuilding region 
during the 1873-1880 period as the industry entered the standardization phase of the 
Product Life Cycle. This region was characterized during the fourth cycle by a pattern 
where each high share category had twice as many frequencies as the corresponding low 
share frequency (Table VIII-7). Based on this observation, it appears that there was a 
strong relationship between innovation and economic viability in this region. The Clyde 
was again characterized by the low share/low innovative ability and high share / high 
innovative ability category extremes. The most notable change for this region from the 
third cycle was the increase in the number of frequencies in the two medium share 
categories, suggesting that perhaps output was becoming more equally distributed among 
the region's centers. Only two other regions, the Irish Sea and Ireland, were represented 
in the high market share / high innovative ability category. Most centers on the Scottish 
East Coast were in the low share / low innovative category, and the majority of centers in 
the remaining regions were in either the low share / low innovation or medium share / high 
innovation categories.
The sixteen centers that were in production at the end of the study period are 
shown in Figure VTH-4. The majority of these centers, fourteen out o f sixteen, were 
assigned the high innovation category across the three market share ranks. The exceptions 
were Greenock and Paisley on the Clyde, which were medium share / low innovation and 
low share / low innovation centers. Five of the six North East Coast centers were in either 
the high share / high innovation (3) or medium share / high innovation categories (3),
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while the number of centers on the Clyde in these same categories were two and one.
Both centers on the Scottish East Coast were in the low share / high innovation category. 
This is also true for Renfrew, the last Clyde center. Both Belfast in Ireland and Liverpool 
on the Mersey were in the medium market share / high innovative ability category.















N. E. Coast 2 4 6 12 9 18 51
Clyde 5 2 6 7 4 10 34
S. E. Coast 8 J 1 0 0 14
Irish Sea 3 1 0 3 0 1 8
Mersey 1 1 2 2 0 0 6
Thames 2 1 0 1 0 0 4
Ireland 0 0 0 2 0 1 3
Solent 2 0 0 1 0 0 *>
Humber 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
Severn 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total 25 13 17 29 13 30 127
Percent Total 19.7 10.2 13.4 22.8 10.2 23.6 100
The chi-square test again indicates that there was an association between market 
share and innovative ability. The contingency table and related statistics are given in Table 
VTTT-R The chi-square statistic is significant (%2 = 11-57, df = 2, p = .003), and the
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Figure Vm-4: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1880
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Kendall's Tau c statistic again shows a positive association between market share and 
innovative ability ( r e = .302; p = .001).
Table VTH-8: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results:
Cycle 4: 1873 - 1880
Market Share
Innovative Ability Low Medium High Total
Low Observed 25 17 13 55
Expected 16.5 19.9 18.6
Contribution to
Total x2 38 4 15
High Observed 13 29 30 72
Expected 21.5 26.1 24.4
Contribution to
Total x2 29 3 11
Total 38 46 43 127
X2 = 11-57; df = 2; p = .003 Kendall's Tau c = .302; p = 001
A comparison of observed and expected frequencies and individual categoiy 
contribution to total chi-square reveals the same pattern as in the previous cycle. The 
medium market share categories were again little different that expected. Frequencies in 
the high share / high innovative category were greater than expected and the high share / 
low innovative category frequencies were less than expected. However, these differences 
between the high share categories was not as great as in the third cycle.
Once again, the differences between the observed and expected frequencies for the 
low market share categories are the most important in accounting for the statistical 
association between innovative ability and industrial viability. Frequencies for the low
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innovation centers were fifty-two percent greater than expected, while frequencies for the 
high innovation centers were forty percent less than expected. And again, their combined 
contribution to total chi-square was enough to produce a significant statistic.
2.5. High and Low M arket Share Comparison
The chi-square contingency table test analysis revealed a positive association 
between industrial viability and innovative during the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles 
only. However, the Tau-c statistic reveals that the positive associations were only weak 
to moderate. Further, the most important categories in accounting for this association 
between industrial viability and innovative ability were the two low market share 
categories and that the high market share categories made only a marginal contribution. 
This suggests that innovative ability, while important, was not a precondition for industrial 
viability during the last two shipbuilding cycles.
The results o f the chi-square analysis, especially the performance of the low 
market share categories, run counter to implicit assumptions regarding the importance of 
innovation to a production center's industrial viability. Therefore, this section examines 
the low share and high share categories in greater detail. This is accomplished by 
comparing the mean values for the innovative index variables and shipbuilding output for 
the four categories against the values for all centers during the respective cycle and against 
each other.
The analysis begins with the third shipbuilding cycle. The innovative index 
variables, as identified in Chapter VI, are Ship Power (in terms of net tons), and the 
Net: Gross and Length-to-Beam ratios. The output data are the number and the average
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size, in gross tons, o f ships built at each shipbuilding center / year combination. 
Comparisons of these data are presented in Table VIII-9.
Table VIII-9: Comparison of Mean Innovation Index Values and Shipbuilding 














Ship Power3 2.85 5.85 4.07 4.06 4.67 Ship Power4
Length to 
Beamb
5.87 7.39 6.96 7 7.87 Length to 
Beam b
Net; Gross' 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.65 Net; Gross'
Mean Tons 193.15 832.67 748.59 799.37 1463.66 Mean Tons
Number Built 1.21 1 2.75 5.73 4.5 Number Built
Total
Frequency 28 6 107 15 20
Total
Frequency
1 Low S hare /L o w  Innovative Ability 
1 Low  Share /  High innovative A bility 
1 High Share /  Low Innovative Ability 
4 H ig i  Share /  H igh Innovative A bility
• ne t tons /  engine horsepower 
b A ip  length /  width 
'  net tons /  gross tons
As the table demonstrates, the low market share / low innovative combinations and 
the high share / high innovative combinations represented the two extremes of the British 
shipbuilding industry. On one hand, there were a relatively large number o f combinations 
producing ships that were much smaller and technologically inferior to those produced in 
the high share / high innovative ability combinations. However, the latter category 
dominated shipbuilding output because o f the large size (and number) of ships they 
produced in any given year. The only similarity between the other two combinations was
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that they produced ships of approximately the same size, with the low share / high 
innovative combinations performing no differently or better than the high share / high 
innovative combinations. The fact that there were only six of these combinations indicates 
that they were not representative of the larger industry and, perhaps, represent years in 
which was down for some reason.
Differences between the two low share categories become more apparent when 
differences in output are examined. Shipbuilding centers in both low market share 
categories produced ships that were smaller than the industry average but, still, the ships 
built at low innovation centers were much smaller (193 versus 833 gross tons). In terms 
o f the number o f ships produced, none o f the high innovation centers produced more than 
one ship per year while the low innovation centers averaged 1.2 ships per year. The fact 
that the low innovation centers were characterized by the production of multiple ships per 
year that were much smaller than average suggests that these centers occupied a distinct 
market niche specializing in small, technologically backward ships. This is a significant 
finding that will be discussed later in this chapter. The low number o f ships produced at 
the Low market share / high innovative ability centers reinforces the supposition that these 
centers experienced off years in terms o f output.
Table VHI-10 presents the same comparisons for the fourth shipbuilding cycle.
The variables incorporated in the innovative ability index for this cycle increased to five, 
the additional variables being rated Boiler Pressure and the Cylinder Vohune:Net Tonnage 
ratio (Vohune:Net in the table). The output variables are the same as those used in the 
previous discussion.
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Table VUI-10: Comparison of Mean Innovation Index Values and Shipbuilding 














Ship Power4 3.45 6.11 5.12 4.99 5.60 Ship Power4
Length tob 
Beam
659 7.46 7.47 7.42 7.93 Length to 
Beamb
Net: Gross' 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.63 .65 Net: Gross'
Pressured 66.30 74.46 70.41 67.43 72.49 Pressure d
VoIume:Net * 2527.46 1959.90 2129.00 2079.20 2003.69 Volume:Net'
Mean Tons 377.19 1161.17 1177.20 1054.21 1721.09 Mean Tons
Number Built 1.48 1.31 4.94 7.92 10.83 Number Built
Total
Frequency 25 13 127 13 30
Total
Frequency
'  Low Share /  Low Innovative Ability 
1 Low S tare  /  High Innovative Ability 
’ High Share /  Low Innovative Ability 
4 High Share /  High Innovative Ability
* net tons /  engine horsepower 
b ship length /  width
c net tons /  gross tan s 
d rated boiler pressure
* engine cylinder volum e /  net tons
The table again shows the extent of the disparities between the low share / low 
innovative and high share / high innovation shipbuilding center / year combinations. The 
low share / low innovation combinations were still characterized by the small size of the 
average ship (although average ship size almost doubled) and their poor technological 
performance relative to not only the high innovative combinations, but in fact to all ships. 
The absolute number of high share / high innovation combinations increased by fifty 
percent between this and the third cycle, reflecting the dominant position, in terms of 
output, of a relatively few centers as established in Chapter VI. The only point to be
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combinations compared in the innovation index variables relative to the high share / high 
innovative combinations. Rather than representing centers that experienced off years in 
production as in the previous cycle, by the fourth cycle these low market share centers 
appear to represent shipbuilding centers that were not rewarded, at least in terms of 
increased orders, for their ability to build innovative ships.
The results of this comparison reveals a very distinct dichotomy within the British 
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. At one extreme were the large shipbuilding centers, 
located primarily in the North East Coast and Clyde regions, that dominated the British 
shipbuilding industry. The success of these centers, based on the historical interpretations 
and an examination of the contingency tables (but not from the results of the statistical 
test), would appear to owe their success as much to their access to factor inputs and major 
ship markets as to their innovative ability.
At the other extreme were small centers, many but not all located in smaller 
shipbuilding regions. These centers occupied a very minor but distinct market niche, 
specializing in small, "technologically backward" iron steamships. Based on an 
examination o f the ships produced at these low share / low innovation centers, it is safe to 
say that they specialized in small coastal trading steamers. According to Waine (1976), 
much o f the coasting trade at the smaller ports was conducted by local shipowners. Ships 
built at these centers during both cycles were much smaller than average, allowing them to 
use small, remote ports. Their small length-to-beam ratios, constrained because of their
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length, would also allow them maintain their stability during adverse sailing conditions in 
deep water.
Based on these observations, it should not be surprising to find shipbuilding 
centers specializing in the production of these technologically lagging ships to fit the 
requirements of small, local shipowners in peripheral ports. This would account for the 
low innovative centers that specialized in these ships, as well as for the existence of low 
market share / low innovative centers in the minor shipbuilding regions. Specializing 
centers were located on the Clyde (Bowling and Paisley) and the Scottish East Coast 
(Dundee and Montrose) and on the North East Coast (North Shields and South Shields), 
as well as at Liverpool on the Mersey during the third cycle and at London on the Thames  
during the fourth. In addition, the output at centers located in the minor regions was 
heavily concentrated in small, technologically lagging ships.
Since the small coastal steamers were built for shipowners in localized coasting 
trades, it is possible that the technological backwardness of these ships was due to the 
indifference of shipowners to the technological changes occurring in the larger 
shipbuilding and ship owning industries. These owners, and shipbuilders, could have been 
more conservative, preferring established and safer technologies, so that they tended to 
forgo improved propulsion systems in favor of established systems as indicated by then- 
poor performance in the NetrGross, Cylinder VolumerNet Tons, and Boiler Pressure 
variables. Ships that incorporated these improved technologies could also have been more 
expensive relative to the older technologies, and the smaller shipowner may not have felt 
the extra cost justified their use. It could also be that the coastal steamer market, because
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of its small share of the total market, was not large enough to warrant the same level of 
innovative activity as that for larger ships.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents tests of the presence of an association between market share 
and innovative ability. This was accomplished using the chi-square contingency table 
procedure for each shipbuilding cycle in order to test for the association of and to assess 
the relationship between market share and innovative ability. The results of this analysis 
reveal an association between industrial viability and innovative ability during the third and 
fourth shipbuilding cycles only. It further reveals that although the associations are 
moderately to weakly positive, it appears that, in general, the higher a center's innovative 
ability then the higher its market share.
At the same time, the analysis reveals that the most important contributors to this 
association are the two low market share categories and that the contribution o f the high 
share categories was secondary. This finding runs counter to implicit assumptions in the 
literature which link innovation to the industrial viability o f the production center. Of 
centers in the two low share categories, the most interesting were those centers that were 
able to remain economically viable despite the fact that the ships they produced were, in 
relative terms, technologically backward. These centers, the evidence suggests, 
specialized in the production of small coastal steamers; in which case the shipowners for 
whom these ships were built may have been indifferent to technological change and the 
shipbuilders in these centers held too small a market share to warrant the levels o f 
innovative activity evident in the larger markets.
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CHAPTER IX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Transformations of the industrial landscape, especially in the world's industrialized 
countries, has heightened interest in the impacts of technological change on the economic 
viability of industrial centers and regions. This interest has manifested itself in an increase 
in the number of studies that investigate the interaction between technological change, 
economic competitiveness, and the economic viability of industrial regions and individual 
production centers. The one feature common to these studies is their implicit assumption 
that a direct and positive relationship exists between innovative ability and industrial 
viability: that the more innovative a place, then the greater its economic competitiveness.
Unfortunately, the field of economic geography has not explicitly examined 
technological change in detail and then attempted to relate those changes back to the 
individual firms within the industrial system. Two reasons for this failure can be identified. 
First, the majority of these studies either assume that one industry is more innovative than 
others or they rely on proxy measures, such as employment growth or the number of 
patents issued, to identify innovative industries. Second, theoretical constructs within the 
discipline of geography do not allow for the analysis of the interaction between large scale 
economic spatial systems and their individual spatial components. The result is that actual 
technological change and the full extent of its impacts are not explicitly incorporated into 
the examination of technologically-induced spatial change.
216
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The over-riding purpose of this dissertation has been to address this neglect.
Using real data for an industry which seems to fit the Product Life Cycle during the years 
in question, it has measured technological change and then related those changes back to 
the spatial industrial restructuring process. This was accomplished through a case study of 
the 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry. This industry introduced and 
perfected the ocean-going iron screw steamship and experienced a profound spatial 
reorientation in the process while accounting for remarkable growth in related measures 
such as employment, productivity, and profitability.
1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The methodological framework developed for this study offers an analytical 
procedure to assess the interaction between technological change and the economic 
viability of individual production centers within larger spatial industrial systems.
Measuring technological change and its linkages to the performance of individual centers 
within an industrial system, however, create serious problems for researchers. These 
problems require a multi-stage methodology that establishes and locates technological 
changes and then subsequently relates those changes back to a center's industrial viability.
Any geographical study of technological change and spatial industrial change 
requires the development of two key site- and temporally-specific variables that measure 
industrial viability and innovative ability. Industrial viability, regardless of the measure 
used, represents a center's growth or stability within the larger related industrial system, 
while innovative ability is a locationally specific attribute which reflects the proclivity of 
any particular place for initiating or rapidly adopting technological change. The
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generation of legitimate measures for these two variables allow for the assessment of the 
performance of any production center within the larger industrial system for any year in 
which the firms within the region were in operation.
1.1. Industrial Viability
The industrial viability index is based on each center's annual market share. This 
study utilized total national shipbuilding output reported in the Lloyds Register o f British 
and Foreign Shipping. Since the vast majority of ships built during the study period were 
ordered directly by shipowners and were not built on speculation, a shipbuilding enter’s 
annual share of national output can legitimately be viewed as a measure of its market 
share. As a result, the market share index was constructed by dividing each center’s 
annual output of ships registered with Lloyds by all ships built and registered during that 
given year. Each center’s market share was then classified and assigned to one of three 
relative categorical ranks—high, medium, or low—based on their proportions o f the 
production scale for each and every year.
1.2. Innovative Ability
The corresponding innovative ability index was constructed from actual iron 
steamship measurements also obtained from the Register. Important technological 
changes were identified from the historical literature on the nineteenth century British 
shipbuilding industry. Technical measurements obtained from the Lloyds Register were 
then used to construct variables that measured these technological changes. At the same 
time, the 1840-1880 study period was sub-divided into four shipbuilding cycles that also 
correspond to industrial innovation cycles first described by Kuznets (1930).
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Once the technical variables were identified, a series of multiple regression models, 
one for each cycle, were used to identify those variables that made statistically significant 
contributions to explaining the increasing size of iron steamships. In a sense, this tested 
the qualitative assumptions reflected in the work of previous scholarship. Those variables 
which were identified as significant were then used to construct a series o f  innovation 
indices that scored each ship based on its component technologies. These indices were 
collapsed into a simple measure of innovative ability which could be ranked for each 
shipbuilding center and for each year it produced at least one ship. A center with a mean 
innovation index for a given year that was greater than the mean index value for the entire 
cycle was considered, technologically, to be a leader and assigned to the high category. A 
technological laggard, conversely, was one whose mean innovative index score was below 
the cycle mean. These centers were assigned to the low category.
1.3. Testing For The Relationship Between Industrial Viability and Innovative 
Ability
Once the two site-specific variables were constructed, the relationship between 
innovation and place was conducted. This was accomplished using a series of chi-square 
contingency table tests to assess the relationship between industrial viability and innovative 
ability. The three market share categories were combined with the two innovative ability 
categories to produce a three-by-two contingency table. The analysis was conducted by 
first testing for the existence of an association between the six categories in the table.
Next, Kendall's Tau-c statistic was used to measure the association between the categories 
and the direction o f that association. Finally, the relative contribution of each category to
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the total chi-square statistic was used to identify important categories for further and more 
detailed analysis.
2. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
The analytical framework employed in this research provided a procedure for 
assessing the relationship between innovation and place. At the same time, it allowed for 
an investigation into one o f if not the, most important industries that keyed Britain's 
nineteenth century dominance of the world economy. The findings of this analysis provide 
important insights into key aspects o f technological change. These insights apply not only 
to the nineteenth century British shipbuilding industry, but to contemporary issues related 
to industrial restructuring as well The most significant of these findings are discussed in 
the following section.
2.1. Cycles
The first of the findings discussed concerns the identification of separate sub-cycles 
within the larger 1840-1880 technological change cycle. British shipbuilding output 
during the 1840-1880 study period consisted of four separate and distinct shipbuilding 
cycles. These cycles are characterized by alternating periods of rising output followed by 
market saturation and glut. As their correspondence to cyclical fluctuations in interest 
rates demonstrated, these cycles fit within larger British economic cycles, referred to in 
Britain as trade cycles and which are analogous to the industrial cycles first identified by 
Kuznets (1930). The existence of these cycles confirm the observations of shipbuilding 
historians and researchers o f the contemporary industry regarding the volatility in output 
associated with this industry.
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More importantly in regard to the process o f technological change, however, is the 
way in which major shipbuilding innovations fit within these cycles. As important ship 
component innovations were identified and dated from the historical literature, this study 
revealed that important innovations were introduced at either the beginning or end of each 
shipbuilding output cycle and that the innovation was not fiilly incorporated until the 
following cycle. The existence of these innovation cycles demonstrates that the innovation 
process was clearly not continuous, but was accomplished through net gains from one 
cycle to the next. Further, the performance of the technical indicators revealed that their 
changes tracked those for shipbuilding output, indicating that the innovation process was 
related to periods of economic expansion and depression within the shipbuilding and 
shipping industries. This strongly indicates that innovations introduced in one sub-cycle 
were not fiilly exploited in commercial terms until the following sub-cycle. This particular 
finding offers concrete evidence and support for similar arguments made by Schumpeter 
(1939 and 1950) and Hyde (1977).
2.2. Technological Change Models
Perhaps the most satisfying, and certainly the most challenging, aspect of this 
research was the identification of the variables required to construct the innovative ability 
index. As should be clear by now, one of this study's primary goals has been to directly 
incorporate changing technology into economic geographic research. To accomplish this 
required extensive reading in the historical and economic historical literature to identify 
and date important innovations. It also required a full summer in Scotland developing and 
compiling  the required database.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
The measure of innovative ability was constructed from variables identified by 
multiple regression analysis. This technique allowed for the testing of hypotheses about 
the contributions o f individual iron construction and steam propulsion innovations 
identified in the literature using actual technical measurements available in the Lloyds 
Register. The Register is not an exhaustive source for all the measurements needed to 
assess the technical components of the iron steamship and their change through time, nor 
is it realistic to expect it to be such a source of data given the very different goals 
associated with its creation and continuation as a resource. However, the sub-division of 
the study period into four distinct technological change cycles and the use o f the two stage 
model specification approach resulted in sets of technical measurements that were 
statistically proven to be theoretically correct and significant. For the last two cycles, 
these variables were proven to be very powerful in explaining increasing ship size.
This approach provides valuable insights into the underlying rationale behind iron 
steamship technological change. Specifically, it reveals the economic considerations of 
shipowners which, in turn, guided shipbuilders' technological concerns in ship design and 
construction. These insights are provided by the behavior o f the register tonnage 
measurements for both absolute size (gross tonnage) and cargo-carrying capacity (net 
tonnage).
hi the model for the 1856-1865 shipbuilding cycle, the highest amount of 
explanatory power was obtained using net tonnage as the dependent variable and net 
tonnage per unit o f horsepower for the independent variable Ship Power. Since net 
tonnage measures the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, the importance of this variable
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suggests that ships were being designed to maximize earning potential. This, after all. was 
the primary concern o f the shipping industry at this time.
By the 1866-1872 cycle, however, the dependent variable that maximized model 
explanatory power was gross tonnage: the ship's absolute volume. When we recall that 
this was the only cycle in which the variable Year was significant it strongly suggests that 
the period represents one of technological consolidation, that the pace of change had 
slowed. The innovation process continued, however, as indicated by introduction of the 
surface condenser and Scotch boiler during this period. These facts, plus the performance 
of net tonnage in deriving the variable for Ship Power, suggest that the innovation process 
was directed toward maintaining its cargo-carrying potential while maximizing engine 
power.
By the fourth cycle, when the variable Year was again significant, the dependent 
variable returned to net tonnage, or cargo-carrying capacity rather than absolute size.
This reversal strongly suggests a renewed emphasis on innovations that maximized earning 
potential and explicitly reflects the economic concerns of the shipping industry.
2.3. Regional Innovative Ability
The primary purpose of the innovative ability index, constructed from the 
statistically significant independent variables o f the multiple regression models, was to 
develop a variable to test for the association between market share and innovative ability. 
The index also serves another purpose. When the resulting regional innovative ability 
rankings are compared, they allow for the assessment of the accuracy of popularly held 
opinions about the relative technological sophistication of individual shipbuilding regions.
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Contrary' to the consensus of both contemporaries and shipbuilding historians 
(except for regional champions), the North East Coast compared very well to regions 
which are considered to be technologically superior. In fact, and again based on the 
rankings., this region can be characterized as the most innovative during the entire 1840- 
1880 study period. At the same time, the results indicated that the technological 
performance of the Clyde, considered to be the country's most innovative region, did not 
actually compare favorably to the North East Coast. At the least, if the Clyde was the 
most innovative region, then its technological contributions are not reflected in the 
technical measurements available from the Register. Nor do the Thames and Mersey 
regions, also considered highly innovative, compare favorably; the performance of the 
Mersey was mixed across cycles, while the Thames's innovative ability most certainly 
declined after the first cycle.
2.4. The Relationship Between Innovation and Place
The ultimate goal o f this dissertation was to test the assumption that there is a 
positive association between an individual production center's innovative ability and its 
ability to compete successfully within its larger industrial system. This assumption is 
implicit in most studies in the field of economic geography. To explore this issue, 
statistical tests for association between the two site-specific variables were conducted.
This determined whether or not a shipbuilding center was rewarded economically for its 
ability to produce technologically superior ships for each o f the four shipbuilding cycles 
within the larger study period.
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The results of these tests indicated that there was no association between market 
share and innovative ability during the first two periods, from 1840 to 1855, but that one 
did in fact exist during the two later periods covering the years 1856 to 1880. Since the 
first two periods were obviously ones of high innovative activity, two possible reasons for 
the lack o f an association can be identified.
The first reason for the lack of association is that the two models do not capture 
the actual innovations that were attracting orders for ships. These two cycles represent 
innovation periods during which the component technologies incorporated in the iron 
steamship were still evolving and during which innovative activity was occurring at a high 
rate. That this was indeed the case is suggested by the Register's failure to recognize the 
importance of many technical measurements until later in the study period. This lack of 
recognition results in a serious lack of data with which to construct the innovative ability 
index. Recall that the models for these two cycles included only two and three 
independent variables, respectively, and that their explanatory power was low.
The second possible reason could be that there simply was not that strong an 
association between market share and innovative ability. If this was the case, then initial 
and later locational advantages in terms o f factor inputs and access to ship and capital 
markets were more important to success than was innovative ability. Again recall that the 
variables used to construct the second cycle's innovation index were basically the same as 
those used for the third cycle, which produced a much more powerful model Therefore, 
data constraints do not necessarily account for the lack of a statistical association during 
the second cycle. This leads to the plausible conclusion that initial advantages were just
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as important (and perhaps more so), relative to innovative ability, for a center's industrial 
viability during the first two cycles. This is especially true when explaining the dominance 
of the Clyde, the region that in many ways pioneered the new ship and its component 
technologies. The importance of access to factor inputs during the second cycle is 
indicated by the continued dominance of the shipbuilding centers on the Clyde, despite 
their low innovative rankings, and the rapid rise of the North East Coast during the second 
cycle. Both o f these regions were located in new iron and machinery producing regions.
By the time of the last two cycles, 1866-1872 and 1873-1880. there is a clear and 
significant association between innovative ability and industrial viability. Further, there 
was a positive relationship, albeit moderate to weak, between the two. The reason for this 
shift, from no association to a positive association, is most likely due to the industry’s 
transition from the innovative or early growth stages o f the Product Life Cycle to full­
blown growth and the standardization stages o f the cycle.
During the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles, the iron steamship overtook the 
traditional wooden sailing ship to become the British merchant fleet's dominant cargo 
carrier. At the same time, the industry made the transition from the innovation (first 
shipbuilding cycle) stage to the growth (second and third shipbuilding cycles) and 
standardization stages (fourth shipbuilding cycle) o f the Product Life Cycle. Shipbuilders 
and shipowners, by now thoroughly familiar with the new ship, were more concerned with 
incorporating greater power and cargo-carrying efficiencies for ships designed for 
particular trade routes. Those centers best able to produce the ships required by their 
particular ship owning customers, or those centers that specialized in particular ship types,
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did indeed enjoy economic advantages over their less innovative competitors. This is the 
reason why the low market share shipbuilding centers were so important in contributing to 
the association revealed in the chi-square tests for the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles. 
Although innovative centers outperformed less innovative centers in the high market share 
categories, the statistical association was due to centers that had the smallest share of the 
market irrespective of their innovative ability.
2.5. Continued Viability of Low Innovation Centers
In addition to testing for an association and then measuring its strength and 
direction, the contingency tables provided a means for identifying those categories that 
made the greatest contribution to the overall strength of the identified association.
Analysis revealed that centers assigned to the low and high market share categories made 
the greatest contribution to the overall association. Further, the centers in low share 
categories, whether innovative or not, made the largest contribution to this relationship. 
Based on these results, the mean values for the innovative index variables and shipbuilding 
output were compared to explore differences and similarities between the four categories.
The subsequent analysis revealed a sharp dichotomy within the shipbuilding 
industry from 1840 to 1880. At one extreme were the large shipbuilding centers, located 
mostly in the North East Coast and Clyde regions, that dominated the British shipbuilding 
industry. Due to their relatively low contribution to the association, it can be speculated 
that these center's owed their success as much to their locational advantages, in terms of 
access to factor inputs and major ship markets, as to their innovative ability.
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At the other extreme were small centers, many of which were located in the small, 
peripheral shipbuilding regions. In truth, the ships built at these centers do not compare 
favorably with ships built at the major shipbuilding centers: they were much smaller and 
much less efficient. The obvious conclusion is that the British shipbuilding industry 
operated at two distinct levels: one specializing in larger, trans-oceanic cargo-carriers; the 
other specializing in the small steamers that carried the bulk o f the British seaboard trade. 
However, the centers that built these smaller, technologically conservative ships were just 
as numerous as the larger centers and often immediately adjacent to them, as witnessed by 
the proximity o f Renfrew and Paisley to Glasgow on the Clyde and the two Shields to 
Stockton on the North East Coast. The reasons for these ships' technological lag are 
probably due to either the indifference of their owners to the technological advances in the 
larger industry or, alternatively, that the market was either not large or lucrative enough to 
justify the same levels of innovative activity displayed in the larger ships.
This dichotomy can be seen today in the contemporary shipbuilding industry 
located on the US Gulf Coast. At one level are the large shipyards at coastal ports from 
Biloxi, Mississippi to New Orleans and further west. These shipyards produce large, 
ocean-going freighters, container ships, and off-shore oil rigs. At the same time, and at a 
distinctly smaller scale of operations, are the small yards on the region's rivers and bayous. 
These yards, often associated with ship repair and refitting facilities, produce towboats 
used in the inland and ocean-going barge fleets. These yards remain in operation precisely 
because the demand from local fleet owners is large enough to warrant the additional costs 
of assembling the needed raw materials and machinery while innovations are deemed
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unnecessary. While they are probably not as innovative as the larger yards, they are 
obviously viable as clearly proven by their continued presence.
3. CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH
This dissertation has examined the relationship between industrial viability and 
innovative ability in the 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry. This 
industry has provided an excellent opportunity to examine this relationship because of the 
importance which shipbuilding analysts and historians place on technological change in the 
industry's periodic spatial restructuring. In addition to the insights it provides into the 
spatial impacts of technological change on the British shipbuilding industry, the study also 
makes two major contributions to the fields of economic geography, historical geography, 
and economic history.
First, it presents an analytical framework that directly incorporates technological 
change into the examination of technologically-induced spatial change. Rather than simply 
examining the relationship between technological change and industrial regions using 
proxy measures, this study posits a possible approach for assessing the relationship 
between actual innovations and individual production centers—the place where innovations 
emerge and where spatial changes are most directly felt. Such an approach reconciles the 
broad macro-scale concerns of the new economic development theories with the place- 
specific focus of the more traditional regional scientists. This reconciliation would seem 
important because technological change is both initiated at and imposed upon individual 
production centers which compose the larger spatial industrial system. The development 
of two site-specific variables, industrial viability and innovative ability, allows for the
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assessment o f the interaction between the larger economic structure and the individual 
production center. Implicit in this research is the hope that others might build on these 
efforts to create measures more suitable for contemporary industries.
The benefits o f the analytical approach presented in this study are not confined to 
studies o f the contemporary industrial landscape, however. This is especially true for the 
fields o f historical geography and economic history. Historical geographical scholarship 
can be especially enriched by an analytical approach that recognizes the inter-relationship 
between the overall economic structure and the individual place. The same can be said for 
studies in economic history concerned with the individual firm. For both disciplines, 
understanding the full consequences of change requires the recognition that change is 
initiated at and imposed upon individual places and firms. At the same time, research by 
historical geographers and economic historians can often profit from the adoption of more 
rigorous analytical methods: as the North East Coast's performance on the innovative 
ability index revealed, subjective historical interpretations do not always bear up to 
objective analysis.
At a broader level, this study bridges the two fundamental theoretical constructs 
within the field of economic geography. At one level, it has placed technological change 
within the context of the larger industrial system and the economic forces that shape it, 
while retaining  a concern for place. While the two constructs are often presented as 
antithetical, this study demonstrates that they can be joined to offer a better understanding 
of the spatial impacts of technological change. The result is a more realistic analysis of the 
spatial restructuring process and a more effective analytical approach.
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